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NEUTRON BOMB DEBATE GOES ON

Paris LE POINT in French 2 Jun 80 pp 74-76

[Article by Dominique de Montvalon]

[Text] Should France produce and deploy the neutron bomb or not? Throughout this debate of the year, pending the decision that in the final analysis must be VCE's [Valerie Giscard d'Estaing], passions have seethed on the issue. They flared with a new intensity last Tuesday when the UDF [French Democratic Union] announced that for its part it is saying "Yes" to the neutron bomb.

Some, seeing behind the choice being presented by the Giscardians as a technical one an actual change in strategy that is Giscard's own, are saying, "France has until now rejected the notion of fighting a nuclear battle in Europe. With the neutron bomb, a reversal of this position is being prepared..." "Not at all," is the reply from centrist Deputy Jean-Marie Daillet, chairman of the UDF Committee on Defense. "We still adhere to the major axes of military policy originally defined by General de Gaulle. We are merely refusing to let slip through our fingers a new weapon that would be a useful addition to the French arsenal..."

A debate among casuists? Many Frenchmen probably think so. They can make neither heads nor tails of this quarrel among theoreticians who forget rather quickly, one might say, that in the eyes of the majority of their fellow citizens the atom--domestic or not, miniaturized or not--remains the supreme terror.

Nevertheless, the stakes in the debate are serious. Let us try therefore to get down to plain facts.

Since 1958, French military doctrine has undergone a few inflections, but its basis has not changed. It rests on two postulates.

First postulate: A nuclear weapon, whatever its nature, is not like other weapons, but is a death-dealing device that creates a hiatus between the conventional and the nuclear domains. Consequently, France has consistently refused to engage, minimally though it might be, in the building of a kind of "nuclear artillery" supposedly capable of providing effective support, if needed, to its conventional forces. Its tactical atomic arsenal--notably, the Ground Force's Pluton missile--has been placed under the sole authority of the head of state as the only person empowered to decide to use it if the need arises. Moreover, the function of this tactical atomic weapon has repeatedly and clearly been circumscribed: to provide the final warning (before escalation to the strategic nuclear level) to an enemy that threatens France's national territory or interests judged by the president of the republic to be vital to it. Should that warning not be heeded, the strategic arsenal--starting with nuclear-submarine-borne missiles--would come into play without awaiting further developments. This would mean, of course, that deterrence had failed.

Second postulate: It would be senseless for a country like France to set out to achieve a nuclear arsenal as complete as that of the two superpowers. Its objective must be solely to have at its disposal a nuclear arsenal capable of inflicting on a hypothetical aggressor such damage as would make an attack on France's vital interests not worth the price. Consequently and until now, France has intentionally not equipped itself with other than a limited tactical nuclear arsenal designed to persuade the enemy beyond any doubt of its determination to proceed rapidly to the use of its strategic arsenal in case of aggression against our country. France has for its part remained attached to the so-called "anti-cities" strategy; that is, that French strategic nuclear weapons would be aimed, in the event of a Soviet attack, for example, against Soviet cities (and not simply against Soviet troops), the only stakes, in France's view, large enough to cause the enemy to reconsider, and hence to stop his advance.

This is the elegant logical structure that the debate on the neutron bomb is now in the process of unsettling. It all started on the first of the year with a confidential remark made by Yvon Bourges during the traditional exchange of good wishes for the New Year with the journalists (see LE POINT No. 382). Oh! The defense minister did not say that France had decided to build the neutron bomb. He said France was not foreclosing its option to build it, and that if the order were given immediately to the French technicians they could have their first operational neutron bomb ready within 5 years, and probably in less than 3 years. Feelings rose very quickly to fever pitch. Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff General Mery lost no time in making it known that he personally was in favor of France building the neutron bomb. This line of thinking gladdened two men, of course. They are both 59 years of age and have known each other some 20 years. One--American physicist Samuel Cohen--is credited with being the "father" of the neutron bomb; the other--French Col Marc Geneste--is, in

France and in the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission], his most zealous disciple. For the last 15 years the two men have been preaching in the desert. As recently as 1978, when Jimmy Carter seemed on the point of reviving the neutron bomb project (buried by his predecessors), a formidable Soviet propaganda campaign stopped him in his tracks. As for France, she pretended not to hear at that point that, during the first 18 months of the 2-year "sabbatical" Samuel Cohen has just concluded at the home of his friend Geneste, not one time, according to Cohen, was he consulted or even so much as contacted. It was the publication in March of their argumentative book "Echec a la guerre" [Checkmate to War] (Editions Copernic) that helped break the wall of silence. The twosome staked their all on it. This time, they are being heard.

What are they saying? That there exists within reach of the French a nuclear weapon of a radically new type: A missile 10 times less powerful than the conventional atom bomb, that is, would suffice to destroy, once launched into the air, all human life (even though protected by the thick armor of a tank) within an area of 2 or 3 square kilometers. Another advantage, if one may call it that, of this enhanced-radiation weapon: It leaves equipment and environment practically intact. Furthermore--they assert--once its effects have passed, life can resume its normal course in the area with risk to anyone. This weapon would thus enable an army, while protecting itself underground, to stop an invader--in a somewhat pinpointed manner and without too much damage to neighboring populations or friendly forces.

The choice of the neutron bomb would--as can be seen--be laden with consequences: It could open the way to an extensive line of miniaturized nuclear weapons (which have, in France, some discreet but nonetheless dedicated advocates); the coming into being of this missile would in any case render commonplace the military atom. A crucial choice.

Addressing it are three schools of thought:

The first, that of the traditional Gaullists (vigorously represented at the recent symposium on military policy organized under the sponsorship of Michel Debre, on which the magazine PARADOXES publishes a complete report this week), refuses any deviation whatever from the classic doctrine. The most moderate among them--like Debre--reject the idea of any priority being accorded to the neutron bomb; the most hostile--like General Gallois--see in this choice a plain heresy committing the country to acceptance of a "battle" from which it could only emerge devastated and inevitably overrun by the enormous quantity of conventional and atomic forces the enemy could bring into action simultaneously.

Oversimplification of a doctrine that under de Gaulle was always characterized by a certain intended fuzziness is certainly to be avoided, but essentially, these Gaullists are inclined to cling to the strategy of "massive retaliation."

The second school, well represented in the centrist and Giscardian ranks, is diametrically opposed to the first: It does not recoil from the idea of a battle fought in Europe, with all it inevitably presupposes in regard to cooperation with our allies. And, since the tactical nuclear weapon is now treated in Soviet military manuals as a "battlefield" weapon, this school is not averse to taking a leaf from the Soviet Union's own book. The UDF report says, "In Europe, the principal theater of a potential confrontation, the idea of battle cannot be omitted from the total strategic concept..."

The third school is perhaps that of the "happy medium." In any case, its thinking is echoed in the Defense Ministry, in the Armed Forces General Staff and even in the Quai d'Orsay. These are therefore good reasons to imagine that Giscard's thinking may not be far removed. This school says it does not want to change the classic strategic scheme: rejection of the notion of battle, rejection of any confusion between atomic weapons and conventional ones, tactical atomic weapons designed as a final warning, and nothing else. But, they say, an effective "warning," that is, one that is sure to be well understood, cannot be a mere (atomic) flick; we must be able "to hit hard and with telling effect." With the neutron bomb, France would have the means not to stop an enemy but at least to hurt him badly. It would indeed reinforce a strategic arsenal that is no longer exactly--as is attested by the growing accuracy and sophistication of French nuclear weapons--grounded solely in the strategy of massive retaliation but is already a more supple array suited in fact to the hypothetical cases that the president might have to confront.

The debate is therefore now on. And VGE must decide. But suddenly, at the moment of choice, the zealots of the neutron bomb think they have found in the international situation the leverage they need to dispose of any remaining doubts: "To say 'Yes' to the neutron bomb," they bring out, "would be, for VGE, to prove to doubters his fundamental firmness vis-a-vis the Soviets..."

Is this Giscard's opinion? Little inclined, some say, to share the infatuation of certain of his loyal supporters with the uses of the neutron bomb, the president silently--for the moment and until the second half of June--remains a sphinx.

9399

CSO: 3100

STRENGTH, BY COMPONENT, OF MILITARY FORCES

Paris LE MONDE in French 5-6 Jun 80 p 15

[Text] The authorized strength of the military forces for 1980--regular forces and national service call-ups paid through the Ministry of Defense--is 572,351, distributed as follows, according to a decree just published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL of Wednesday 21 May:

Strategic Nuclear Forces: 17,853; Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 8,115; conventional forces: 373,902; Overseas Forces: 16,407; research and testing: 6,257; training organizations: 77,800; personnel support organizations: 34,597; equipment support organizations: 18,777; general administration: 18,643.

Annexes to the decree establish the distribution among major components:

Ground: 314,253 (of which 198,868 are national service call-ups); Air: 100,625 (of which 38,455 are national service call-ups); Navy: 67,937 (of which 18,009 are national service call-ups); Gendarmerie: 78,296 (of which 5,000 are national service call-ups); Judge Advocate General: 186; Armed Forces Medical Services: 8,644 (of which 1,998 are national service call-ups); General Delegation for Weaponry: 2,203 (of which 627 are national service call-ups); Central Administration: 63; Armed Forces General Control: 144.

9399

CSO: 3100

LABOR PARTY YOUTH ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN ATTACKS TNV PLAN

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET is Norwegian 16 Jun 80 p 3

[Text] "A pause in the insane atomic weapons race in Europe is a requirement which only grows stronger with time. Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund must bring up NATO plans for production and deployment of new atomic missiles for renewed debate when he meets his colleagues next week in Ankara. I insist that NATO's new atomic weapons strategy conflicts with Norwegian defense and security policies. It also conflicts with the assumptions for our participation in NATO," said AUF (Labor Party Youth Organization) leader Thorbjorn Jagland in a speech at Vinstra last weekend.

Jagland spoke out strongly against armaments in Europe and said that nobody should close his eyes to what is about to happen. Later this month the NATO foreign ministers will meet in Ankara and Jagland directed a strong appeal to Foreign Minister Frydenlund to take up the new atomic weapons plans for debate.

"It has now been 6 months since the resolution for production and deployment of new weapons in Europe was passed. It is claimed that the resolution would be a part of negotiations with the Russians, but negotiations have not taken place as Norway and several other countries had assumed. On the contrary. The outlook for negotiations is worse than it has been for a long time. We have been assured that the new atomic weapons actually will form a central point in NATO defenses in the coming years. NATO generals and the United States really desire the deployment of these missiles. The result will be that the balance of terror will grow to its ultimate insanity. Today we have entirely too many atomic weapons. The West European countries must now make it clear to the United States that they do not want to have the new weapons inside their borders. Furthermore I believe that it is only requests by Europeans to the Soviet Union which will bring the parties to negotiations on disarmament and reduction of tensions in Europe," said AUF leader Thorbjorn Jagland in his speech.

NORWEGIAN-SWEDISH OIL INDUSTRY COOPERATION INCREASES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Jun 80 p 31

[Report by Lars Hellberg, AFTENPOSTEN correspondent]

[Text] Stockholm, 3 June.--The newly established cooperation between Norcem and the Swedish offshore concern Consafe, which Volvo has bought into for 30 percent, will be expanded to include several concerns. To begin with, according to AFTENPOSTEN's information, another Norwegian and a Swedish industrial firm will be brought into the cooperation on development of oil platforms. At the same time Secretary of State Trygve Tamburstuen says that the discussions on cooperation are developing much more positively at the ministry level than formerly.

"I can say honestly and sincerely that we have taken an important step in the direction of working out a common starting point for cooperation on industry and energy," Tamburstuen said in an interview with AFTENPOSTEN's representative after a meeting with his Swedish colleague Robert Nilsson in Stockholm Tuesday [3 June]. Next week's meeting between the Norwegian and Swedish ministers of industry and energy, according to Tamburstuen, will confirm that they have more to present than the general declarations of intent that have characterized the discussions of cooperation hitherto under three Swedish governments.

Earlier Tamburstuen has repeatedly emphasized that the Norwegians missed any concrete Swedish initiatives when it came to industrial development.

"I will not conceal the fact that there has been real disagreement. We have asked for concrete information about how Swedish authorities will stimulate their economy to Norwegian-Swedish cooperative projects, and made that a condition for discussing possible oil and/or gas supplies for Sweden. The Swedes have had the opposite starting point," Tamburstuen points out.

In reality the distance was great. It is no secret that the Norwegians have felt that Swedish authorities have not made use of real possibilities of cooperation, especially with regard to relations with third-party countries. Similarly, they missed any Swedish interest of the same type as has been shown by, for example, West German and French authorities.

But after Tuesday's meeting Tamburstuen feels that there is a basis for stating that the Swedes recognize that there has been no appropriate industrial initiative that can be taken up on a broader basis since the Volvo agreement was upset, apart from the initiative Volvo took on its own during the subsequent period.

8815

CSO: 3108

SELECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL SOKAY AS CABINET CHIEF QUESTIONED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 4 Jun 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Frank de Moor: "What Is a General Doing in Internal Affairs?"; passages in slantlines published in italics]

[Text] Practically the whole country must have been surprised when it became known that Minister of Internal Affairs Philippe Moureaux had appointed Major General Guy Sokay as his cabinet chief. Although Sokay has been tagging along with Walloon socialist cabinet life for a number of years, the question still arises whether the PS [Walloon Socialist Party] hasn't created a dangerous precedent here.

When Lieutenant General Edmond de Wilder, commander-in-chief of the Belgian armed forces in the FRG, on Tuesday 20 May for the first time stated publicly that the readiness of our advanced NATO defense lines can be endangered amongst other reasons by lack of fuel credits, and resigning Major General Robert Close on his part started to tell in Brussels how the Chinese defense should inspire us, it also became known that aviation Major General Guy Sokay (53) had been appointed as Philippe Moureaux'(PS) cabinet chief, Moureaux being the recently-installed minister of internal affairs and institutional reforms.

In the previous government, Moureaux himself was only cabinet chief of Vice Prime Minister Guy Spitaels [PS] who was minister of budget at the time, for whom Sokay moreover did advisory work in the negotiations on the current government accord. Higher officers thus definitely do not lack publicity in Belgium these days.

That is even more true in that the statements of Lieutenant General De Wilder on the lack of men, munitions and fuel follow analogous statements by the chiefs of staff of the air- and naval forces, and former Minister of Defense Jose Desmarets (PS) also undertook futile attempts to wangle additional fuel credits. In those attempts he primarily ran up against the almost open resistance of Major General Sokay. The latter at the time

managed to make us believe -- admittedly through his budget minister and his Flemish and Walloon party associates -- that Belgium (contrary to what General Close claims) is not doing so badly in a NATO context and perhaps is employing too many means for its defense.

These types of theories sound at least strange, coming from a general. Perhaps he does have an almost exclusively administrative, if not political career behind him. The politicizing of the army, just as that of other officialdom, is an old wound. Higher officers, such as Guy Sokay, quickly learned to live with that, however. Contrary to many of his colleagues, who usually are accommodated en masse under the liberals or christian democrats for lack of ideas or conviction, Guy Sokay almost immediately opted for the pronounced Walloon socialist liberality and he played an important role in the Air force in the last few years. In that respect his appointment as cabinet chief in internal affairs is his crowning achievement. Simultaneously it is the umpteenth slap in the face for the CVP [Social Christian Party] top administration which nevertheless (for many years) has been warned of the political cleverness of the Sokay clan by higher officers such as the meanwhile early-retired Lieutenant Colonel Airman Herman Candries. It seemed however as if the air force existed for the Walloon socialists, the army for the Flemish christian democrats and the navy for everyone -- somewhat like our coast -- and that the traditional interest groups also should have been able to put in orders according to that schedule. The Walloon socialists, however, continued to go their own way entirely. The advantages this yielded for Guy Sokay and a number of industrials such as FN, Sonaca, Delairbus and (once again) Asco, were already explained earlier in this paper as a result of a series of questionable Sokay appointments. The manner in which the PS and PSC [Walloon Social Christian Party] have long since been distributing promotions and orders for Walloon-Brussels companies amongst each other, is however of less importance today than the manner in which the CVP, for example, then reacted to it. Eighteen days after the entire story [broke] some CVP youth members sent an /urgent/ note to their chairman and that of the party, while the CVP paper ZEG attacked Major General Sokay the week after that as "the influence peddler of a certain francophone lobby which determines the personnel- and purchasing policy of the air force." (meanwhile all the appointments under attack had already been pushed through, however.)

Clan

Guy Sokay, who is among the bench brothers of PS Chairman Andre Cools and, for example, was himself appointed major general because the list of candidates was lengthened additionally for his benefit, in due time acquired the security of victory which sometimes makes socialists so authoritarian. In this case, however, it brings along a surprising /leftist militarization of politics/ which, amongst other things, impinges on the policy of certain Flemish socialists with respect to defense and foreign affairs. Thus Major General Guy Sokay, who would not grant us

an interview last week "because he doesn't want to take political stands nor give a Close performance," ought to explain, however, what he is planning with respect to the Belgian defense policy.

For the time being it almost seems as if he wants to finish off the Belgian army, if necessary withdraw it from a number of NATO commitments and, in a sort of Gaullistic elan, unglue Europe from the United States under the cloak of Pierre Harmel (PSC), the former minister of foreign affairs (1966-1972).

How else can one explain the fierceness with which the dismissal of Major General Robert Close as chairman of the /Commission for National Problems Relating to National Defense/ was obtained in the council of ministers on 22 February because he -- as a military man -- had made political statements and amongst others had made a butt of SP Chairman Karel van Miert because of the latter's critical attitude toward NATO nuclear missiles. Meanwhile Robert Close disappeared from the army, followed shortly thereafter by his friend Henri Simonet in Foreign Affairs. It is well known by now that he too was drummed out of the PS and the government by the Sokay group because he aligned himself too much with the United States. For that matter, during the forming of the previous Martens Government this discussion led to Major General Sokay's moving from the cabinet of Minister of Foreign Affairs Simonet to that of budget.

Meanwhile the general has not become less diligent. On the contrary. Not only has he put like-minded persons in the air force in just about all posts in which future orders can benefit Walloon industry, but he clearly has also pushed through a number of political changes of course and settlements which are not part of the normal thoughts of the Flemish socialists.

SP Parliamentary Group Leader Louis Tobback's question during the BRT [Belgian Radio and Television -- Dutch Service] television news broadcast of 19 February: "how far are we removed in politics from the infiltration of the military?" sounds even more pointed since the appointment of Major General Sokay in Internal Affairs.

Internal Affairs in fact continues to be one of the 10 most important ministries. The handling of a number of dossiers and the carrying out of certain paragraphs of the government accord give the cabinet of internal affairs and the man who effectively is in charge of it even more power than ever before.

Time of Crisis

First and foremost "essential measures have to be carried out in order to allow the Belgians to cope with international crisis conditions" and "amendments in legal texts concerning the possible peacetime summoning of armed forces for the maintaining of public order in case of social conflicts..."

must be tackled, which in the government accord indeed appear under the chapter Defense but in practice concern Internal Affairs and the /General State Police/ and /Civil Protection/ under its jurisdiction just as much.

By now, however, it is quite clear that we also -- with respect for the constitutional guarantees -- will have to learn to employ the concept of crisis period in a practical manner, at least if we want to continue to make an appeal to massive American troop re-inforcements. Even if Sokay wants to continue to deal with Close and Simonet in still other areas, he can't avoid it that something has to be done about the protection and escorting of civilians in case of conflict. The reasoning that nothing could be done anyway seems however to be the cheapest re-issue of the "broken gun" which even today's pacifist doesn't care about. Rejecting the setting up of all sorts of air-raid shelters and evacuation zones because precisely NATO experts plead for that, once again is evidence of the political and military agitation which historically has always yielded more victims than voters.

Major General Sokay, as cabinet chief at internal affairs, moreover will be concerned with "the interdepartmental task force charged with formulating proposals with respect to the general concept of the police apparatus in our country and the fundamental redistribution of tasks among the various police bodies." With this the government accord means that the task force in question, which met regularly during the past year and in which General Sokay already participated as Minister of Budget Spitael's co-worker, will have to submit its conclusions in the coming weeks. It must be clear to everyone that as cabinet chief of internal affairs a general here steps on one of the most independent areas of our constitution, namely that of the attorney general and of the magistrates of the prosecutor's office, who already have the various police bodies under their charge now and who could arrive at a redistribution of police tasks also without that task force if they should want to do so. On the other hand, it is clear that the redefinition of the authorities of the state police will be a central point here, in which the question remains whether a major general, be he a cabinet chief, in principle is the most appropriate man to impose the otherwise long expected limitations on the state police.

The fact that General Sokay will have a decisive influence in this type of important dossier, is evidenced by the scope of the precedent the socialists have created by admitting a higher officer to such a politically sensitive post. Moreover, the longer General Sokay remains cabinet chief, the more the right can permit itself to install, in its turn, higher officers in cabinets other than that of national defense.

Further, it should be remembered that internal affairs has authority over the communities and, in this case, more particularly over the Fourons area and the Brussels suburban areas with facilities on which the government accord is gracefully keeping silent.

With the extra-parliamentary Minister Moureaux, who for a long time has negotiated all the communal accords together with and for Andre Cools, and a general who as chief of internal affairs must coordinate the action of the law and order agencies in case of incidents, a general who moreover is known not to be particularly pro-Flemish, it seems as if the government has already built sufficient tension into its composition.

8700

CSO: 3105

UNION ECONOMIST: FOREIGN CREDITORS WILL ADMINISTER COUNTRY BY 1982

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 May 80 p 37

[Report by Thomas Knutzen]

[Text] Copenhagen in May.--When the Danish government presents its economic plan for 1982, Denmark will be put under the administration of its foreign creditors. That is the gloomy prospect that Steffen Møller, chief economist of the Danish Metal Workers' Union, considers probable. He does not believe Danish politicians will be capable of making the decisions needed to save the country from the so-called abyss.

Three central questions for Denmark are whether there really is an economic crisis in the country, how far away the abyss is, and whether it is really a crisis of political decision the country is in. We asked these questions of seven leading Danish economists. In addition we asked whether they themselves are optimistic or whether they believe that Denmark will have its freedom of action curtailed by its foreign creditors.

We asked these four questions:

- A. Is there an economic crisis in Denmark?
- B. How far away is the abyss?
- C. Is it more a crisis of political decision than an economic crisis?
- D. Are you yourself optimistic, or do you believe Denmark will have its freedom of action curtailed?

Torben Nilsen, Chief Economist of the Private Bank:

- A. Yes.
- B. Three years, unless we change our economic policy.

C. Yes, first and foremost a political crisis, which creates an economic crisis.

D. Yes, I am an optimist.

Jørgen Hansen, Chief Economist of the Industrial Council:

A. Yes.

B. We are losing our freedom of action more and more. We cannot pursue the interest policy we want. We are caught by the demand that interest shall be higher in Denmark than abroad.

C. There are hard economic realities, but also a crisis of political decision. The political system has only taken measures that are too little and come too late.

D. If I am an optimist, the optimism is dwindling. The chance of getting ashore dryshod is growing less and less.

Folmer Hammerum, Director of the Secretariat of the Economic Council:

A. There is not a crisis in the sense that we may be dead by Sunday. But we have been pushed far into a corner.

B. Of course we shall get through this, too.

C. The two things cannot be separated.

D. I believe it will be difficult, but have no doubt that it can be done. I am not an optimist.

Steffen Møller, Chief Economist of the Danish Metal Workers' Union:

A. We have great problems, problems that we ourselves have the responsibility to solve.

B. Unless there are radical changes in Danish economic policy, we shall be in an abyss situation by the fall of 1981.

C. We have a crisis of decision because the problems are so great that the Folketing is powerless before them.

D. I do not believe we can avoid a consortium solution.

Mogens Lykketoft, Chief Economist of the Workers' Industry Council:

A. There is a crisis in relation to the politicians' and the firms' expectations, but it should not be an impossible task to solve the problems. Zero growth through the 1980's is not synonymous with crisis.

B. Not imminent if the policy that is being prepared for now is followed. Then we shall move away from the abyss. The decisive thing is not tempo, but a sure trend.

C. Many of our economic problems are the result of defects in the political system.

D. I believe we shall manage to solve the problems, but it will be a process that goes slowly.

Paul Nyrop Rasmussen, Chief Economist of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions:

A. Yes.

B. Not a relevant question. If when you say abyss you are thinking about financing problems for the Danish deficit, it is a dismal picture. The difficulties will announce themselves as a sliding process.

C. Both.

D. If Danish politicians, including others than Social Democrats, understand that one of the quite fundamental prerequisites is to consider the distribution policy, I am optimistic.

Prof Hans E. Zeuthen, Chairman of the Economic Council:

A. If the definition of a crisis is a problem that has to have something done about it, I agree that we have got a crisis.

B. I really do not concern myself so much with the talk about the abyss.

C. What makes it hard to solve our economic problems is the difficulties in getting the political decisions made. Any solution will almost inevitably mean an income policy redistribution.

D. We shall avoid its going completely wrong, and we shall probably stagger on.

8815

CSO: 3108

CENTRAL BANK CHIEF HOFFMEYER AGAIN WARNS OF FOREIGN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard: "Erik Hoffmeyer: Newborn with Debts of 20,000"]

[Text] "Our foreign debt is now so high that we in reality are furnishing each newborn child in Denmark with a 20,000-kroner instrument of debt which he or she is obliged to pay interest on and pay back for the rest of his or her life."

With these words National Bank Director Erik Hoffmeyer tries to describe the absurd in the tremendous indebtedness to the outside world which Danish society has slipped into.

Hoffmeyer's words of warning fell at the Savings Bank Association's annual meeting at Nyborg Strand yesterday, where he made it clear that Denmark continues to sink into the economic "abyss." However, at the same time he pointed out that it is not useless to tighten the economic policy. Since 1976 the recurrent crisis compromises have actually had an improving effect on our balance of payments, but these improvements have been more than outweighed by higher energy costs and larger interest payments abroad, Hoffmeyer maintained.

Erik Hoffmeyer characterized the growth in Denmark's interest payments through the 70's as "explosive:" from interest payments of three million kroner in 1970 to interest payments this year of almost 10 billion, and presumably 12 billion next year. "Anyone can tell himself that this development neither can nor ought to continue for several years," said Hoffmeyer. He reported that the exchange deficit this year will presumably be up around 20 billion kroner and that this level is much too high.

At a press conference the National Bank director said that the exchange deficit ought to be lowered to a tenth of the present just to be proportional to the deficit other Western countries on average are running with today. "We stand continuously three steps down in the 'abyss,' where our worthiness for credit is about to come into the limelight."

However, Hoffmeyer at the same time made it clear that the last two crisis compromises, in spite of all, have helped the situation somewhat, but he does not consider it probable that we can avoid further crisis interference in the coming 12 months. For the time being we must wait and see how the exchange deficit develops in coming months, says Hoffmeyer.

GOVERNMENT SURVIVES TEST OVER ENERGY MINISTER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 13 Jun 80 p 12

[Article by Hans J. Poulsen: "Government Survived on Radical Oil Platform"]

[Text] The prime minister managed not to slip in Nielson's oil and when the Radicals came up with the idea of a frame law, which governs the procedure of future oil trades, the government emerged safe and sound from the closing debate in Parliament prior to the summer recess. No summer sessions are planned. Apparently the prime minister feels on safe ground with the three smaller parties that agreed to the May Compromise without demanding any "discredit clauses" for the remainder of the period until the end of 1981.

Anker Jorgensen's government managed not to slip in the oil as Hans Hedtoft's government did in the butter in October 1950. But the roller coaster seemed for a time to have brought not only Nielson but the entire government close to the edge of the abyss. That was when the bizarre circumstances surrounding the existence of the oil contracts became known. The political wet bargain in connection with that trade led to a grim parliamentary fight.

However, the Radical Liberals arranged for the suitable time and place to launch an oil platform. That was in the form of a promise to back the government if it, in turn, would promise that future government oil trades be negotiated in accordance with a special frame law. The other two small compromise parties, the Christian People's Party and the Democratic Center Party, promised to help keep this platform afloat.

And when the prime minister was able to prove that the manning rules had been met, the Social Democratic Party's political spokesman, Ole Espersen, could then present an agenda which was guaranteed adoption by the four parties involved in the May Compromise, the Social Democratic Party, the Radical Liberal Party, the Christian People's Party and the Democratic Center Party, in the early stages of the closing parliamentary debate on Monday.

That was an agenda which stressed that the latest information about the economy showed the need for measures which have already been enacted as well as the need to continue a tight economic policy.

No Punishment for Nielson

It was an agenda which called for no punishment of Energy Minister Poul Nielson, who, if anyone, has been the central controversial political figure for the last month.

The vote on the governing party's agenda showed, however, that sides have become more sharply drawn in Parliament than has been the case for many years and the parliamentary debate left the same impression. The implacability became much stronger after Anker Jorgensen chose to continue on his own and at his own risk following the election last October.

It was noteworthy that no party abstained from voting on Espersen's agenda. The Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Christian People's Party and the Democratic Center Party (a total of 83) voted for the agenda, compared to 79 against (the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the Progress Party, the Socialist People's Party, the Liberal Socialists and the Single-Tax Party). The government's "drop" was thus reduced to 4 votes.

In his opening statement before the closing debate, Anker Jorgensen said that the session had at times been marked by drama. No one can contradict the government leader on that point nor on the fact that the drama often originated within the government circle.

While former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen has managed to keep the troops in check in his present role as leader of the Social Democrats in Parliament, it has apparently been difficult for Anker Jorgensen to hold his flank of ministers together.

Verbal Blows

The opposition, not least the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Progress Party, directed verbal blows at the government during the closing debate. To give an example of these blows, we could mention Finance Minister Svend Jakobsen's reference to the conduct of the Liberals and the Conservatives as "boulevard press methods" and Poul Schluter's (Conservative) description of the prime minister as "shameless." However, regardless of the verbal blows and parries, the 7-hour long debate was more languid than dramatic. The air had already been let out of the balloon.

Five other agendas were submitted besides the defensive one of the Social Democratic Party. The Liberals and the Conservatives were united in saying they mistrusted the government's economic policy and in declaring that Energy Minister Poul Nielson had "failed to fulfill" his duty to give Parliament "accurate" and "adequate" information about the way he had discharged his official duties.

but neither that nor other agendas from the Progress Party (2), the Liberal Socialist Party and the Single-Tax Party came to a vote. They were not considered because the majority voted for the Social Democratic agenda. The opposition is still grumbling about a practice which makes it possible to postpone voting on no-confidence agendas. These types of agendas are considered to be a necessary parliamentary tool, which becomes dull when not used.

Will Reconvene 7 October

At a meeting of Parliament the first part of the week, the prime minister made it clear that members will not be called in for extra sessions this summer, which had been requested by the Liberal Party due to the nation's ailing economy.

The clear and unambiguous dismissal of Henning Christophersen's request can only be ascribed to the fact that the prime minister feels safe. The May Compromise with the three small parties runs till the end of 1981 and there was no formulation of a discredit clause when that agreement was made.

8952

CSO: 3106

FOLKETING APPROVES 'SOCIAL INCOME' LAW IN AUSTERITY MOVE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Jun 80 p 8

[Text] After a number of sharp objections had been made by opposition parties Folketing passed yesterday the new and wideranging complex of legislation introducing the concept of social income. This will form the basis for calculating various public payments which in the past depended on taxable income.

There were 86 members (the four compromise parties, the Social Democrats, Radical Liberals, Center Democrats and Christian People's Party plus the Single-Tax Party) voting for the major legislation on social income presented by Social Affairs Minister Ritt Bjerregaard while 63 voted against (Liberals, Conservatives, Left-Socialists and Progressives) and 11 members (Socialist People's Party and the Greenland representative Preben Lange) abstained.

In addition seven companion bills were passed with varying vote margins. The margin between yes and no votes was narrowest with regard to changes in the social assistance law as a result of the introduction of the social income concept. Here only the four compromise parties were in favor--a total of 80 votes--while 77 voted against and two members (Social Democrat Henry Grunbaum and Preben Lange representing Greenland) abstained.

Protests From Gallery

When a bill containing changes in childcare subsidies came up for a vote protest leaflets were thrown down from a visitors' gallery--the reserved gallery, available to the public only by special permission from Folketing.

During the debate preceding the balloting an unusual event occurred, the speech of a nonsocialist politician (Liberal member Peter Brixtofte)

was greeted with a storm of applause from the visitors' gallery. For years demonstrations in the halls of parliament have tended to come from the left wing.

Several speakers from opposition parties protested the introduction of such sweeping reforms in social legislation in such a short time and with such a narrow majority.

Uncontrolled

Peter Brixtofte found the steps dealing with pension recipients totally uncontrolled but the worst part concerned the handicapped. When invalid subsidies are scaled down in the income interval between 125,000 and 160,000 kroner the handicapped will actually have all income improvements confiscated. At the first opportunity the Liberals will try to correct the injustices now being introduced.

Agnete Laustsen (Conservative) said that a special tax was being imposed on a group already hard hit. It had nothing to do with solidarity to require the handicapped to pay for their own special equipment.

Agnete Laustsen could see broad and unclarified perspectives in the law that was passed and in its next phase, when more bills will be introduced next year. "The question is whether in the long run the government intends to impose income taxes on the basis of social income."

Jorgen Junior (Progressive) noted that the modest majority that passed the first phase of the social income plan did not even agree on what should be done in the next phase. The consequences were incalculable.

Aase Olesen (Radical Liberal) found the objections to the law very exaggerated. She could not understand how people could talk about special taxes in view of the modest sums involved. Arne Melchior (Center Democrat) protested that the Social Democrats, Radical Liberals, Christian's People Party members and Center Democrats were being depicted as heartless asocial politicians.

Social Affairs Minister Ritt Bjerregaard said that the basis for the new legislation is that those in the best position should bear the burdens. She wished to thank the speakers, with the exception of Peter Brixtofte, for having conducted a factual debate in a sensitive legislative area.

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CSO: 3106

JORGENSEN DEFENDS GOVERNMENT AS FOLKETING ADJOURNS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 13 Jun 80 p 1

[Interview by Hans J. Poulsen: "System Is Not Functioning Well Enough"]

[Text] Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen considers the matter of his energy minister's oil trade absolutely closed. He will not comply with the opposition's request for a special investigation of the circumstances, but in this interview at the close of the Folketing session, the prime minister did admit that the government had made some internal mistakes, creating self-inflicted problems in this case as well as in several others.

"Words like mistrust, non-fulfilment and discredit have been used over and over again in the course of the political feud the last few weeks. Is that because the political system itself is functioning less efficiently than it did during your former terms as prime minister?"

"I do not think it is functioning less efficiently, but it is not functioning well. The Liberals and the Conservatives seem to be angry with us, verbally also, which could be due to the compromise we made with three small parties last May."

"There is also something called problems of one's own making?"

"I admit that some of the things we have done or created could be termed 'problems of one's own making' but, for the most part, there has been 'much ado about nothing.' With respect to the government's oil purchase in Saudi Arabia, there was actually nothing, but I must admit that the presentation may have left the impression things were quite different. We are not without faults and the same can be said of the Energy Minister with respect to the way in which he presented this matter. Besides the oil purchase, however, 'other' things are being mentioned again and again. When that happens, things begin to look terrible. Really, I do not understand it that way."

Conciliatory Government Meetings

"There has in fact been several more conciliatory government meetings than normal in the last few weeks?"

"Yes, you may call them conciliatory meetings, but is that not one of the prime minister's duties to conciliate several divergent points of view?"

"Can the matter concerning Poul Nielson be considered absolutely closed with respect to all the circumstances surrounding the origin and the signing of the contract, i.e. the whole procedure?"

"No doubt about it; the matter is closed...but I am a strong supporter of changing the procedure in the future to avoid misunderstandings. Nor am I opposed to making the change in terms of legislation. We have to admit that the Saudi-Arabian oil contract could have been handled differently."

No Investigation or Special Tribunal

"The non-socialist opposition has requested a special investigation of these matters?"

"We have received a number of questions about this from other parties and they will be answered to a reasonable extent. We are not going to answer all the questions and we will not undertake a special investigation. And with respect to appointing a special tribunal--which has also been mentioned--I would like to see the party that would dare to try anything in that direction."

"Why was it important to you as the government leader to have the cabinet deal with the Nielson issue?"

"To tell the truth, at no time did I believe it was an issue that could hurt the government in terms of votes. Therefore, the thought of making it an issue that could affect the destiny of the entire government did not enter my mind. At one point I was asked whether the entire government stood behind Nielson. To that I answered "yes" and then came all the evaluations of my "yes" from the other side. But I never felt they could get the majority against us in this case."

"Inequities" For Public Employees

"The government this week reported that, in the capacity of an employer until August, it would begin to negotiate with public employees in preparation for the contract talks. Is it especially postmen, policemen and others in lower income brackets who will get help?"

"We intend to sort of probe the situation. In that way we might be able to establish a tempo that can be used to open the actual contract talks. Do not misunderstand this to mean that we are now formulating an income policy. In fact, we will attempt to stay out of the agreement situation."

ith respect to public employees in particular, we know that "inequities" have developed in some areas and they must be analyzed prior to the actual contract negotiations."

"Which groups do you have in mind as far as "inequities" are concerned?"

"I do not want to mention any specific groups, but since there is a need for great restraint as far as wages are concerned, we must make sure that forthcoming gains are 1) modest and 2) go to groups that receive the lowest wages. But there may also be other areas with sufficient inequities that we need to take a look at them."

The Prime Minister and Economists

"Do we understand it correctly that you deliberately keep a certain distance between yourself and national economic experts in this country despite the economic crisis?"

"I am not particularly on bad terms with nor to have an aversion to economists. On the contrary, I have lived with economists in this party and I have also--contrary to what is being said--read a great deal about economics in order to familiarize myself with economic problems and theories.

But the situation is this: One day people say things are terrible because the Social Democratic Party is run by political science graduates! But when the chairman of the party is not a political science graduate, people begin to doubt that he really understands the economy. I am no expert, but I listen to experts without thus having to overrate them. Experts can contradict one another. I am not gloating over that, but it shows that few things in this world are so exact that they cannot be submitted to common political sense.

What if we had intervened in the contract talks and eliminated some cost-of-living allowances, which we could not bear to "steal" were it not for the fact we had taken the experts' advice, or cut public expenditures or levied new personal taxes?"

"According to recent calculations, you have served the longest term as government leader since Stauning and thus also longer than your predecessor J. O. Krag. In 2 years you will be 60 years old and, with the growing trend toward early retirement or after-pay, it would be interesting to know whether you have given some thought to that possibility?"

"If I had given it some thought, I also know for a fact that such matters should not be shared with anyone. But: there are no up-to-the-minute considerations."

POLL INDICATES INCREASED POLARIZATION IN EC VIEWS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jun 80 p 5

[Text] The European election on 7 June 1979 apparently did not benefit EC in terms of a more positive attitude toward Danish membership in the organization. On the contrary.

This was shown by the latest of the studies the Gallup Institute made to analyze the attitude of the people toward our EC membership.

In these surveys a representative selection of the adult population was asked:

"If you voted today on affiliation with the European Common Market would you vote for or against Danish participation?"

In the chart on the following page we see the results of the latest survey which was made in May and for comparison the results of earlier surveys conducted after the referendum in October 1972.

With a few exceptions all the surveys since the fall of 1973 show relatively more opponents than supporters of Danish membership in EC. If the entire period is considered we see that in the period when the European Parliament became a political reality, in other words since the spring of 1979 when the "campaign" was in full swing, opposition to EC has been relatively greatest.

Along partisan lines it is still true that Social Democratic voters are generally opposed to EC while left-wing voters are almost unanimously opposed. This is shown by the chart below:

	For EC	Against EC	Don't know	Total
To right of Social Democrats	59%	28%	13%	100%
Social Democrats	34	44	22	100
To left of Social Democrats	7	87	6	100

UDVIKLINGEN 1972-80

		3) for %	4) imod %	5) ved ikke %	6) i alt %
2. oktober	1972	57	33	10	100
februar	1973	51	37	12	100
maj 1)	1973	48	43	11	100
oktober	1973	42	43	15	100
marts 2)	1974	42	42	16	100
maj 1)	1974	38	43	19	100
august	1974	31	53	16	100
oktober	1974	37	45	18	100
april	1975	40	41	19	100
august	1975	45	41	14	100
marts 2)	1976	40	43	17	100
maj 1)	1977	39	43	18	100
april	1978	40	37	23	100
februar	1979	38	40	22	100
26.-30. maj	1979	33	48	19	100
december	1979	31	39	30	100
maj 1)	1980	36	43	21	100

Developments 1972-80

Key:

- | | |
|----------|---------------|
| 1. May | 4. Against |
| 2. March | 5. Don't know |
| 3. For | 6. Total |

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CSO: 3106

AFGHANISTAN STANCE EXACERBATES LEFT-SOCIALISTS FEUD

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Jun 80 p 9

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Text] "This is the most dangerous situation VS [Left-Socialist Party] has been in during the 12 years the party has been in existence."

Folketing member Preben Wilhjelm, a party veteran, views the political and ideological struggle which threatens VS with schism along with the disagreement over the work of the parliamentary group as being that serious.

From the outside it looks like Preben Wilhjelm's criticism of the work of his parliamentary colleagues, Kurt Hansen and Thio Tyroll, is the most serious sign of internal unrest. And Preben Wilhjelm and others--among them Folketing member Mikael Waldorff--make no secret of the fact that a members' dispute over the party's political line is the most dangerous thing threatening the party.

The Left-Socialist Party is a party of factions. The right to form factions is even set forth in the party's program because this is seen as a productive route to discussion and political firmness. But in the last half year a few party members, mainly concentrated around the international committee, have shocked older VS members.

One of the members of the international committee is Folketing member Anne Grete Holmsgard whose views were rejected by the majority of the parliamentary group when it had to establish the party's line on foreign policy issues

Goal

The line chosen by Anne Grete Holmsgard and those of like mind is not backed by the VS majority. There are diverging views in the areas of

both foreign and domestic policy. While the majority has repudiated such things as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the minority has taken a line somewhat friendlier to the Soviet Union.

"They follow a 'we know better' policy. For them the goal justifies the means. While the rest of us have underlined the democratic principles of national self-determination and freedom of speech time after time, they question whether freedom of speech should be extended to opponents too," it has been said of the minority.

Discussion

At the moment discussion concerning how much influence this line should have on VS policy is going full blast. This will probably culminate in the fall when VS holds its congress. A congress that will be closed to the public.

Preben Wilhjelm who will take up the discussion with the rabid group in the next issue of the VS internal organ hopes and expects that the discussion will lead to clarification--and not to a party split. But he is surprised that a group of VS members is so far away from the official party policy.

The other disputed issue--the work of the Folketing group--has also been thrown out for debate by Preben Wilhjelm in the latest issue of the internal VS organ.

"If we want VS to go on being represented in Folketing, and most VS members do, it is important to maintain the priority of Folketing activity," Preben Wilhjelm said to BERLINGSKE SONDAG.

He has therefore recommended that party members in the internal nomination of Folketing candidates drop Kurt Hansen and Thio Tyroll who were elected by the factional Joint Union List.

The Joint Union List does not place work in Folketing very high and the result of this has been that Kurt Hansen and Thio Tyroll have not been able in the course of their parliamentary work to "raise issues" as Preben Wilhjelm and Steen Folke, for example, have done.

In Folketing Kurt Hansen and Thio Tyroll deal with labor market, social, municipal and traffic issues.

Cutoff Limit

"I think most VS members believe the party will pass the 2 percent cut-off limit in the next election. I don't think so. When the Danish CP with its core of voters, better economy and a daily newspaper can make

a surprise exit from Folketing so can a little party like ours. This is a matter of overestimating ourselves--and of self-deception--if anyone claims the opposite," said Preben Wilhjem in explaining why it is important for VS to define itself in Folketing.

Preben Wilhjem with his parliamentary experience has another thought in the back of his head. VS rules mean that Folketing members cannot serve more than 7 years in Folketing. Both Preben Wilhjem and Steen Folke entered Folketing after the election in January 1975. If an election is scheduled before the end of 1981 they can take another election period. But otherwise they'll have to get out. Members from the 1977 election--Kurt Hansen, Thio Tyroll and Mikael Waldorff--will also be subject to the 7-year rule soon. That will leave the party with an entirely new, politically untested Folketing group. But if Kurt Hansen and Thio Tyroll don't run again a couple of new people could come in--perhaps under the protective wings of Wilhjem and Folke to begin with.

VS was formed in December 1967 following the split in the Socialist People's Party. The party was outside Folketing from 1971 to 1975 but in the last three elections the party received four, five and now six seats. In the opinion polls the party is currently above its election results last fall.

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CSO: 3106

GREENLAND WOULD SHARE IN BUDGET CUTS; MP HOLDS BALANCE

Godthab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 4 Jun 80 p 5

[Excerpts] The authorized budget cuts will not affect home-ruled areas on Greenland, but the ministry's operating and construction costs.

By a very narrow majority vote in Parliament, the Danish government was authorized to cut public expenditures by 8 billion kroner in 1981 and to increase government income by 5 billion kroner the same year. The VAT will be raised from 21.25 percent to 22 percent, personal taxes will go up, oil, gasoline and other forms of energy will also become more expensive. Greenland will also be affected by the cuts. The Minister of Greenland has had to accept cuts in ministerial construction and operating costs totaling 39 million kroner. The same cuts will be made in 1982 and 1983.

The Ministry of Greenland's Economic Director Olaf Johansen:

"According to political agreements in 1979, Greenland's budget will be cut by 24 million kroner already this year, cutting operating costs by 13.3 million kroner and construction costs by 10.7 million. The same distribution of the 24-million kroner cut between operating and construction costs will be maintained for the next 2 years.

In 1981 there will be a further cut of 15 million kroner, which will be repeated in 1982 and 1983. This means a cut of 6 million kroner in operating costs and 9 million kroner in construction costs in 1981, a cut of 4 million in operating costs and 11 million in construction costs in 1982 and in 1983 the entire 15-million kroner cut will be applied to construction costs," said Olaf Johansen.

He added that the block aid to Greenland, the amount of which has been established by law and is based on price developments, will be 495 million kroner in 1981. That will not be affected by the cuts.

On Equal Terms With Others

Greenland's Minister Jorgen Peder Hansen:

"Percentage-wise the Greenland ministry will be cut the same as other ministries. As far as Greenland is concerned, we have said we wanted to be treated on equal terms with the other ministries. We should point out, however, that the cuts do not affect home-ruled areas like the labor market and social and cultural areas. These are financed by the forementioned block grant, which is continually adjusted depending upon price developments," said Jorgen Peder Hansen.

Block Grant Not Affected

When home rule was established, leading Greenland politicians and I agreed it was very important to work out an arrangement whereby the block grant would by law be a fixed sum. And that went through. Consequently, there can be no cuts in the block grant without the matter being taken up in Parliament and a new law adopted. This system was agreed upon because we wanted to make sure the home rule government would have a stable economy in the beginning," added Jorgen Peder Hansen.

Almost 40 Million Kroner in Extraordinary Grants

The Minister of Greenland added:

"Greenland's budget will be cut by 39 million kroner in 1981. That is correct. But, at the same time, I was able to get an extraordinary grant for a South Greenland trawler, which will cost almost 30 million kroner, as well as another 8.5 million kroner for an energy project which will utilize waste heat from Greenland power plants for heating purposes. The trawler will be financed by special grants to promote employment, which is also part of the political agreement concerning budget cuts and tax increases," added the minister.

How do the two Greenlandic members of Parliament, who will now participate in the legislative work, feel about the budget cuts?

Otto Steenholdt's Opinion

Otto Steenholdt, Atassut: "We want to stand solidly together with the rest of the Danish population. If Denmark has to cut its spending, we on Greenland want to be part of it. That is only logical because whatever economic problems affect Denmark will also sooner or later affect Greenland. We want to help carry the burdens."

Preben Lange's Opinion

Parliamentary member Preben Lange, Siumut, was more skeptical. This is what he said after the prime minister submitted the crisis plan:

"The home rule government did declare itself solidly supporting and understanding of the crisis which Denmark is now experiencing. But the economic squeeze which we have had on Greenland for a number of years and which has put us in the present situation of dependence, is in part no fault of ours.

When home rule was established, Greenland expected that the economic framework with respect to long-term planning would be maintained. But that was obviously not possible. To be sure, the grants that affect areas of home rule will not be cut. But cuts of 39 million kroner to the ministry of Greenland have been allocated and there is reason to have second thoughts, particularly with respect to the amount of 15 million kroner which will affect construction projects," said Preben Lange and added:

"On the other hand, we are aware that money has been made available for energy conservation projects."

Preben Lange will abstain from voting when the crisis proposal finally comes up for approval in Parliament.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Otto Steenholdt could be the important "deciding factor." But he does not yet want to say how he will vote when the proposed crisis legislation comes up for adoption.

8952

CSO: 3106

INDUSTRY'S COMPETITIVENESS STILL STRONG DESPITE PROBLEMS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 May 80 p 37

[Text] "In Denmark the market works even outside of the textbooks," Jørgen Hansen, chief economist of the Industrial Council, points out the difference between Denmark and, for example, Norway and Sweden. Denmark has a political and a union tradition that has led to the country's choosing other solutions than those chosen by its Scandinavian neighbors.

While unemployment in Denmark is of record size when seen with Norwegian and Scandinavian eyes, the balance of payments deficits are large and persistent, and the foreign debt so big that it has the economy in a forked stick, the competitive ability of Danish industry is good. "We stand on a very good foundation," Torben Nielsen, chief economist of the Private Bank, tells AFTENPOSTEN. "Danish industry has had an unusually high growth in productivity, a growth of between 4 and 6 percent a year. There is nothing holding us back."

Steffen Møller, chief economist of the Danish Metal Workers' Union, points out that Denmark does not have the same structural problems as Sweden, for instance, with its mines and shipyards. "In reality we should have been very good. We have all the tools, but we cannot," he says, and characterizes that as Denmark's misfortune. The country's industry is still flexible.

Folmer Hammerum, director of the secretariat of the Economic Council, also attaches weight to the fact that there are hardly any Danish concerns that depend on subsidies or support measures, that most stand on their own feet.

Folmer Hammerum points out, however, the same thing that Jørgen Hansen of the Industrial Council mentions: The growth in productivity in Danish industry reflects the fact that all of the poorer concerns have disappeared.

"The least productive is always being trimmed away. The industry we are left with is very competitive, but there is too little of it," says Jørgen Hansen.

Another sign of development in the Danish economy is that in spite of the record number of unemployed, there have never been so many employed wage-earners as now. Denmark experienced a striking growth in its work force in the 1970's. In plain language that means that the percentage of women that work has greatly increased in Denmark in recent years. While the work force totaled 2,340,000 in 1967 and 2,479,000 in 1974, in 1978 it came to 2,630,000. In those four years the work force thus grew by 150,000 persons, and since 1967 it has risen by 290,000 persons.

In the same period of time the number employed has risen by 110,000. In 1967, when the unemployment in Denmark was at the same level as in Norway, employment was 190,000 lower than in 1978. In other words, during the same period the work force grew by 290,000, while employment grew by 190,000. Roughly 100,000 became unemployed. But all the time the situation has been that the work force has been bigger in Denmark than in Norway, computed in percentage of the population, and that employment has been greater than here [in Norway] computed in the same way. If Norway had as many at work as Denmark, relatively, we would have employed well over 100,000 more than we have in our work force.

8815

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U. S. MILITARY MOVES WOULD INCREASE DEFENSE COSTS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 13 Jun 80 p 3

[Text] It is doubtful whether the United States will earmark reinforcements for Denmark in a crisis if the Danish defense budget is not increased quite considerably.

The reason is not being argued, as is often the case in Denmark when "the necessity" of an increase in the defense budget is pointed out--namely to allow Denmark to prepare for the arrival of foreign soldiers and set up various facilities.

Congressional experts, military men, politicians on committees relevant to the military and independent experts, on the other hand, told INFORMATION on its recent visit to Washington that there is talk about a political trade.

Greater Contribution

"If Denmark continues to stand by its decision not to increase the defense budget in the next few years, it is very likely we will not be able to comply with Denmark's request for earmarked reinforcements, the equipment for which would be set up in advance," said a source central to the decision-making process. "We have very seriously considered Denmark's request, but have also noted that Denmark, despite its promises in NATO, cut its military budget this year. It is extremely difficult for Congress to accept the fact that we should spend several hundred millions on Danish defense when you yourselves are not willing to make a greater contribution.

The United States has a higher rate of inflation than that of Denmark and there are many other bids for our forces. There are some people who always trouble the outside world with the fact that they have personal problems. But we all have personal problems. The same goes for the economy. All countries have economic problems these days and you cannot expect special consideration," our source concluded, who because of his position wants to remain anonymous.

This point of view is shared by many and one thing is often stressed, with considerable irritation, "these Danes, who have the world's highest standard of living."

According to what INFORMATION has learned, the Danish government party's internal debate saw the problem in reverse: It is necessary to accept depots and reinforcements in the early stages of a crisis because that will allow Denmark to use less money on the military.

Global Role

But there is also another problem. The United States has informed its allies that growing demands for its military in the third world means that Western Europe cannot expect to be first in line to get reinforcements in a crisis. Last spring Assistant Defense Minister Robert Komer submitted a report to NATO which dealt with the intended changes and, at the last meeting of the political leadership within the alliance, it was agreed that final plans would be ready in time for the next meeting in December.

Chief Clerk Wahl in the Danish Defense Ministry told INFORMATION that "it is very difficult to say at this moment what the changes in U. S. strategy will mean for Denmark. He had not seen the final plans, but was of the opinion "it is clear they could mean a change in our plans."

Corps in Crisis

The fact that the Marine Corps has become relevant at all as far as Denmark is concerned has to do with a post-Vietnam corps crisis the last few years. The Carter administration attached great importance to NATO and a war in Europe in which the Marine Corps with its relatively light equipment--few cannons and tanks--had played no prior role. That meant the corps was ignored in the bureaucratic struggle in the Pentagon and was actually supposed to be reduced.

The Marine Corps has traditionally been the spearhead for American imperialism abroad. Its function was perhaps most clearly summed up in the 30's by Brigadier General Smedley F. Butler, who was the corps' commander for a number of years: "I spent 33 years--most of the time as first class muscleman for Big Business, Wall Street and bankers. I was, to put it briefly, capitalism's blackmailer: I helped to purge Nicaragua for the international banking house Brown Brothers in 1909-12. In 1914 I helped make Mexico, and especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Haiti and Cuba suitable places for the daring men of National City Bank to collect profits. I helped overpower a half dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street... In 1927 I helped Standard Oil get out of China intact."

Military expert William Arkin from the Independent Center for Defense Information in Washington DC has followed the corps' maneuvers in the bureaucratic game since Vietnam:

Drill in Jutland

Here at home, Social Democratic Party Chairman Lasse Budtz said only last week during the debate on armament reduction that Denmark can in no way increase the defense budget by three percent, which NATO has requested.

Some 70,000 Men

The American position is also becoming clear--if only indirectly--through a report on the Marine Corps' duties in the 80's, which was discussed last Thursday. It was prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and looks at the assignment of nearly 70,000 marines to Denmark.

"In connection with both Denmark and Norway, the more important questions of sharing the burden with the alliance keep piling up, particularly due to the growing need for American forces beyond the borders of NATO--but nevertheless in NATO's interest. Both countries' dependence upon reinforcements has supposedly limited the growth in their own defense budgets and military organizations. If they would increase their own defense forces, the need for American marine reinforcements in connection with the northern flank would be reduced, thus allowing these forces to be assigned to other duties."

In order to comply with Denmark's request, it would cost 1.3 billion dollars between now and 1985 to place a division equipped with tanks in Jutland and 165 million for a less heavily equipped brigade to defend the islands, according to the report.

The costs involve the purchase of new equipment, building depots in Denmark as well as maintaining and transporting the equipment.

Who Will Pay?

The report states that "a number of complications could mean that the United States would have to pay the entire bill for the construction of the depots." The Danish Defense Ministry, however, expects that money from the so-called NATO Infra-Structure Fund will cover this item. But, according to the American report, there is "considerable uncertainty" as to that possibility. Denmark is already drawing some money from this fund to construct facilities for American planes. Traditionally, this money has been distributed among the most economically disadvantaged members of the alliance and, for that reason, Denmark's new requests will have low priority in the next few years. The project in question will cost 200 million dollars, which means that even a tremendous increase in Denmark's defense budget will not cover the costs.

According to the report, "Denmark prefers" that some of the already planned new depots for the regular American army's reinforcements be placed in Denmark, but that is "an unlikely possibility." The reason is that these units are mostly needed in Central Europe.

"Hence, an increased Danish military budget will be the "political price" for the United States' benevolent look at Denmark's request," INFORMATION's sources stressed.

"The important question was whether the corps' possibilities were relevant in modern times. But it has much prestige and excellent opportunities to exert pressure. So it looked around for some new tasks. It underwent reorganization, in which greater emphasis was placed on anti-tank war, artillery and armor. There was a drill in 1978, in which marines set ashore in Jutland and that was an historic turning point. The ability to fight in Europe was demonstrated. Danes may have gotten their ideas at that time.

The Soviet Union has really done nothing to create this need. To be sure, they have armed themselves, but there has also been fantastic improvements in the Scandinavian countries' military. I believe the Soviet Union rather considers its northern flank forces a drain on its striking power in Central Europe."

The report from the Congressional Budget Office clearly shows that the corps is "at a crossroad," as the author of the analysis, Dov Zakheim, expressed it. It has 185,200 men in active service and a large number of planes attached to the corps' units.

In order to comply with Denmark's request completely would mean rather extensive changes in the corps. Where it could formerly be placed anywhere with great flexibility, the advance placement of a great number of tanks and other equipment in Jutland means that the corps would lose part of its engagement ability in the third world and other places in Europe.

The new U. S. dispatch corps, the Rapid Deployment Force, was originally conceived of as a unit in the regular army. But just as European duties for the Marine Corps would be an intrusion of the army's traditional province, the Marine Corps and its strong lobby feel that the dispatch corps is an intrusion of its traditional sphere. So the Marine Corps has already found a role in the dispatch corps and several units are energetically training for war in desert areas.

Bureaucratic clashes of interest and the difficulty in casting units, which with their present training and equipment can only handle limited duties, almost turns the American decision-making process into a Gordian knot. "If Denmark wants its share, it will have to hurry," says Washington.

8952

CSO: 3106

Briefs

BANKERS' ORGAN ON FOREIGN DEBT--The Danish foreign debt is "bottomless" and will in five years even under the best conditions be doubled to 200 billion kroner, foresees the Regional Bankers in the last issue of the bankers' periodical RASMUS. In the long term the foreign debt will continue to increase rapidly on account of the high and increasing interest payments. The sum established is based on conditions which are optimistic rather than pessimistic. For one thing it is assumed that the deficit on that portion of the balance of payments current items which concern commodity and service payments alone will be settled before 1985. Even under optimistic conditions the balance of payments will show a deficit of 17 billion kroner in 1985. This entire amount will consist of interest payments abroad, it is reported in the Regional Bankers' periodical. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jun 80 p 13] 8985

8985

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STRAUSS' LEADERSHIP TEAM FOR ELECTION PROFILED

Important Role for Stoltenberg

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 13 Jun 80 p 3

[Article by Kurt Becker: "Is Stoltenberg the Coming Man of the CDU/CSU?--The Cool Politician From the North Intends To Attack the Chancellor's Fiscal and Energy Policy"]

[Text] Has Gerhard Stoltenberg staked his leadership claim to the highest government office in Bonn? It is hardly possible to come up with a different interpretation of the Schleswig-Holstein minister president's entry as vice-chancellor-to-be into the government team of candidate for chancellor Franz Josef Strauss. Breathing a sigh of relief, Stoltenberg's friends in Bonn and in the Laender say: "At last he has thrown his hat into the ring." And they have in mind not so much the 5th of October, the day of the Bundestag elections, as above all the time afterward--in case Strauss does not make it in the fall and inevitably a new leadership debate is unleashed in the CDU/CSU as a result.

Gerhard Stoltenberg is not fond of woodcut-like opinions, particularly in matters concerning him personally and at this early stage. "I have no firm career plan," he assures his visitor very nonchalantly, though probably intending above all to make it clear that he is not consumed with ambition and chasing after top-level offices. Besides it is not in keeping with his cool north German temperament to announce advances in his personal political career vociferously and with promising claims. Stoltenberg has all along guarded against shooting from the hip. Deliberateness and avoidance of imponderable risks are proverbial in his case. If he thinks he really does not know something exactly, he prefers to keep silent; and even when he has long since got everything straight in his head, he invariably speaks deliberately, without an edge or undue emphasis.

"The paragon of clarity from the north" is what Herbert Wehner once called him mockingly in the Bundestag, but deprecatory though this label was meant to be, Stoltenberg's friends did not find it so at a closer look but rather

diagnosed it as being to the point and in fact unintentionally appreciative. So they turned the disparaging label into a seal of approval for the acumen and straightforwardness of their Land chief in Kiel.

Stoltenberg's readiness to join the Strauss team, contrary to his previously announced stand, is a result of the election defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia having been taken to heart. Though not by Strauss himself, this defeat is interpreted throughout the CDU/CSU as a personal debacle of the candidate for chancellor, as an effect of the anti-Strauss campaign. When Strauss was elected candidate for chancellor in July of last year, the only one of the few prominent "northern lights" whom he could count on right off in the preparations for his election campaign was Lower Saxon Finance Minister Walther Leisler Kiep--notwithstanding the distance normally prevailing between them. Minister Presidents Stoltenberg and Albrecht, who in any case lacked all enthusiasm for a Strauss candidacy from the beginning, displayed a striking reserve--Stoltenberg because he had promised the people of Schleswig-Holstein before the Landtag elections that he would stay in Kiel, and Albrecht because he wanted to be available only as candidate for chancellor and nothing else.

But the black election Sunday on the Rhine and Ruhr gave the CDU/CSU a bad shock. The disappointing result made it appear in a flash overnight that the CDU/CSU had to consider the possibility of a similarly catastrophic election result on 5 October and that it would then keep going downhill. To dampen the no longer deniable effect of the anti-Strauss campaign and also prevent any defeatism in the CDU/CSU, the CDU Presidium stressed the need visibly to broaden the leadership group around Strauss at an early stage. This was done last week, with the prominence given to the north German Protestant Stoltenberg deserving the utmost attention.

Inexorable Practice

Stoltenberg defines the short-term aim as follows: If not an election victory, at least an election result respectable enough to make it impossible for the secession plans hatched by the CSU in Wildbad Kreuth after the Bundestag election loss in the fall of 1976 to be renewed, and for the danger of a split between the CDU and CSU to recur. Of course, putting the Kiel minister president in a prominent position in the government team also has long-term effects. If the CDU/CSU loses the election, the party's inexorable practice will also throw candidate for chancellor Strauss from his pedestal. He would suffer the same fate as befell Kurt Georg Kiesinger 11 years ago or Rainer Barzel and Helmut Kohl after that.

Stoltenberg does not hide his distaste in recalling earlier proceedings in filling CDU/CSU top offices. He is horrified at the thought of such things happening again. True, as previously, there would have to be a discussion about the problem of dual leadership, about how to fill the top offices (party chairman, leader of the opposition, candidate for chancellor) and as to whether or not it was permissible for one person to hold them all, but

Stoltenberg thinks such debates will be fruitful only if henceforth they are conducted without confrontation. "The policy of the CDU/CSU and its leadership structure must have priority. That is the aspect under which the offices must be filled. Kohl, Albrecht or Stoltenberg--that is not the way my question runs." And to make sure that there is no doubt whatsoever in the strictness of this maxim, he supplies instructions on how to interpret his conviction in the bargain: "I say so and mean this not as a tactical argument."

Expert Knowledge But No Charisma

In case of a victory by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt one may certainly expect a considerably strengthened commitment in national politics by the Schleswig-Holstein minister president. Stoltenberg faced a similar question as long as 5 years ago. In the spring of 1975 he enjoyed great support in the CDU. Leading CDU politicians from the north and south would have preferred to choose him rather than Kohl as candidate for chancellor. But when he was able to save his minister president's office by only a one-seat majority at the Landtag elections, he faced the television cameras on election night pale as a ghost. What perhaps until then had seemed ready to fall into his lap had suddenly come to naught. Soon thereafter Kohl, the radiant victor in Rhineland-Palatinate and at the same time party chairman, was nominated candidate for chancellor. Stoltenberg, on the other hand, disengaged himself. He did not take any risks and, much to the regret of his loyal friends, did not raise his head above the trench in the later leadership struggles.

Yet Stoltenberg did not lose his reputation. As deputy national chairman of the CDU and as an authority visible throughout the nation in fiscal, economic and energy questions, he even managed in the fringe location of the Land of Schleswig-Holstein to escape the general fate of Land chiefs, neither sinking into the oblivion of provincial office nor becoming immersed in the universal political cliches of minister presidents' ceremonial speeches. His 25 years as a parliamentarian, 4 years as federal minister for research and 10 years as minister president represent a trove of experience that now stands him in good stead. For any eventuality in the foreseeable future, Stoltenberg now has the best chance to replace Strauss as candidate for chancellor.

Stoltenberg is appreciated--to well within the SPD-FDP coalition--for his expert knowledge and know-how. What he lacks in foreign affairs he appears to be making up for systematically--not by political tourist activity but through work. The fact that he can lead, while taking full advantage of his rights to assess guidelines, is not in doubt anywhere. Wherever smooth intellect, indefatigable application and clear judgment are indispensable the politician born in 1928 does extremely well. On the other hand, Stoltenberg lacks all semblance of charisma and even the gift of compelling oratory or the ability to present exciting ideas in a fascinating manner. While audiences listen to him attentively and believe what he tells them, no one will excitedly jump up from his seat.

Stoltenberg is a man of democracy by consensus, not a man of confrontation, a liberal conservative who with dependability and integrity knows how to influence the political center--a contrast to Strauss. Matters causing public uproar and scandals are hardly imaginable under his aegis. And finally he is believed to be able to win over the Free Democrats for a coalition. He therefore enjoys a great deal of trust in the CDU. All this leads the party to hope for a beneficial momentum during the Bundestag elections, at least north of the Main--in other words, where the CDU, judging by what happened in North Rhine-Westphalia, has more reason than elsewhere to fear for its electoral support.

In case he should win in the election, Strauss, in addition to the vice chancellorship, has assigned to the minister president in Kiel responsibility for fiscal and economic matters. It is in this field above all that Stoltenberg wants to conduct the fight against the SPD-FDP coalition. "Without detracting in any way from his political competency," says Stoltenberg, "it must be said that Schmidt simply no longer discharges his leadership task." What Stoltenberg misses is a needed change of course in fiscal policy although immediately after the outbreak of the Afghanistan crisis everyone realized that such a change was necessary. Everyone, he says, realized that foreign and security policy now required greater financial efforts. Stoltenberg wonders why the chancellor early this year failed to react to the depressed mood of the population by making it clear that there was a need for an expenditures economy oriented toward greater parsimoniousness. After all, the opposition had offered its cooperation.

Instead Bonn had passed laws--such as those for protection from noise, assistance to youth and so on--imposing burdens of billions of marks on the Laender. Stoltenberg regards as a warning signal the Brussels EEC compromise about reducing Great Britain's contribution and Bonn's inability to cut these excess costs from the budget. He does suspect that--in compensation for the EEC decision--the federal government is also using the scheduled tax increases as a means of putting pressure on the Laender in order to come up with a higher federal share in the new distribution of tax income.

Stoltenberg misses convincing starts toward an appreciable reduction of the excessive new indebtedness, particularly since prospects of sizable rates of growth are decreasing all the time. What aggravates the situation in addition, in his opinion, is the fact that there are two opposing groups within the SPD of which one wants greater growth while the other is increasingly skeptical about growth. Stoltenberg thinks it is "a calamity" that under these circumstances the SPD has pledged to support a 35-hour week. He considers this objective proper for older employees and women but not for everyone. It has nothing at all to do with social progress any longer, he says. Wage costs would increase as a result and make exports more difficult, causing dire difficulties for the middle classes. The successful Japanese, he remarks, work 4 weeks more a year than we do. Stoltenberg reproaches the chancellor, who knows better, for doing nothing about these trends.

Nuclear Energy an Aim of Attack

Stoltenberg's second aim of attack is the nuclear energy policy of the SPD-FDP coalition. "I do not see any indication whatever of the federal government wanting to conduct a consistent policy of expanding nuclear power," he says. Bonn was talking about liquefaction of coal as an alternative to nuclear power, knowing full well that such a development would devour billions of marks which so far had not been provided for in fiscal planning.

In foreign and security policy Stoltenberg regards it as crucial for the CDU/CSU to stand up as a champion of German-U.S. friendship. He is watching with concern a new anti-Americanism and a new "without me" movement on the left. He says the CDU/CSU must make an effort to oppose this more effectively by putting forward its ideas of peace and freedom.

In fiscal policy as well as in the fields of nuclear energy and Western policy, Stoltenberg perceives cracks and weaknesses in the SPD. By contrast, he is convinced that "the great strength of the CDU/CSU in the truly central questions--among which I include the Atlantic alliance, insuring the supply of energy and fiscal policy--is that it is united and capable of action. It is free of the serious orientation struggles in the SPD."

Influence of CDU Liberals

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 13 Jun 80 p 3

[Article by Carl-Christian Kaiser: "Strauss Strengthens Leftwing--Liberals in CDU Gain in Influence"]

[Text] The team behind Franz Josef Strauss, Gerhard Stoltenberg and Helmut Kohl is a respectable lot. There is no justification for describing it contemptuously as "Volksstrum" [territorial army, of young and old not qualified for regular military service, formed by the Germans toward the end of World War II], as was done, albeit before its formation, by a member of the CDU Presidium. It is not a last reserve; nor is it a bunch of people lumped together or difficult to size up. There are 23 persons in all--a group that can be surveyed. The CDU/CSU team is not one whose outline gets blurred after a while.

Of course, the surprise effect is small. Except for Werner Dollinger and Fritz Zimmermann, all those who are now in the inner circle of potential ministers belonged to Kohl's shadow cabinet in 1976. And Dollinger and Zimmerman too are old charioteers of the party. Too, the team of 11 accompanying the 3 top people and the 9 who (in addition to Stoltenberg) definitely are meant to become ministers are, to quite a large extent, people who already played a role in Kohl's team 4 years ago or otherwise enjoyed rank and reputation. Quite apart from consideration for the claims and the inherent power of the established, the reservoir of the CDU/CSU, after all, is not so great as to enable it to come up with many entirely new convincing candidates.

Many old faces, in other words. But, beyond identity as such, the fact that to a large extent the new team is the same as Kohl's in 1976 is the most noteworthy criterion. For this identity of persons clearly means that the party's liberal and social element has been preserved in the new team--in fact, is represented even more strongly than before. Included in the representatives of this portion of the party among the prospective ministers are Heinrich Geissler, Walther Leisler Kiep and Helga Wex, plus Hans Maier and Manfred Woerner and perhaps Rainer Barzel. And in the accompanying team one can definitely include Norbert Blum, State Secretary in the Rhineland-Palatinate Social Affairs Ministry Renate Hellwig, Richard von Weizsaecker and Matthias Wissman, chairman of the Young CDU. Thus quite a bit is being offered to those socially enlightened and liberal-minded voters who are not wedded to voting for the CDU/CSU and so far have been so irritated and perhaps frightened off by the top candidate Strauss.

Strauss did not curtail this team, suffering shipwreck wherever he tried to do so. His attempt to ease out Geissler through the surprising nomination of Barzel failed. This in turn is all the more remarkable as the CDU secretary general--unlike Strauss, but very plausibly--has no use for attacking Helmut Schmidt directly and making foreign policy the crucial election campaign issue of the opposition.

True, it is a flaw that the potential ministers have not also already been assigned all the ministerial posts, but if one interprets this with schadenfreude as confirming Strauss' indecisiveness, one mistakes the political reality. If he is to remain prepared for the vagaries of the formation of a government--something which has always been difficult in a CDU/CSU in which things are so much a matter of personalities--one cannot duly expect him to do anything more than give indications. In any case, for the time being the only office that is set is that of party leader in the Bundestag. The fact that Kohl wants to continue in that capacity is an important preliminary decision, particularly in case of an election defeat, when the question of the CDU and CSU continuing to exist together and to form a single party in the Bundestag probably will be at issue again. However, it is not to be taken for granted that Kohl would retain Strauss' blessings as party leader in the Bundestag also after an election debacle.

Anyway, it is possible to figure out or at least surmise who--in addition to the already clearly nominated Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Stoltenberg and Defense Minister Woerner--might fill what office. Geissler to social affairs, Maier to a once again merged Ministry of Education and Research, Mrs Wex to family and youth--all that almost goes without saying.

Things get more tricky in the question of the Foreign Office. It would seem logical to give that post to the widely traveled Kiep. But as a foreign-policy, or at least Ostpolitik, man Kiep is not to the liking of Strauss and the conservative part of the CDU/CSU. They would prefer Zimmermann, whom many people in the CDU, however, would find it difficult to put up with in that post. So it would not be farfetched for Barzel to become the CDU/CSU nominee for foreign minister, and Kiep for economic minister. In any case, a man of Barzel's stature cannot be given a ministry with a strictly limited field.

In turn, many people can see Zimmermann as minister in the Office of the Chancellor in this puzzle--as Strauss' Ehmke, as it were. But of late the head of the CSU Land group in the Bundestag has been getting pretty tired of being Strauss' drudge. If the Foreign Office remains out of his reach, one can therefore easily imagine his eyeing the post of minister of interior. Alfred Dregger, to whom the augurs allot this post as a matter of course, would then be left out and might, for instance, find himself relegated to the Ministry of Transport, particularly since Strauss if he becomes chancellor would again put an end to the same person heading a Ministry of Transport and Post, with the latter portfolio then being available for Dollinger.

The rest, however, remains sheer speculation--particularly also because, for example, there is as yet no visible candidate at all for such a major portfolio as the Ministry of Justice. Strauss' shadow cabinet has a few clear and some probable contours. More important than the outline, however, is the fact that one can see in the team behind Strauss the center and the relatively left wing of the CDU/CSU, which he has been blocking from view to such an extent heretofore. This is what counts above all, since a "mild" Strauss--as certified by the elections in the Saarland and in North Rhine--Westphalia--has not met with enough credibility and the thunderer Strauss only arouses new doubts.

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ANNUAL REPORT REVIEWS ACTIVITIES OF EXTREMIST PARTIES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by bhr: "The DKP Has Changed Its Tactics"]

[Text] Wiesbaden, 4 July--The extremist groups on both the left and the right are not getting any new members, are not finding any support among the people and do not pose an acute danger to the free democratic basic structure of the FRG. The constitutional police in Hesse arrived at this conclusion in their report for the year 1979, which Minister of the Interior Gries issued on Friday in Wiesbaden.

As a result of observing the DKP, which has 5,000 members in Hesse, the police arrived at the conclusion that this Moscow-oriented party has changed the tactics of its federal policy in order to penetrate its political isolation. The DKP, they say, is now striving to achieve massive connections with the environmental protectionists, nuclear energy opponents and other groups they previously rejected for ideological reasons. Members and functionaries of the DKP in Hesse were importuned to have an influence on the citizens initiatives in order to be able to win over active citizens, especially the younger ones working in these groups, "for a fundamental criticism of the capitalist system and for the socialist alternative."

The Marxist Spartacus Student Association (MSB), a daughter organization of the DKP, has 1,200 members in Hesse and about 1,400 young people belong to the Socialist German Working Youth (SDAJ) in Hesse. The Communist Association of West Germany (KBW) has 400 activists in Hesse but according to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution [BFV] is the sole organization of the dogmatic New Left, which is capable of mobilizing up to 5,000 persons for individual activities. Financially, the KBW is supported by the party-owned Kuehl Corporation in Frankfurt, which has leading KBW members on its board. The BFV report presented by Gries also says of the KBW: "As a result of purchasing more buildings, as well as setting up legal and medical practices, the party was able to further strengthen its organization in 1979."

The threat of terrorism continues to be imminent according to the security police report. The terrorists being searched for are preparing for new

actions. Various bank robberies suggest that the RAF is getting ready for new "commando operations."

The supportive base of the RAF remains to be active in the entire territory of the FRG and in West Berlin. The Hessian supportive groups of the RAF have been devoting themselves intensively to incarcerated terrorists, observing trials, handing out leaflets and indicating an increased militancy.

Neo-Nazi individual fighters discussed by Minister of the Interior Gries are also showing themselves to be militant and are enjoying media coverage which reflects a power of organization which does not at all exist. The number of rightist extremists in Hesse is estimated at about 1,000. Last year 154 anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi disruptions and spray-painting activities were registered by the police and Hessian courts imposed prison terms and fines on 18 rightist radicals. The attorney Manfred Roeder, probably the most well known neo-Nazi in Hesse, who has a warrant out against him and is forbidden to practice his profession, is no longer taken very seriously by many of his supporters, according to the BfV. He has expressed admiration for the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini in his letters from abroad.

9527

CSO: 3103

YOUTH VIEWS ON POLITICS, SOCIETY PROBED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 May 80 p 3

[Article by Jutta Roitsch: "Politically, They Fall into Line Somewhere to the Left. The Young Generation and Their Attitude Towards Politics: A Forum of the German Shell"]

[Text] "I keep out of politics. It is something that has nothing to do with my own needs or those of the population." Susanne Schliffer, 22, is a student of pedagogics at the Frankfurt University. She is not politically active, neither in the established nor in the alternative groups. Yet the imminent Bundestag election and the Union's candidate for chancellor, Franz Josef Strauss, do concern her. "If it is such a close call, I do get involved and voice my opinion."

Many students think this way, if one can believe the group which made a slide film entitled "Youth Between Adjustment and Dropping Out" for the Forum of the German Shell Youth Welfare Organization. Ralf Nagel, for instance, a 22-year-old student of mathematics, cannot identify with the political parties, either, but works with a group which "clearly states what it is working against": war, neofascism, armament, political exclusion from professions. But Ralf will "definitely vote" for the party which "tallies" with his opinion the most. His expectations as far as politics or his university studies are concerned are not very high.

Paid youth researchers and politicians hardly know much more than was presented in the short film shown at Gracht Castle, which contained some students' statements on personal matters, their studies, opinions and attitudes towards politics. The images which they continue to draw about "the" youth remain somewhat vague and superficial. Using tables, curves, and statistics, Eckehard Hagen, official planner in the Chancellor's office, drew up a youth image from the party-political viewpoint. For Bonn, "youth" does not begin until age 18 and is reduced to the question of which party the young and first-time voter will vote for when he makes his mark on the ballot.

According to this information, young voters have given preference to the Social Democrats since 1969. Allowing for some fluctuation, for the past 11 years more than 50 percent have voted for the SPD and 30 percent for the

CDU/CSU. According to Hagen a "change in the trend" is not apparent. He states that while there is a feeling of disappointment among young voters regarding the reform willingness of the SPD, the latter is still regarded with more trust than the CDU and the CSU as far as the solution of difficult issues is concerned, e.g. solving the problem of unemployment. To the civil servant in the Chancellor's Office the source testifying to youth's extended trust is reliable and unsuspecting: the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which is a CDU affiliate.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that between one-third to half of the youths do not vote at all, and up to 10 percent have tended to vote for alternative, green, or multicolored slates since the last Bundestag election.

During the Shell Forum, Hagen also uncovered the Infratest polls, which usually are kept absolutely secret, on the political involvement of youths: Of the 18-to 21-year-olds, 31 percent showed a "very strong interest in politics" (March 1980); the same applied to 41 percent of the 22-to 24-year-olds, and 22 percent had "little to no" interest in politics. These numbers gain importance in view of the fact that the vast majority of youths between the ages of 18 and 24 fall into the political ranks of somewhere to the "left" to "mid-left."

Hardly anyone of those responsible in Bonn has asked for the reasons why youths exhibit these attitudes--neither in the Chancellor's Office nor in the party fractions. Even young politicians like CDU Bundestag deputy Matthias Wissmann, who was present at the Shell Forum, have a hard time even listening to young people. They come, utter sweet nothings and disappear again. Politicians like this are certain to become the targets of youth's wrath, because the young people get the feeling that they are not being taken seriously. The same thing is true of those scientists who conducted tests on behalf of the Shell Foundation regarding "The Young Generation's Attitude Towards the Working World and the Economic Order of 1979" by means of computer question catalogues.

The patterns of behavior found by the Munich Institute of Youth Research are too concrete for those concerned. According to the researchers the topics which youths will discuss with others are environmental protection, unemployment among youth, differences between capitalism and communism, job security, and the situation of guest workers. Only a few suggestions were voiced to correct the current economic order, which should provide more equal opportunities. Dropping out and leaving society's prescribed and desired paths does not occur or very rarely occurs among youth, they say; instead, the list of wishes for the future is headed by children, a happy family life, recognition, achievement, and success. Politically, "nonoffensive behavior" is in high regard.

This is enumeration of apparently proven facts caused uneasiness among those involved; in some instances it caused boredom. "I have nothing to do with this," "I do not recognize myself in it," they said, and uttered their mistrust: youth research by an "oil multi" was bound to be a dubious undertaking.

Of course, there is also uneasiness on the part of the client who ordered the research. It has been financing youth research for almost 30 years. Shell Director Volker Hoffmann thinks that the topic of "Youth Between Adjustment and Dropping Out" has become too fashionable. "It is used more by incompetent than by competent people," he says. And there is too much talk about young people, but too little talk with them. Hoffmann also expressed doubts as to whether youth research so far has actually dealt with the core issues or has evaded them by using obsolete outlines of empirical social research.

Those doubts were kindled by psychologist and pedagogue Thomas Ziehe, 32. Up to a short time ago, this young scientist from Hanover did not belong to the circle that "one" tended to invite to meetings and forums. He now has to watch that he is not marketed as a "youth guru" who knows what is going on in youth's psyche.

There is something fascinating, however, about the way he approaches the topics youth, self-actualization, and experience of social changes by means of psychoanalysis. He talks about changes in the role of mothers and fathers, total care from early childhood on, the weakened structure of values and standards. He speaks of the problems youths have in choosing the life style most fit for them from the various existing and coexisting life styles. According to Ziehe, competition and the merit principle are omnipresent, and the increased freedom of movement of today's youth burdens the individual youth in his search of himself and his self-regard much more than was the case in former generations when more or less fixed "paths of development" existed.

States Thomas Ziehe: "Nobody so far has really thought out what it actually means to a youth that all areas are occupied, that there is hardly any area left in which one can be original." At Gracht Castle, the youths sat on the floor in a circle with Thomas Ziehe. They listened and gradually opened up to discussion, because finally there was someone who did not speak about them, but with them.

9544

CS0: 3103

POLL FINDS ALMOST AS MANY FEAR NATO ICBM'S AS AFGHAN MOVE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Jun 80 p 6

[Article: "Finns Believe Firmly in Their Foreign Policy; Afghanistan, Iran, and NATO Missiles Are Frightening"]

[Text] The Afghanistan and Iran crises and the placement of NATO missiles in Western Europe clearly disturb most of all the belief of Finns in the preservation of world peace.

The economic and Olympic boycotts of the United States and the situation in Yugoslavia after Tito, on the other hand, do not give much cause for concern.

Finland's own peace is threatened most by the NATO missile decision and the worsening of relations between Norway and the Soviet Union, not by geographically distant Afghanistan and Iran with their crises.

Almost 90 percent of Finns consider the conduct of our foreign policy in recent years to have been good. The information is based on a study on Finnish opinions about security policy ordered by the Planning Committee for National Defense Information.

This time the Planning Committee ordered, in addition to its 10th in a continuing series of studies, a quick study, in which the attitudes of just under 500 Finns on crises in world politics which have appeared in the media. The study was done by Irja Kandolin, a candidate in political science.

More than half of the respondents considered the Afghanistan and Iran crises and the NATO missile decision either extremely or very threatening from the point of view of world peace. About 80 percent of the respondents consider the Yugoslavian situation either only slightly or not at all threatening.

35 percent of the respondents consider the NATO missile decision as either extremely or very threatening to Finland's peace. On the other hand, 27 percent consider that the missiles do not threaten Finland's peace at all.

The strain in relations between Norway and the Soviet Union, which has been claimed in the media, is considered by Finns to be equally threatening to peace from the point of view of Finland and of world peace. The Afghanistan and Iran crises and the United States' boycott decision are evaluated as only slightly or not at all threatening the peace of our country.

The possibility of a military defeat is considered by over 70 percent of the respondents to be very or extremely unlikely. Women and young people believe in the probability of military defeat a little more than do others.

In general, when attitudes toward world events were evaluated, there were hardly any differences according to the education or occupation of the respondents. The greatest differences were caused by the respondents' political stand.

Supporters of the Coalition for the most part, but also supporters of the Center Party, more than representatives of the parties of the left, tend to feel that crises are threatening. Supporters of the four major parties are of the same opinion about preserving Finland's peace.

The great majority of respondents has a positive attitude to the YYA (expansion unknown) agreement. However, young people under age 25, evaluate the agreement somewhat more negatively than do others. Among the parties, the Coalition has a less positive attitude toward the YYA agreement than the other parties.

Even though people were concerned about the preservation of world peace, the worry was not reflected in their attitude about defense policy in their own country.

In the opinion of 43 percent of the respondents, defense expenditures can be kept as at present. Ten percent proposed reducing expenditures and 37 proposed increases.

Trust in foreign policy is seen also in a strengthening belief that Finland can remain outside a great European war.

How Do Crises Threaten Peace Between the Great Powers?

	Afghanistan situation %	Iran situation %	Yugoslavian situation %	Strained Norway- Soviet relations %	NATO missile decision %	USA's economic & Olympic boycott %
Extremely Threatening	19	15	2	3	17	10
Very Threatening	47	42	10	16	34	23
Slightly Threatening	27	33	37	45	34	30
Not at all Threatening	5	8	44	32	10	34
Don't Know	2	2	7	4	5	3
	100	100	100	100	100	100

9611

CSO: 3107

PARLIAMENT PASSES SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET, ADJOURNS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Jun 80 p 9

[Article: "Left and KEPU Get Their Own Points in the Supplementary Budget; Parliament Has Left for a Three-Month Vacation"]

[Excerpts] The left and bourgeois parties in the government were in opposite camps on Wednesday in the Parliament debate on the supplementary budget.

The supplementary budget itself was approved in a vote that lasted over an hour. In addition to the supplementary budget came points from the Social Democratic and Center Parties.

The dispute in Wednesday's session was started by the government. The left complained that the Center Party and the RKP [Swedish People's Party] got by mistake 5.6 million marks into the supplementary budget for support of home care for the unemployed.

The left opposed the support on the grounds that the purpose of the support was just to make unemployment figures look better. The amount of support would be 700 marks per month, whereas unemployment assistance is about 900 marks per month. The left considered the proposal a weakening of income security for the unemployed.

The Center Party explained that the support is designed to help unemployed parents who receive orders to start work and have difficulties because of children to support.

The Parliament's finance committee eliminated the support for home care after the Center Party was left alone in the voting. After that the KEPU [Center Party] proposed in the committee that the funds be shifted to financing vacations for farms. KEPU lost this vote as well....

Agriculture Budget

The supplementary budget approved by Parliament, 1.6 billion marks in final total, is the first of this year. An amount of 4.6 million marks for copyright compensation was eliminated from the budget during the debate in Parliament. The second legal committee wanted to consider thoroughly a new copyright law, and the money for compensation will be in the fall supplementary budget.

Expenses in the supplementary budget were caused mostly by employment care, the agricultural income decision, and the rise in the prices of petroleum products. The 5.0 million for agriculture promoted by the Center Party is a new round of expenses. It cannot be considered a substitute for support for home care; that support, if it had been implemented, would have reduced expenses for unemployment compensation.

In the voting on the supplementary budget, which lasted over an hour, the points proposed by the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] and the opposition Communists were the main items in question. Besides the points of Koivisto and Martikainen, Parliament did not approve any other amendments.

The proposal of Esko Koppanen (KOK [Coalition]) to continue the search for helicopters suitable for sea rescues, was rejected by a vote of 92 to 50.

The finance committee says in the supplementary budget that helicopters being obtained from the Soviet Union will be provided with the best possible equipment for sea rescue.

Parliament will return to work from its 3-month vacation on September 23d.

9611

CSO: 3107

PAPER COMMENTS ON PARLIAMENTARY SESSION'S RECORD

[Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Jun 80 p 2]

[Editorial: "Parliament Performed Satisfactorily the Tasks of the Spring Session"]

[Text] Parliament has now begun a 3-month vacation at the same time as a year ago, but with a different feeling. Then there was a background of parliamentary elections, negotiations on forming a government, and a short session. This session was normal in length, and the fall municipal elections are ahead, for which reason most members of Parliament will spend their vacations on political activity.

Parliament received 83 new bills from the government and considered 73 of them. It was a unique occurrence that none of the matters considered differed greatly from the others in size. The laws and amendments passed were relatively small, but of course necessary for social progress and international relations, among other things.

Among the more interesting matters was a law to repeal the entertainment tax, in which Parliament showed commendable initiative in rewriting the government's proposal. On the other hand, a few proposals of broader general significance, which will lead to political disputes, were postponed till fall. Some of these are of course the modernization of the highway-traffic law, proposals for copyright for literary and artistic works and the right to photograph, and the so-called "rebellion law," a proposal for official help to police from the armed forces.

But the spring session contained a few other noteworthy features. Parliament received a report from the government in March on family policy. The budget report came in May, and though it was more vague than expected, and the debate was not very fruitful, the way was opened by which Parliament can increase its possibilities to influence the preparation of the budget proposals. The same line for additional influence should be applied also for negotiations between government and Parliament in the preparation of other more important proposals.

New features also appeared in consideration of the reports of the government and the attorney general as well as proposals by members of Parliament. Among these is to be considered the fact that Parliament is increasing its use of the power to supervise and its own initiative. This is also shown by the fact that at times almost every committee was considering initiatives and government proposals were not being heard. The result was some initiative resolutions and about ten approved points expressing desires. That isn't much, but it is more than average.

The search for additional work was influenced also by--in addition to the delay of government proposals--criticism of idle periods in Parliament. But that remained very one-sided, as it dealt only with the amount of work. After all, nothing requires that Parliament should always be fully productive while in session like a factory, always throwing out laws regardless of the situation.

To be sure, the recent session also included a few features which are less suitable for Parliament's position. Some of these are, among others, the visible absences from voting and committee meetings, so that there was often not even a quorum present. In committee considerations there was occasionally seen and applied the less than desirable scene which the opposition displayed with a temporary majority when a committee was considering an increase in children's supplements.

Some of these negative features were influenced by the cracks that appeared in government cooperation throughout the spring, and the irritation caused as a result. These difficulties hindered, in addition to the internal workings of the government, also communication between government and Parliament and even the work of making laws. The reasons were political, partly connected with the recent party congresses, and they were never able to be overcome with any negotiations.

But hopefully we have learned from experience. In any case, the spring session of Parliament can be considered satisfactory from the point of view of the work of law-making.

9611

CSO: 3107

CENTER PARTY CONGRESS ELECTS NEW PARTY SECRETARY

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 17 Jun 80 p 5

[Text] Seppo Kaariainen, 32, Master of Political Science, is the Center Party's new and unmistakably popular party secretary, succeeding the more austere and inaccessible former diplomat Mikko Immonen. It is hoped that the new party secretary will succeed in stimulating the people out in the countryside to new efforts for the improvement of the party.



Seppo Kaariainen

Kaariainen was born in Idensalmi in 1948 and still speaks with a broad accent. Herein lies some of his popular appeal. It is also due to his genial and uncomplicated way of talking to people. He is easy to get along with, and is a much needed complement to the more reserved new party chairman, Paavo Vayrynen. In his speech of thanks to the party congress Kaariainen said that he is going to try to concentrate heavily on strengthening party work and stimulating party enthusiasm in the field. Previously he diligently traveled around among the party's "grass roots" and thereby established a firm foundation for his position as party secretary. Inside the party they have hopes that Kaariainen will develop into "a new Arvo Korsimo," the legendary party secretary who in his time set up a powerful party organization.

Kaariainen is also very knowledgeable ideologically. In the speech of thanks to the congress he gave in personal motto, which in translation says approximately, "Spirit and power are much more important than prodigious papers and great wealth."

Inside the Center Party Kaariainen is considered a part of the so-called K-line. When asked how he defines the K-line, he replied, "A good foreign policy and a constructive domestic policy."

A constructive domestic policy, according to Kaariainen, means cooperation across party lines between the bourgeois parties and the left. The framework of government cooperation during the 1980's should include the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party.

Like the recently elected party chairman Paavo Vayrynen, Kaariainen is convinced that general community development gives the Center Party bright prospects of increasing its support. Among other things, the ecological questions and the increased importance of the so-called quality of life should lead voters to the "green party." And one of the passwords of practical politics in this connection should be "centralization."

Seppo Kaariainen began his university studies in 1967 and received his Bachelor of Political Science degree in 1970. The same year he became research secretary for the Center Party. During 1974-75 he was chief investigator for the party. During 1975-77 he was political secretary, first to the then minister of education, Paavo Vayrynen and thereafter to the then prime minister, Martti Miettunen. In 1977 he was appointed chief of the Planning and Information Department of the Center Party.

9287

CSO: 3109

STUDY CONFIRMS TREND OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION, NARROWING CENTER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 May 80 p 21

[Article by Hannu Savola: "Center Parties Are Pressed"]

[Text] The support curve for the political center is continually declining. The Coalition is wedging in from the right and the Social Democrats are squeezing from the left.

The political center is in difficulty. The support curves for the Center party, the Sweden, and the Liberals are continually going downhill. In addition, the Coalition is threatening by its growth to push the right wing from its place.

Already in the last elections, the Social Democrats grew bigger than the center groups, and the Coalition, excluded from the government, has for the first time in the history of the country grown almost as large as the center.

The center, especially the Center Party (formerly Maalaisliitto [Agricultural Union]) has had a central position in the government of the country during the whole period since independence. That position will apparently remain in the future as well, but a change in power relationships is making government more difficult than before for the center.

At the beginning of the 60's, the parties of the center still had over 80 seats; now they have only 50. That is a drop of more than 30 seats in less than 20 years.

The role of the center groups in the national-front government is made especially difficult by the growth of the Coalition, which has been kept in the opposition for 14 years. At this moment the Coalition group in Parliament has 47 members, or just three less than the center groups. In addition, all opinion polls show a continuing pattern of growth for the Coalition.

The number of members of Parliament from the center has continually decreased in the last six elections, with one exception. A veritable collapse happened in 1970, when the SMP thundered into Parliament.

Reasons for Kepu's Decline

Kepu, whose support in Parliamentary elections has collapsed from 23 percent to about 17 percent and whose membership in Parliament has dropped by 17, has lost the most. The decline in support leveled off during the '70's to be sure. On the other hand, the people's parties have continually lost ground.

The main reason for the shrinking of Kepu is the violent change in the structure of the population and their means of earning a living. Olavi Borg, professor of political science and former Liberal member of Parliament, thinks it is a wonder that the Center Party has remained as strong as it still is.

Borg says that the small-businessmen, among whom agricultural businessmen are a large majority, have decreased in numbers from over 750,000 to 260,000 in 20 years.

"The Center Party has been able to increase its support compared to other parties among the agricultural population, and on the other hand it has strengthened its position also among white-collar workers," Borg says.

Borg says that support for the Center Party in districts with agricultural population has grown during the last couple of decades by five percentage points. At this moment it is a little over 60 percent.

About 10 percent of the white-collar workers are supporters of Kepu, according to Borg, whereas at the end of the 1940's their support was only about 4 percent.

Also another political scientist, editor-in-chief Jan-Magnus Jansson, formerly an active politician in the RKP [Swedish People's Party], thinks that support figures for the Center Party are greater than would be predictable from the change in means of earning a living.

In Jansson's opinion this shows that the party has succeeded in attracting support in rural areas beyond the agricultural population proper. "In the cities, to be sure, Kepu has not been able to obtain a very strong foothold, despite strong efforts."

The Center Party lost support during the 1970's principally to the Maaseudun Puolue [Rural Party]. Since then some party voters have been siphoned off by the Christians and the Coalition.

Future of Language Party Problematical

The Swedish People's Party is a typical language party, whose greatest problems have been the steady decline in the Swedish-speaking portion of the population and the heterogeneous makeup of its body of supporters.

The party leadership has had to perform a balancing act in order to keep together a party whose voters represent different areas, different ideologies, and different means of earning a living.

Since the beginning of the 1960's, the RKP's share of the voters has dropped from 6.5 percent to 4-1/2, and the number of its members in Parliament from 14 to 10.

In the first half of the 1970's, Georg C. Ehrnrooth's constitutional wing broke off, which drew away voters of the right. Left-wing parties have also traditionally campaigned for Swedish-speaking voters as have the Christians and the Coalition in recent years.

The many faces of the RKP are illustrated well in the party leadership's "mandate division": the chairman represents the young people and the party's liberals, one of the vice-chairmen represents the agricultural wing, one the women, and one the moderate right.

In practice, the RKP's possibilities for growth are quite limited. Editor-in-chief Jansson even observes realistically that the RKP can hardly grow at all. "It will be most important for it to be able to attract the bilinguals, and thus to preserve its previous positions," he predicts.

Fateful Moments for the Liberals

The Suomen Kansanpuolue [Finnish People's Party], which was the predecessor of the Liberaalinen Kansanpuolue [Liberal People's Party], had 14 members in Parliament at the beginning of the 1960's. Today's Liberals are the smallest group in Parliament, with only four members. The party's share of the vote has collapsed from 6.5 percent to 3.7 percent in barely 20 years.

During the ten-year chairmanship of Pekka Tarjanne, support for the Liberals declined in all elections, in spite of the fact that the chairman predicted that the LKP would grow to be the largest non-Socialist group and that the party's share of the voters would rise to over 10 percent.

Neither did Jaakko Itala's term as chairman begin well. After his election, he announced that a renewed LKP would raise its share to 8 percent. The Liberals' vote harvest nonetheless was smaller than ever before, 3.7 percent.

Olavi Borg thinks that the main reason for his party's decline has been that the LKP has not been able to get new supporters from the growing white-collar class.

Borg observes that at the end of the 1940's, the people's parties were the second largest group among white-collar workers, behind the Coalition. At that time almost 30 percent of white-collar workers supported the people's parties. "The people's parties have not completely lost the white-collar workers to other parties, but all growth has gone to the other parties,

and the Liberals' and Swedes' share has dropped to around 15 percent," he says.

In Jan-Magnus Jansson's opinion, it is vitally important to the whole center to gain new ground in the white-collar area. "For the Liberals, this is a matter of life and death," he observes.

According to Jansson, the Liberals have fallen into a severe squeeze between the SDP and the Coalition, and the party has not succeeded in attracting voters, even though its potential possibilities for growth are great. "Liberalism has become common property to all."

Searching for Ways To Cooperate.

In the last half of the 1960's, political cooperation was begun in order to unify the dwindling forces of the center. The architects of cooperation in the center were Johannes Virolainen, Mikko Juva, and Jan-Magnus Jansson, who were chairmen in 1967.

In Jansson's opinion, cooperation has been necessary for all. "For example, the RKP is too small as a party to fly by itself in the air," says Jansson. He believes that not even growth of the Coalition will be able to separate the RKP from the center, although the party's right wing thinks of cooperation as more practical than a matter of principle.

Jansson estimates that cooperation in the center during the 80's will lead to a tighter organization, which, however, will not absorb the RKP into itself.

Olavi Borg goes further than Jansson, and predicts that in this decade there will be born a "coalition-type loose center grouping."

Both Jansson and Borg believe that the center will maintain its key position in government politics.

In Jansson's opinion, only two miracles could take this key position away from the center: "A government of all parties could be formed or else the SDP and the Coalition could find each other." Jansson does consider the latter miracle to be possible at some stage.

"The growth of the Coalition and the decline in the center's share of the voters does make it more and more difficult for the center to bear government responsibility," he says.

Editor-in-chief Jansson thinks it probable that in the near future governmental cooperation will have to go through a bourgeois phase in the manner of certain other Western countries, because the present government does not appear able to repeat itself.

9611

CSO: 3107

POLL INDICATES BOURGEOIS PARTIES GAIN IN OCTOBER VOTE RACE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 16 May 80 p 8

[Article: "If an Election Were Held: a Bourgeois Majority for County Councils"]

[Text] The selection of county councils by elections, which the government is about to approve, would bring a clear bourgeois majority to every county council. This can be concluded from both the last Parliamentary election and the party-support figures shown in the most recent public-opinion polls.

The Coalition would be the largest party in the councils of Uusimaa, Turku-Pori, and Häme counties.

The Social Democrats would be the dominant party in Kymi, Central Finland, North Karelia, and Mikkeli counties.

The remaining councils, in Kuopio, Vaasa, Oulu, and Lapland counties, would be controlled by the Center Party. The SKDL would not be in the position of largest party in any county.

Three weeks ago the government decided that the county councils would appoint a government in each county according to the prevailing political relationships.

The party commission of the Center Party was dissatisfied with the views of its ministers, however. So the Kepu later ministers changed to support elections for county councils to take place in connection with municipal elections.

The Center Party ministers have worried that from the party's viewpoint the small agricultural communities, on which their party support is based, would not receive sufficient representation compared to the cities. Attempts are being made to solve this problem through the election arrangements. One possibility is the use of so-called long lists.

[Table]

Party Support by County in the Last Parliamentary Elections and According to the Most Recently Published Public-opinion Polls

County	Left-wing Parties	Bourgeois Parties	Parties' Proportional Share				Others
			SDP	SKDL	KOK	KEPU	
Uusimaa	EK 42.8	57.2	26.4	16.3	26.0	5.6	25.7
	M 42.9	57.1	27.2	15.7	29.1	5.4	22.6
Turku- Pori	EK 43.9	56.1	23.9	20.0	23.0	15.1	18.0
	M 43.6	56.4	24.4	19.2	25.6	14.7	16.1
Hame	EK 48.6	51.4	28.7	19.5	28.4	9.9	13.5
	M 48.0	52.0	29.3	18.7	31.7	9.6	10.6
Kymi	EK 45.0	55.0	34.7	10.3	22.5	15.9	16.6
	M 45.2	54.8	35.4	9.8	25.1	15.4	14.3
Mikkeli	EK 39.6	60.4	29.4	9.9	20.9	25.6	14.2
	M 39.3	60.7	29.9	9.4	23.3	25.0	12.4
Kuopio	EK 40.0	60.0	17.7	22.3	16.1	28.9	15.0
	M 39.5	60.5	18.1	21.4	18.0	28.1	14.4
Central Finland	EK 48.2	51.8	27.8	20.4	16.4	22.2	13.2
	M 48.1	51.9	28.5	19.6	18.2	21.6	12.1
North Karelia	EK 39.2	60.8	28.3	10.7	17.1	23.2	20.7
	M 39.2	60.8	29.0	10.2	19.1	22.5	19.2
Vaasa	EK 25.6	74.4	14.2	11.4	17.5	25.6	31.3
	M 25.2	74.8	14.4	10.8	19.6	25.0	30.2
Oulu	EK 39.5	60.5	13.2	26.2	14.5	33.0	13.0
	M 38.8	61.2	13.6	25.2	16.2	32.0	13.0
Lapland	EK 44.2	55.8	12.8	31.4	11.6	34.8	9.4
	M 43.3	56.7	13.1	30.2	12.9	33.9	9.9
Ahvenanmaa	EK --	--	--	--	--	--	100.0
	M --	--	--	--	--	--	100.0
Entire Country	EK 41.9	58.1	23.9	17.9	21.7	17.3	19.2
	M 41.6	58.4	24.4	17.2	24.2	16.8	17.4

The public-opinion poll trend is assumed to be the same in every county.

For the counties of Uusimaa, Häme, Mikkeli, and North Karelia, the total support figure for the left-wing in the Parliamentary election includes the share of the STP [expansion unknown] party.

Abbreviations: EK = 1979 Parliamentary election
M = 1980 data from the M-information center

(Computations by Juha Veikko Pietikainen, M.A.)

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MIDDLE PARTIES' CHAIRMEN AGREE ON NEED FOR COOPERATION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 May 80 p 21

[Article: "Cooperation Is Necessary for All"]

[Text] The chairmen of all three middle parties swear by cooperation in the center. Johannes Virolainen of Kepu and the Liberal's Jaakko Itala are finding possibilities for cooperation on principles. Par Stenback of the Swedes for his part regards cooperation as more practical, and the RKP as more of a general bourgeois party than an ideologically pure party of the center.

Virolainen offers to his partners as a basis for cooperation on principles among other things ecological goals and similar concepts on promoting the interests of white-collar workers.

Itala is in agreement with Virolainen and hopes that clear options for action will come from the center. "We are in such a critical situation that we must now separate ourselves from old things. A socialized state has almost been constructed."

All the chairmen believe that the center will maintain its key position in government politics in spite of the growth of the Coalition.

Virolainen compares the position of the center and especially that of his own party to the Italian Christian Democrats, who are condemned to government responsibility, because the country does not want to become polarized.

Whether the Coalition comes into the government depends on the Coalition itself, in Virolainen's opinion. He says that chairman Ilkka Suominen must begin to negotiate with the left. "It has been seen that there will not be a government in this country with a non-Socialist majority. If such a thing were going to start to happen, then surely Harri Holkeri should have been able to do it after the last election," Virolainen believes.

In Virolainen's opinion, there are hardly any choices in putting together a government. He recalls that cooperation has had good results. "It

would be an error to start breaking up this broad-based cooperation without knowing what to replace it with," says Virolainen.

Itala and Stenback would be ready to see the Coalition together with themselves in the same government. According to Stenback, the Swedes and the Coalition have no problems in cooperation.

Itala for his part considers that government responsibility would tend to cut off support for the Coalition: "The Coalition would not disturb anybody in the government. It's that much of a flexible party."

Especially Virolainen and Itala talk freely about the "forgotten" and "neglected" white-collar- and middle class.

Virolainen emphasizes that the Coalition has been best able to benefit from the change in social structure. In opposing high taxes, and Coalition has attained favor among the exploding white-collar population, which feels the national front--that accursed national front--has neglected it. "The growth in support for the Coalition is in large part a protest against high taxes," Virolainen says.

Stenback of the RKP admits that the policy of the Coalition has been clever. No one has been offended, and internal schisms have been avoided. "If the government has had a low profile, then the opposition's profile has been even lower."

In Itala's opinion, the Coalition, which has been outside the government for a long time, has achieved the reputation of a safe company. "The party promotes a policy of standing still, which at this moment seems to represent the will of the great majority."

In Itala's opinion the Coalition has received an undeserved rise in respect because the image of the center has become dimmer.

Especially in the people's parties the wisdom of cooperation has been violently debated at times, and it has been feared that the smaller factions would easily be trampled by Kepu. At this moment, the voice of those who oppose cooperation is rather small.

In the opinion of chairman Stenback, cooperation is now working well, and the RKP has benefited from it in terms of practical politics. He recalls among other things his party's strong representation in the national-front government: "Certainly the RKP is visible in the center, and we are listened to."

Nor does Itala fear that cooperation will endanger the party's individuality. "If we are boldly liberals, we will remain visible," affirms the leader of the smallest of the middle parties, and he is sure that the year's time spent by the Liberals in opposition has not made a dent in cooperation on principles.

POLL SHOWS COMMUNIST-FRONT PARTY LOSS, CONSERVATIVE GAIN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 May 80 p 3

[Article: "Party Strength Measured: Coalition Gained, SKDL Lost"]

[Text] The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic Union] has lost the most in support since the last parliamentary elections. The Kokoomus [Coalition] has succeeded best in improving its position. This information was revealed in a poll by Suomen Gallup [Gallup of Finland], which it made during April and May at the request of four large parties.

According to the poll, support for the SKDL has dropped from 17.9 percent in the parliamentary elections to 16.7 percent, or a loss of 1.2 percentage points. Support for the Coalition was measured by Gallup of Finland at 22.8 percent or 1.1 percentage points more than in the election.

The SDP [Social Democratic Party], for which the poll shows an increase of 0.6 percentage points, has maintained its position as clearly the largest party. Support for the SDP in April-May was 24.5 percent.

In the estimate published just a month ago by the M-information center, the support figures for the Coalition were 24.2 percent or about the same as the Social Democrats. According to the Gallup poll, the difference between the SDP and the Coalition would be 1.7 percent, however.

Also the Keskustapuolue [Center Party] has succeeded in increasing its support, according to the Gallup study. A support of 17.9 percent was measured for Kepu [Center Party], which is 0.6 percentage points more than in the election.

The small parties, with the exception of the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], have lost some of their support. The people's parties seem to have lost most of all.

Gallup of Finland interviewed almost 1200 persons of voting age in 111 communities between 20 April and 14 May.

[Table]

	PARTY SUPPORT		
	Parliamentary Elections, March 79	Gallup of Finland, April-May 80	Change since Parliamentary elections in %
SDP	23.9	24.5	+0.6
SKDL	17.9	16.7	-1.2
Kok	21.7	22.8	+1.1
Kepu	17.3	17.9	+0.6
SKL	4.8	4.5	-0.3
SMP	4.6	5.2	+0.6
RKP	4.5	3.9	-0.6
LKP	3.7	3.2	-0.5
PKP	1.2	1.0	-0.2
SKYP	0.3	0.3	+0.
Socialists combined	41.9	41.2	-0.7
Non-socialists combined	58.1	58.8	+0.7

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STALINIST CP-WING ORGAN COMMENTS ON VAYRYNEN WIN

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 17 Jun 80 p 2

[Editorial: "The Center's Choice"]

[Text] So that which many thought impossible, the fall of Johannes Virolainen from the leadership of the Center Party, is now an accomplished fact. Vayrynen's win was close, to be sure, but indisputable.

The main reason--along with effective field work--for Vayrynen's victory was the drop in support for the Center Party. By making the party leadership younger and in that way changing the general image of the party, a majority of the party congress hoped to bring the Center Party to a new rise.

An immediate prerequisite for Vayrynen's victory was an alliance with some of Virolainen's traditional supporters, which is also reflected in the choice of Tahkamaa for vice-chairman. It was also not unimportant that the change had the support of such veteran KEPU [Center Party] members as Sukselainen and Miettunen as well as that of President Kekkonen, as far as is known.

After his election, Vayrynen was quick to give assurance that the party's policies would not change. He also extended a hand of cooperation to those who had voted for Virolainen. No basic changes in KEPU's policies are likely to occur, since the party is after all very satisfied with, for example, the present government's policy line. But new areas of emphasis and new kinds of position statements in some matters can be expected from the new leadership.

In the congress the significance of Finland's peaceful foreign policy in the present international situation was stressed. It's cornerstone is the YYA treaty, the international statement observed. Keeping the Scandinavian situation stable was also emphasized. This must be considered especially valuable just now, when NATO, with its cruise missiles and weapons to be based in Norway, is attempting to upset the stable peace in Northern Europe.

As a concrete step toward insuring and hastening detente, the Center Party will act toward achieving a second conference on security and cooperation among the center and agricultural parties of Europe.

Great hopes have now been placed by the center on the new party leadership. To make good on them will not be easy however from the point of view of growth in support. The center cannot get ahead at the expense of the Coalition by adopting more and more right-wing stands on economic and domestic policy. The words of Mikko Immonen, who has just left the post of party secretary, to the effect that a clear line of demarcation between [the Center Party and] the Coalition must be maintained, are timely even after the Turku party congress.

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MODERATE CP-WING ORGAN SUMMARIZES FRONT'S PROGRAM

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 18 Jun 80 p 1, 5

[Article: "The SKDL's New Program Is Ready"]

[Text] The new party program of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic Union] is ready. The leadership of the union finalized it yesterday in their meeting, in accordance with directives of the council. The program was ratified in content at the meeting of the council held in mid-May. The themes of peace and humanity are emphasized in the program, and in its goals it is clearly socialist.

In the introduction to the new program, the basic ideas of SKDL activity, on which the almost 40-page program is constructed, are defined. They are:

- Nations, the world community, must be able to preserve and strengthen world peace;
- Peoples must be able to decide about their life and their future;
- Productive life must be made to take place on the basis of appropriately reasonable production, corresponding to the real needs of people;
- The activities of people must be in harmony with the rest of nature, so that natural systems will retain their ability to operate, which is a condition for the continuation of human life;
- People must be able to win back their self-respect, worth, and creativity;
- Inter-personal relationships must be built on the basis of mutual responsibility and world-wide solidarity; people must be freed from all kinds of exploitation, oppression, and humiliation.

The program is divided into four main chapters. In the first, whose heading is "The SKDL As a Gatherer of Progressive Forces," the birth, nature, and principles of activity of the SKDL are discussed.

An analysis of the world situation and an outline of Finland's international position and international responsibilities are contained in the program's second chapter.

In the third chapter, which is the most extensive, entitled "Viewpoints on the Development of our Country," the situation and central problems of Finnish society are evaluated, and the goals of the SKDL for economic policy and the expansion of fundamental civil rights are presented. In it are also discussed the achievement of deep social renewals and the creation of a new kind of democracy, and the aim of Socialism is defined.

Matters pertaining to culture and our way of life are contained in the program's final chapter, in which the SKDL outlines its goals for the development of our culture and the creation of a way of life better than at present.

The Goal is a Nature Package for Everyone

The leadership of the SKDL supports efforts to achieve a "nature package" expanding the rights of everyone by developing possibilities for spare-time fishing, boating, and hunting. The leadership considered the matter in its Tuesday meeting on the basis of a speech by Veikko Saaristo, minister of traffic. Timely questions about these three great national avocations are in the bill now being considered concerning bottom fishing, granting of deer-hunting permits to non-landowners and small farmers, and state participation in construction of small-boat harbors.

The leadership also accepted into the SKDL a unit from Satakunta province. It is called the Satakunta SKDL Technicians, and is based in Pori.

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ENERGY COMMISSION: GIVE MORE AUTHORITY TO PARLIAMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Apr 80 p 9

[Article: "Pekkanen's Committee: More Authority to Parliament in Energy Decisions"]

[Text] In the future permission for the use of nuclear energy will only be granted by a government decision approved by the Diet.

Before a decision in principle is made, a hearing will be granted to the residents of the proposed location of a nuclear power plant.

If the final storage place for nuclear wastes is to be the foundation rock of our country, the state must be made responsible for its security.

These plans are a part of the nuclear energy commission's first report, which was handed over on Tuesday to Trade and Industry Minister Ulf Sundqvist. The report contained a proposal for a new nuclear energy law even though the intent is to amend it with riders to the nuclear waste management law by the middle of June.

The task of this committee, which was established in 1978, was to compile a more timely set of rules to replace the atomic energy law of more than 20 years. The old law was so inadequate that, for example, the most important security stipulations regarding nuclear power plants had to be given separately in the conditions for a license and in radiation security instructions.

Minister Sundqvist, who spoke at this occasion, considered the law proposal to be such a totality that it can be subjected to an extensive round of opinions. In Sundqvist's opinion the government's law proposal can be turned over to the Diet by the end of this year.

"Interest of the Whole" Is Decisive Factor

The law proposal deals with other aspects of nuclear energy such as nuclear power plants, explained Raimo Pekkanen, chairman of the committee. In Finland the most important areas of the implementation of this law are the nuclear power plants themselves, their fuel management, and waste treatment systems.

The committee has determined the general principles by which the use of nuclear energy will be governed. They even include a new term: the interests of the whole society.

Administrative Counselor Pekkanen stated the interests of all of society meant that, "for example, the advantages and disadvantages will be carefully weighed when locating a power plant and it will be decided as to whether the construction of a new power plant is indeed necessary from the point of view of power management.

The committee proposes that the dangers of the use of nuclear energy must be kept as small as possible.

"According to the law proposal an application for a license must always include an environmental impact and safety report. In many countries even ordinary manufacturing plants are obligated to submit environmental impact reports," stated Pekkanen.

Diet's Share Increased

Pekkanen, who has examined the law proposal point by point, proposed a new licensing system, which he considered to be the most interesting section of the proposal.

"There has been a desire to increase the Diet's role in the decisionmaking process. The Diet will in the final count approve or reject the government's decision in principle," stated Pekkanen.

If one wants to build a nuclear power plant, one must follow the following procedure:

A decision in principle concerning a power plant must be requested by written application to the Council of State. The application must include a statement on the estimated environmental impact of the plant and its safety as stipulated by decree.

Before a decision is made, the applicant must publish an overall report of the project, which is to be approved by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The report must be made available to anyone.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry for its part must provide the residents of the area in which the nuclear power plant is to be located and neighboring municipalities an opportunity to present written opinions concerning this matter. Also a public meeting at which opinions are to be gathered must be held in the locality intended as the site of the plant.

"A power plant will not be constructed against the will of the local community and its residents," emphasized Pekkanen.

when the government has made a decision in principle, it must immediately notify the Diet. The decision is to be rejected, if the Diet so decides.

In the opinion of the committee the new licensing system guarantees that all decisions concerning a nuclear power plant will be made early enough, at a sufficiently high level, and on the basis of a sufficient amount of information. Prior to the adoption of a decision, the applicant may not make any statements or commit any acts that would affect the decisionmaking process of the Council of State.

Guardianship Role Becoming Clarified

According to the proposal of the committee leadership in the area of nuclear energy and supervision over the implementation of the law belong to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In the report an attempt has been made to more clearly define and differentiate the tasks of the officials responsible for the granting of a license and practical supervision.

The position of the Radiation Safety Institute will become more important. The institute can demand changes in power plants already in operation and even suspend their operations.

Also the question of nuclear wastes has been treated in detail. The committee proposes that the producer of nuclear waste be made responsible for the waste, and this responsibility does not end until the wastes are sent abroad or finally stored in Finland. The committee has not yet taken a stand as to how the final storage of the wastes is to be accomplished. Instead, it proposes that the state be made responsible for final storage at the expense of the producer.

Three Differing Opinions

The committee's report contains three differing opinions. The most extensive opinion is that of Professor Antti Vuorinen, the director of the Radiation Safety Institute.

Professor Vuorinen does not consider the planned government decisionmaking procedure to be successful. In his opinion the decision given to the Diet for resolution should not depend on uncertain preliminary information, but on exact practical plans.

Vuorinen also talks about the hearings for local residents: their voice will already be heard in connection with the initial outline.

Differing opinions were also presented by Legislative Counselor Mikko Kanariainen, First Secretary Kyosti Suonio, and Chief Inspector Olli Passivirta. In their opinion the Diet's position remains indefinite in the committee's proposal. The decision of the Council of State goes into effect immediately, and the Diet can repeal it only afterwards.

The third differing opinion was presented by Section Chief Olli Ojala, who for his part is not satisfied with the procedure for the final storage of waste.

MINISTRY STUDIES POTENTIAL FOR INCREASE IN PEAT ENERGY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Mar 80 p 40

[Article by Harri Saukkomaa: "Fierce Struggle Over Peat Refinement"]

[Text] A struggle, in which prestige and politics are involved, is raging around the use of peat as a fuel.

Today peat makes up 2.5 percent of Finland's energy market, but it has been predicted that it will increase fivefold.

Kyyjarvi, a municipality with the most bogs in Central Finland, made a proposal a year ago to the State Fuel Center that a peat refining plant should be established in the municipality. Vapo [State Fuel Center] rejected the project as unprofitable.

The Lapua Leather and Harness Plant was the next to become interested in the establishment of a pressing plant. It was planning a briquette plant. The leaders of the municipal council in Kyyjarvi began to promote the enterprise for their own municipality.

In February the enterprise requested raw materials from Vapo, but Vapo's Board of Directors placed a ban on the transaction, which in the opinion of the representatives from Kyyjarvi should have been routine. The enterprise wanted to purchase 0.25 million cubic meters of cut peat.

Vapo turned the matter over to the Ministry of Trade and Industry where it is being handled by the energy section under General Manager Erkki Vaara. Vaara is also chairman of Vapo's Board of Directors.

Vapo has its own briquette plant in Ilomantsi. In December Vapo's Board of Directors postponed the plant intended for Kiuruvesi.

Ministry Requests New Reports

Now the Ministry of Trade and Industry is requesting that Vapo provide a new report as to whether the peat reserves of Central Finland are sufficient if the Kyyjarvi plant is built.

As far as is known, Vapo's Board of Directors is considering a counterattack regarding the Kyyjarvi project. It held a secret meeting on Friday.

A report of exactly the same nature was last made in August. At that time it was needed for the peat operated power plant planned for Jyvaskyla.

The Kyyjarvi enterprise has presented a new offer to the ministry. It states that it will need cut peat from Vapo only in the initial stages of its operation. According to the new offer deliveries from Vapo could be reduced after 1984. After 1987 peat would be acquired elsewhere.

The ministry now wants to know how the company intends to guarantee its procurement of peat after that time.

The Kyyjarvi plant would manufacture peat briquettes for the small consumer. The project is being promoted by Graduate Engineer Pekka Ranta, who has previously worked in marketing and product development at Vapo, which is directed by his father.

The supporters of the Kyyjarvi plant are accusing Vapo of building a monopoly. Representatives of Kemira, Neste, and Imatra Power, among others, sit on the Board of Directors of Vapo. All of them are in one way or another interested in the refining of peat.

Neste's position with respect to the Kyyjarvi project is neutral. Assistant Managing Director Nikko Tanner states that Neste is interested in peat primarily as a raw material for methanol.

Imatra Power's Managing Director Pentti Alajoki estimates that the company "will eventually be able to procure peat on its own".

Imatra Power is trying to sell its power plants to cities. At the present time negotiations on peat operated power plants are being conducted with 4-5 cities.

"Vapo's situation in Central Finland must first be studied. Only then can a stand be taken with respect to the Kyyjarvi project," states Chief Examiner Pentti Harje of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Vapo Amending Price Policy

At the beginning of the year Vapo raised its prices for peat. Also according to Vapo the price policy was made more uniform.

Now cut peat costs 22 markkas per megawatt hour at the bog. At the power plant the price rises to 29 markkas because of transport expenditures.

A portion of the peat users receives this form of fuel on the basis of advantageous, long-term agreements. In Vapo's opinion the agreements were under-priced.

"According to the decree Vapo will have to cover all the expenditures and the interest on the capital. Many of the agreements have been rather bad for us," states Vapo Engineer Aarne Murtolahti in justifying Vapo's price policy.

The base price for peat planned by the MTK (Agricultural Producers Association) may affect the price of peat in the near future. This organization has already recommended that bog owners rent rather than sell.

The MTK will consider the base price for peat already this spring. Vapo has not calculated the future price development of peat, but the institute believes that peat will remain a cheaper alternative.

Politicking With Peat

The struggle over peat has been conducted between the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party. Trade and Industry Minister Ulf Sundqvist has side-stepped the question on at least two occasions when the matter was brought up before the Diet.

The Center Party has been beating the drum that Vapo has acquired a monopoly. The Social Democrats have not yet adopted a definite stand with respect to the new enterprise. The Social Democrats have wanted to support a more centralized peat industry.


A taste of politics was brought into the peat war also by emissaries from Kyyjarvi, who made the rounds of political decisionmakers in the capital city a few weeks ago.

In the opinion of the local politicians from Kyyjarvi this economically poor municipality has only become a pawn in the struggle between greater forces.

Those involved in the Kyyjarvi project presented their cause last Thursday to the Center Party's Diet faction. As far as is known the group promised to take the matter up at the "ministry level" in the event that Trade and Industry Minister Sundqvist does not make a positive decision.

Last week in his answer to the Diet Minister Sundqvist emphasized Vapo's role in the peat industry:

"Vapo is experiencing considerable pressures to expand because of the forcefully growing demand for cut peat. Vapo's active development is also necessary in order to accomplish the goals of our energy policy program."



The pricing information in the above table is from official energy statistics. The curve depicting the price of peat is not, however, completely precise since transportation costs have a strong effect on the price.

Key:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Price development of fuels | 4. Heavy fuel oil |
| 2. markkas/MWh | 5. Coal |
| 3. Light fuel oil | 6. Cut peat |

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PEAT PRODUCTION TO START IN CENTRAL FINLAND AREA

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Apr 80 p 27

[Article: "Peat Production Being Studied"]

[Text] Peat production is the projected goal in Central Finland. The study of peat samples sent by individuals to begin in the summer in Vapo [State Fuel Center] is aimed at this goal. The samples are being sent through the agricultural society.

Peat is the fuel of the future, stated agronomist Pekka Mennala of the Central Finland Agricultural Center in Laukaa in trying to sort out the confusing situation with respect to energy matters.

At the Laukaa Agricultural Society's function it was pointed out that there will come a time when Vapo will purchase peat from farmers in the same manner that firewood was once purchased.

The labor expenditures for excavating peat are according to current estimates 20-30 markkas per cubic meter and if there are no actual expenditures in starting up production, it can according to Mennala be profitable.

Vapo states that 20,000-30,000 markkas per hectare will have to be sunk into a forest bog before peat production can commence.

In addition to peat production, the intent is also to begin wood chip production. Mennala talked primarily about energy raw materials produced for use by farms. One worker would be able to chop down enough wood for 30 farms.

Agronomist Matti Kares of Helsinki University's Agricultural Technological Institute refuted the idea that wood chips could be enriched by burning. A transition to the use of domestic wood and wood chips in particular is only a means to avoid further impoverishment.

Kares is a strong supporter of wood chips. He urges the selection of a boiler suitable for the burning of wood chips when trust in wood chips is not sufficient.

The same amount of energy that requires thousands of liters of fuel oil can be produced with 14-16 cubic meters of wood chips or 8-10 cubic meters of logs or 8 cubic meters of peat or 2,200 kilos of peat briquettes or 4,400 kilos of straw or 370 compact 12-kilo straw bales.

Very recent information indicates that a megawatt-hour of energy produced by heavy fuel oil now costs 65 markkas, 109.80 markkas with light fuel oil, 39.30 markkas with peat, 56.90 markkas with birch logs, and 48.30 markkas with wood chips, stated Forest Manager Veikko Oksanen, according to whom there is enough wood unsuitable for industry to last for approximately 5 years as a fuel. Before that we must find other wood reserves and a suitable redistribution of wood between industry, export, and energy.

The City of Tampere is planning for the additional use of peat. The city has inquired about possible additional deliveries from State Fuel Center. In its answer to the City of Tampere Vapo, however, requests additional time for a report and the procurement of bogs. Vapo promised to carry out present agreements.

The burning of peat in Tampere was begun in 1977 when the second phase of the Naistenlahti Power Plant was completed. After the initial difficulties were overcome, the power plant has operated better than the preliminary expectations.

The Naistenlahti Power Plant is able to burn 1.3-1.5 million cubic meters of peat annually. This amount currently covers approximately half of the fuel used for producing electricity for Tampere. The electric company is now studying the possibility of converting the oil-operated unit one at Naistenlahti to peat consumption or constructing a new peat-burning unit.

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MINISTRY ISSUES ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN FOR 1980'S

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Apr 80 p 13

[Article: "Energy Conservation Plan for 1980's Completed: A Savings of 415 Million Tons of Oil in 1990"]

[Text] All in all 21.4 billion markkas in energy production, industrial, construction, and transport savings investments will be needed in the energy conservation program for all of the 1980's.

In the report of the Energy Conservation Committee presented on Wednesday to Trade and Industry Minister Ulf Sundqvist it was confirmed that the accomplishment of this program will mean a savings of 4.5 million oil tons in 1990.

In question is an approximate 14-percent savings of the estimated total consumption of energy. The total savings for all of the 1980's would be 27 million oil tons. This would correspond to 1 year's energy needs at the end of the decade.

The Energy Conservation Committee, which was established a full 2 years ago, states in its report that the savings of imported fuel obtainable from investments would in 6 years be greater than the expenditures required for the investments. Their employment effect would be approximately 20,000 man-years.

Construction Costs Increasing

The committee has also evaluated the effects of the conservation program on construction, among other things. Investments will increase the construction expenditures of new construction sites 4-5 percent even though the use-expenditures of construction will decrease.

According to the report support for energy conservation investments with respect to construction should be expanded throughout the whole construction area. The 200-million markka subsidy granted for the improvement of heating systems in housing is, however, considered to be sufficient by the committee.

The procurement of funding not covered by subsidies should be facilitated with credits as well as funding procedures.

The funding for heating improvements in public buildings should be obtained from state, municipal, and parish budgets.

In the opinion of the committee funding intended for industrial energy conservation investments is not sufficient for the conservation goals established. While current methods of state support are being developed, new measures should be delivered.

One proposal is to develop loans in such a way that energy conservation loans granted from state credit institutions would be figured in markkas. They could be granted in amounts up to 75 percent of the total expenditures required for a project.

Stimulations to Be Made Stricter

The accomplishment of the conservation goal presupposes that construction rules be made stricter in the current decade. Justification for changing the regulations is being sought by means of research projects and experimental construction.

The Ministry of Transportation should make haste to change those regulations which hinder energy conservation.

Trade and Industry Minister Ulf Sundqvist, who accepted the report, does not at this time consider it necessary to establish a separate energy ministry. In Sundqvist's opinion conservation measures should not be accomplished by means of expanding state bureaucracy.

Instead it might be possible to establish an institute which would be situated between the state administration and the consumer. In any event according to Sundqvist communication with the consumer is needed at the practical level.

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CSO: 3107

SOFRES POLL SHOWS GOVERNMENT HOLDING ITS OWN

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 7 Jun 80 pp 90-92

[Article by Charles Rebois: "After Warsaw: Giscard Goes up Again"]

[Text] Barometer: the Figaro Magazine SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] Polls

■ Giscard : 1) + 2

□ Question : Faites-vous tout à fait confiance, plutôt confiance, plutôt pas confiance ou pas du tout confiance à M. Giscard d'Estaing pour résoudre les problèmes qui se posent en France actuellement ?

	2)		3)	
	Mai 1980		Juin 1980	
● Tout à fait confiance 4)	11	81	12	83
● Plutôt confiance 5)	48		41	
● Plutôt pas confiance 6)	34	45	34	43
● Pas du tout confiance 7)	21		19	
● Sans opinion 8)		4		4
	100 %		100 %	

■ Barre : 9) + 2

□ Question : Faites-vous tout à fait confiance, plutôt confiance, plutôt pas confiance ou pas du tout confiance à M. Barre pour résoudre les problèmes qui se posent en France actuellement ?

	2)		3)	
	Mai 1980		Juin 1980	
● Tout à fait confiance 4)	7	32	9	34
● Plutôt confiance 5)	25		23	
● Plutôt pas confiance 6)	22	62	21	60
● Pas du tout confiance 7)	48		38	
● Sans opinion 8)		6		6
	100 %		100 %	

Key:

1. Giscard: +2. Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, little confidence or no confidence at all that Giscard d'Estaing can solve France's current problems?
2. May 1980
3. June 1980
4. Complete confidence
5. Some confidence
6. Little confidence
7. No confidence at all
8. No opinion
9. Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, little confidence, or no confidence at all that Raymond Barre can solve France's current problems?

The Popular Wisdom

This June barometer (inquiry of 23 and 29 May) was eagerly awaited. It was to make it possible to measure the impact on public opinion of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's 19 May meeting with Leonid Brezhnev. The answer is clear: having lost five points the month before, the president of the Republic regained two of them. So the French do not share in the criticism heard in political circles, the media and foreign chancelleries of the Warsaw summit. In support of this finding, we clarify that it is in the foreign policy area that the presidential rating has increased most--after an appreciable drop the preceding month, it is true.

For several months one of the themes more or less officially asserted has emphasized the lack of agreement between the political class and public opinion. This argument might appear to be disputable, but our poll shows it to be well-founded. It tends to prove that the gap is even widening. For lack of a true dialog opposition grows and everything becomes a pretext for accusations based on assumptions. Even though those were times of rather inglorious memory, Munich was mentioned on the occasion of the Warsaw meeting. According to our inquiry the same people will support the idea that the souls of Frenchmen are decidedly "Munich-like." The similarity is shocking. To put it simply, in the face of danger public opinion reacts with better sense than some politicians. How can the act of agreeing to a confrontation between two divergent conceptions take over from the spirit of capitulation? The flaw is seen when the fiercest defenders of national independence condemn an initiative that desires to shake off the yoke of Yalta and provide for a new division, which some predict will take place shortly after the American elections.

The prime minister's two-point gain should be pointed out. The question concerning him was asked in these words: Do you or do you not have confidence that Mr Barre can solve France's current problems? In that formulation the adjective "current" assumes great importance. Of course 60 percent of the responses are still negative. But 34 percent of the individuals questioned still have confidence in the head of government, as opposed to 32 percent in May. This despite a harshly expressed judgment in response to the question about rising prices. There is in this attitude of Frenchmen a large portion of resignation and the feeling that no other prime minister would do any better in the present economic context.

Moreover, it is an obvious paradox that Raymond Barre loses one point in the rating of political personalities. For the second question has to be answered by betting on the future--but Mr. Barre is not president for life!

The "Security and Liberty" plan, which was the excuse for an unprecedented assault on Alain Peyrefitte, is another illustration of the gap between the initiatives of the political seraglio and the French in general. Despite the







promised attacks of which he is the object, the keeper of the keys holds onto his rating. But if the reform he is undertaking had several ulterior motives, the effect would not be obvious. Many people think that to strengthen security it is enough to dip into the arsenal of existing laws.

Recent events of political life have scarcely served the images of the individuals who figure in the inquiry. The lead that always placed Simone Weil closely at the top is steadily dwindling. The president of the Strasbourg University is suffering because of Europe's misfortunes. Jacques Chirac's continued progression has also been halted. The leader of the RPR loses two points.

Among the opposition, Michel Rocard's breakthrough seems to have lasted a long time. The deputy from the Yvelines loses two points, while François Mitterrand, with a one-point gain, undertakes a long climb back already begun in May. Fifteen points still separate the two potential candidates for the presidential election. But it is significant that this differential is now no more than 12 points in the opinion of the Socialists.

■ Rocard : - 2

Question: Please provide the following information for the purpose of the study. The information will be used for the purpose of the study and will be kept confidential. The information will be used for the purpose of the study and will be kept confidential. The information will be used for the purpose of the study and will be kept confidential.


	1981-1982	1982-1983
	42	40
	36	34
	34	32
	31	30
	28	24
	22	22
	17	16

	Mar 1990	Apr 1990
	50	48
	32	33
	31	30
	21	22
	21	21
	14	13
	10	11

Partis politiques

U.D.F. : 11
- 1

R.P.R.: 41
+ 1



1. Question: For each of the following political personalities, please tell me whether you hope to see him play an important role in the coming months and years.
2. May 1980.
3. June 1980.
4. Political parties
5. UDF [French Democratic Union]
6. RPR [Rally for the Republic]
7. Good opinion.
8. Bad opinion.
9. Communist Party
10. Socialist Party
11. Radical Left Movement

The SOFRES Technical Index

Poll conducted by Figaro Magazine

Dates of poll: 23 to 29 May 1980

National sampling of 1,000 persons representative of the over-18 population as a whole.

Quota method (sex, age, profession of head of family) and stratification by region and category of settlement.

Economy and Society: the Climate is Improving

Government Priorities and Action

Question: Among the following things, which one in your opinion should the government give priority to at the present time?

	May 1980	June 1980
Fighting inflation.....	28	28
Fighting unemployment.....	46	43
Fighting violence and criminality.	15	15
Maintaining social peace.....	10	13
No opinion.....	1	1
	100 percent	100 percent

Unemployment: a Slight Improvement

Question: Concerning the fight against unemployment, do you think the government's action is--

	May 1980		June 1980	
--very effective.....	-	} 11	-	} 12
--fairly effective.....	11		12	
--not very effective.....	48		43	
--not at all effective.....	37	} 85	39	} 82
No opinion.....				
		4		6
	100 percent		100 percent	

Prices: Continuing Anxiety

Question: Concerning the fight against inflation, do you think the government's action is--

	May 1980		June 1980	
--very effective.....	1	} 11	-	} 9
--fairly effective.....	10		9	
--not very effective.....	49		48	
--not at all effective.....	37	} 86	37	} 85
No opinion.....				
		3		6
	100 percent		100 percent	


The Political and Social Climate

A Trend Toward Optimism

Question: When you look at the France and the French are evolving, do you get the impression that things are improving, or on the contrary that they have a tendency to get worse?

	May 1980	June 1980
Things are improving.....	6	9
They have a tendency to worsen....	66	63
There is no change.....	25	24
No opinion.....	3	4
	100 percent	100 percent

Optimism and Pessimism in Public Opinion



Key:

- | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Things will improve | 8. December 1979 |
| 2. Things are worsening | 9. January 1980 |
| 3. June 1979 | 10. February 1980 |
| 4. July 1979 | 11. March 1980 |
| 5. September 1979 | 12. April 1980 |
| 6. October 1979 | 13. May 1980 |
| 7. November 1979 | 14. June 1980 |

Question: Do you think that in two or three months there will be many or only a few social conflicts?

	May 1980	June 1980
Many social conflicts.....	58	54
Few social conflicts.....	28	30
No opinion.....	14	16
	100 percent	100 percent

8946

CS0: \$100

SEP'S BACHELOT INTERVIEWED ON ARIANE MOTOR DEVELOPMENT

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 15-30 Jun 80 p 19

[Interview with Francois Bachelot of SEP [European Propellant Company]--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Your company has been called upon by the CNES [National Center for Space Studies] to assure the perfecting of the predevelopment of a 60-ton force cryogenic motor. What will be the impact of this operation on your work plans?

[Answer] The development of "Ariane" represented for the SEP a very important task from 1973 to 1979. However, as a result of this, we had to use personnel whom we have now lost due to the decline in growth of the European launcher.

Our desire is to maintain a team that will be sufficient to continue to do interesting work in the area of propulsion. That is why the predevelopment of a 60-ton force cryogenic motor is vital for the survival of this team of engineers and technicians. In reality, through this predevelopment, we can continue developing our technology and our techniques from now until 1983, with the hope that from then on the program will be authorized to permit an in-flight qualification in 1990, in keeping with the CNES objective.

However, this predevelopment program, as defined by the CNES, does not absolutely take care of all our needs. But the related activities on "Ariane," especially the increase in rates which are to go up to 6 units per month, should allow us to maintain our Vernon teams.

[Question] 100 MF: that is the amount to be allotted to the first development works on this hydrogen and liquid oxygen motor. What exactly will this investment cover, and do you think it is enough?

[Answer] This amount should allow us to arrive at a precise definition of the motor and its specifications, in order to limit the areas of research in the years to come. It should also permit the execution of technological or technical works, so that definitive choices can be made with a guarantee of good results from now until 1990.

This investment is enough for studies or technological works. It is not enough if you include works involving the infrastructures which are necessary to the development of the motor itself.

[Question] What might the development of such a motor amount to?

[Answer] From 2.5 to 3 billion francs.

[Question] The predevelopment of the motor will be carried out in cooperation with the MBB. Will that be done on the same basis as for the HM7 cryogenic motor of "Ariane's" third stage?

[Answer] In the framework of the first talks which we had with the CNES, it was clearly admitted that the SEP would remain in charge of the HM-60 motor, with the CNES especially insisting that this control be kept in France.

Thus, the SEP would subcontract to the MBB, as with the HM7, the development of the chamber, what we call the hot part.

[Question] The HM7's force is 6 tons. You are going to get up to 60. What do you think about the American experiment, for if the latter has not had any problems with the J2 motor (102 tons), wouldn't it be the same for the "shuttle" (200 tons)?

[Answer] In fact, the motors to be used for the "shuttle" are different from those previously conceived of in the United States. The Americans have really been playing at two games: first they increased the power of the motors, but also, and above all, they changed the functioning principle of these motors, and it turns out that the better developed and performing principle which they have chosen is difficult to adapt.

While operating in the framework of what one might believe for the "Ariane" V, we are seeking to preserve the technologies developed for the HM7; and thus we will find ourselves facing a problem of a change in graduation. Also, we believe that with the predevelopment studies of the HM-60, which will be staggered over 3 years, we should be able to solve the technological problems at the base relating to this motor's development.

[Question] What are your goals in the area of cryogenics for the decades to come, and what role could this technology play in the future of the SEP?

[Answer] In this area, we estimate that the development of the HM-60 motor, and of the H45 propulsion complex in which it will be integrated, would bring in enough activity to the SEP until 1990.

After that time, cryogenics will play a very important role for our company: we will, in fact, have worked for more than 20 years on motors using that technology, while the motors with stockable ergols [types of engine] that we will continue to use for many years will not be developed any further.

in the field of cryogenics, we can thus expect that starting with the next decade there will be a need for much more powerful motors.

But of course, in terms of the policy to be defined at that time, these motors could be developed in Europe, or through cooperation with the United States, for example, in order to share the costs and charges. Furthermore, the development of the HM-60 and the corresponding stage should allow the Europeans to acquire a technological level on the subject sufficient to carry on discussions on practically an equal footing with the Americans by 1990, especially to be able to share the charges, in which the European part could be meaningful and interesting at the technological level.

[Question] But will the cost of such a program be considerable?

[Answer] It is clear that the use of space is heading toward gigantism. All we have to do is look at the superstructures that the Americans plan to establish around the world.

And certainly the finances required to carry out such operations will be very significant. That is why, even if European solutions can be foreseen, reality encourages us, in the framework of a vast multinational cooperation, to look toward the United States.

There has already been collaboration there in the field of propulsion: in recent years, the SEP had, in fact, entered into a contract to cooperate with Rocketdyne on the HM7 motor.

9475

CSO: 1100

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DEFENSE APPOINTMENT

Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Jun 80 p 8

[Text] Mr Marcel Blanc, prefect of the Central District, was appointed by the Council of Ministers of 11 Jun 1980 as prefect in charge of defense measures in the Department of the Interior, replacing Mr Marcel Heckenroth.

[Born in Lyon in 1925, Mr Blanc, who was deported to Germany, is a graduate of the National School of Administration. Subprefect of Ancenis, head of the Cabinet of the IGAME (Inspector General of Administration on Extraordinary Mission) of the First Region (Parisian Region), he became in 1954, head of the Civil Protection Services and the following year, head of the cabinet of the Cote-d'Or prefect, Mr Moris, whom he would accompany when the latter became in 1959, Secretary General of Algerian Affairs and in 1960, prefect of the Toulouse District. Technical adviser to the cabinet of Mr Frey, minister of the Interior, in 1964, he was appointed the following year prefect of Correze and specially appointed prefect in October 1968. Prefect of the Languedoc-Roussillon region, prefect of Hérault from December 1973, he was appointed director-general of local organizations in April 1977 and prefect of the Central region, and prefect of Loiret in April 1978.]

9018

CSO: 3100

MILITARY PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS

Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Jun 80 p 13

[Text] On the proposal of the defense minister, Mr Yvon Bourges, the Council of Ministers approved on Wednesday 11 June the following promotions and appointments:

Ground: The following have been promoted: Division general, Brigade General Francois Comes; brigade general, Colonels Francis Cecilia, Robert Prieur (appointed commander of the Fifty Fifth Military Territorial Division) and Guy Lewin (appointed "Operations" Assistant to the general commanding the Third Armored Division).

The following were appointed: Deputy to the director general of the National Institute of Higher Defense Studies, Higher Military Training and Center of Higher Military Studies, Division General Claude Le Borgne; Military Sports Commissioner, Brigade General Jacques Bresson, Deputy to the general commanding the Eleventh Territorial Division, Brigade General Philippe Noiret; director of upper military scientific and technical training, Brigade General Albert Billard; commander of the French forces based at Djibouti, Brigade General Rene Bellamy; commander of the Fifth Armored Division, Brigade General Jean-Paul Cuq; "Operations" Assistant to the general in command of the Eleventh Paratroopers division and the Forty-Fourth Military Territorial Division, Brigade General Pierre de Quengo de Tonquedec.

Air: Air Brigade General Edgar Pintor has been appointed director of the Higher Interarmy School and the Higher Military Air Force Academy. He is assigned to the Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Corps General Robert Martinet.

Navy: The following are appointed: Head of the "Plans, Programs and Budget" division at the Army General Staff, Rear Admiral Jean-Andre Brusson; Deputy Chief of Staffs for "Operations" in the Naval General Staff, Rear Admiral Bernard Louzeau.

Armaments: The following are promoted: Engineer general first class, engineers general second class, Michel Bergounioux, Rene Lesavre, Andre Pinchon and Louis Dulos; general engineer second class, chief engineers Jacques Cochet-Grasset, Claude Pierre, Daniel Huet and Pierre Amy (appointed Deputy Director of Schools and Training of the Board of Personnel and General Affairs).

Engineer general second class Jacques Renault was appointed head of the air-surface combat group of the technical section of construction and naval weapons.

Engineer general second class Jean-Claude Wannier was assigned to the director of research, armament studies and technique; engineer general second class Maurice Bomnier was assigned to the Armament Inspector.

Constabulary: Colonel Georges Peytavi was promoted to brigade general. Brigade general Rene Omnes was appointed regional commander of the Constabulary in Metz.

Medical Services: The following are promoted: to doctor general inspector, doctor general, doctor head of normal class of services, Daniel Auphan and Chief doctor of Normal Class Services Jacques Sepetjian (appointed Director of Medical Services of the Fourth Air Region).

The following are appointed: Director of Supplies and of the Central Unit of the Health Service, Physician General, Chief doctor of normal class services, Roger Hertz; Director of the Medical Services of the Third Army Corps and the First Military Region, Physician General Inspector, Chief doctor of Special Class Services, Pierre Juillet, Director of Medical Services of the Second Air Region, Physician General. Chief Doctor of Special Class Services Valerie Andre.

Fuel Services

Chief military engineer first class, Pierre Donne was appointed Military engineer general second class.

Military engineer general second class Gilbert Borde was appointed Central Director of the Army Fuel Services.

9018

CSO: 1100

CNES ASTRONAUT SELECTION FOR 1982 NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Jun 80 p 16

[Article by J.F. Augereau]

[Text] The National Space Research Center (CNES) presented on 11 June, in Paris, the two future French cosmonauts who will take part in 1982 in the space flights which the French and Soviets have decided to organize jointly. The two men, who are Air Force officers, will go to the Soviet Union at the end of summer to undergo a special training and prepare for their mission.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Loup Chretien, 41 years old, and Captain Patrick Baudry, 34 years old were declared fit for the service. Happy winners in a marathon selection in which there were 193 candidates, including 26 women, the 2 fighter pilots have finally triumphed after several months of physical tests, medical check-up examinations and psychological tests.

This represents the concrete implementation of a project whose idea had been officially proposed in April 1979 by Mr Leonid Brezhnev on the occasion of the trip of the President of the Republic to the Soviet Union. So it is a joint space mission, but as Mr Hubert Curien, Chairman of the CNES was pleased to recall, a "preeminently scientific" space mission, whose engagement was no doubt facilitated by a favorable political context illustrated by the recent Franco-Soviet talks in Moscow and France's participation in the Olympic Games.

Be that as it may, it is not before 1 September and after having attended intensive Russian lessons, that the two Frenchmen will travel to the City of the Stars, located about 40 kilometers away from Moscow, where the Soviet cosmonauts are trained. There, for a year and half, they will be initiated along with their Soviet colleagues, to the cosmonaut profession. Theoretical courses, flight simulation in weightlessness, survival operations and rescue missions will follow each other for the first 8 months. Then the two men will become familiar with the Soyuz spacecraft and the Salyut station, and will rehearse in the simulator the procedures of takeoff, link-up and landing. It is in the course of this long period, that the selection will be made among the 2 future cosmonauts, of the man who will have the opportunity of flying, while the other, the substitute, remains on the ground to assist him in his work during the flight.

One Week's Work

This mission, planned for mid-1982, should take place in the following way: after takeoff from the Soviet Union and placing the Soyuz spacecraft into orbit, the crew, consisting of a captain (Soviet pilot) and a flight engineer (French co-pilot) should reach within 25 hours, an orbital station, no doubt Salyut 7, on board of which they would remain for a week to accomplish the scientific program which would be entrusted to them: on this occasion, the possibility that they might meet a Soviet crew already installed on board is not excluded.

Such a mission is not without certain elements similar to those of the missions already accomplished on several occasions by mixed crews composed of a Soviet and a representative of a friendly country (Czechoslovakia, Federal German Republic, Poland). But the CNES authorities believe that it differs from the others both by the procedures set up, the means of execution and the contents of the scientific program. For the moment, 8 experimental projects have been retained. Of these, 4 are in the area of space physiology and biology (Cytos-2, DS-21, Echographie and Posture); 2 concern materials science - in particular, the attempt to obtain an aluminum-indium alloy, and finally 2 relate to astronomy and geophysics (high sensitivity photographic experiments and use of a grating collimator). Cost of this program: about 30 million francs.

The strong orientation of the mission towards human physiology (fight against infections, measurement of blood rate in the brain, redistribution of blood volumes in weightless conditions, mechanism of equilibrium) is favored by the French authorities. Actually if the joint flight were successful, the possibility is not excluded that new missions may be considered. On the other hand, "even if it is too early to dream of creating a small unit of French cosmonauts," Mr Curien said, "We must not neglect manned flights, for we do not know whether this type of activity will be important in the future."

Patrick Baudry

[Born 2 March 1946 in the Cameroon, Patrick Baudry is an Air Force Academy engineer (1967-1969). He received his fighter pilot certificate in 1970 and after spending 6 years in operational unit on a Jaguar combat aircraft, he became major of the British Test Pilot School E.T.P.S. [expansion unknown]. He is currently test pilot at the Bretigny-sur-Orge Flight Test Center. He is married, and father of a 4-year old girl. His hobbies are motor-cycling, squash and skiing, and is interested in the study of wines.]

Jean-Loup Chretien

[Born on 20 August 1938 in La Rochelle, Jean-Loup Chretien is an engineer of the Air Force Academy of Salon-de-Provence (1959-1961). He received his fighter pilot certificate in 1962, and after spending 7 years in operational

with the Mirage combat aircraft, he joined the Istres Test Pilot School in 1970. He accomplished test flights for 7 years, and was responsible, in particular for the test program of the Mirage F-1 interceptor. Jean-Loup Christen, presently Air Force lieutenant-colonel, is assistant in the Air Defense Command of the Southern Region.

He is married and the father of 4 boys, 18, 15, 14 and 5 years old. He plays the organ, and does sailing and skiing.)

9018

CSG: J100

DELIVERY TAKEN OF SOVIET TANKERS

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 21 Jun 80 pp 7, 32

[Text]

THE Piraeus-based Athenian Tankers Management SA last week took delivery of the first of five 29 500 ton tankers from the Soviet Kherson Shipyards Company, a spokesman for the company said.

The first tanker was delivered at Kherson in the Black Sea, in the presence of President of Athenian Tankers Mimos Kyriakou, and about 200 shipowners, businessmen and other officials who travelled from Greece to the Soviet Union for the occasion.

It is understood the ships will cost about \$15 million each, i.e. about \$10 less than they would have cost if built in West European shipyards.

The five tankers, whose delivery is due to be completed by the end of 1981, will be added to the fleet of 21 tankers already being handled by Athenian Tankers, and will bring the company's total tonnage to about one million, the company spokesman said. He added that the five new tankers will be used to transport mainly vegetable oil, in which the company carries 46% of the world trade.

The spokesman said the new vessels are part of a renewal programme of the company's fleet, and will operate on four main routes: from the Far East to the United States, to Europe, to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, and from South America to Europe.

CSd: 4920

VETERAN DIPLOMAT AWARDED PEACE PRIZE

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 21 Jun 80 p 3

[Text]

IT HAS been officially announced in Brussels that the Committee for the award of the Dag Hammarskjöld International Peace Prize has decided to award the prize this year to Greek Ambassador Constantine Stavropoulos, the Foreign Ministry said last week.

The prize has been instituted in memory of the late UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and is awarded by an honorary committee, consisting of diplomatic correspondents residing in Brussels, to personalities who have become prominent because of their diplomatic activities in favour of peace.

Ambassador Constantine Stavropoulos served for 28 years at the United Nations under four Secretaries General, among them Hammarskjöld, and closely collaborated with him and with the UN Mediator in Palestine, Count Bernadotte, and his Deputy, Dr. Ralph Bunche.

After he retired from the United Nations service, he was elected a Deputy of State during the 1974 Parliamentary elections, and was Foreign Undersecretary from 1975 to 1977.

He is now Greek Ambassador and leader of the Greek delegation to the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.

CSO: 4920

CABINET MINISTER ON EEC ACCESSION

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 21 Jun 80 p 3

[Text]

THE GREEK section of the European Union of Economic Cooperation held its first public session last week at the Grande Bretagne Hotel.

The main speaker was the Minister without Portfolio for Relations with the EC Mr. George Kontogeorgis, who discussed the position Greece will take within the framework of the European Communities and the benefits to be obtained by Greece in the economic sector.

The Minister stressed that the importance of the EC is immense in international economic relations. The EC member states exceed in population the two super-powers, and the EC production of certain industrial goods exceeds that of the US and USSR.

Another speaker at the conference was the President of the Greek section of the European Union of Economic Cooperation, Mr. Dimitrios Marinopoulos, who explained the aims and the programme prepared by the Union, which is a non-political and non-profit-making European organisation with its head office in Brussels and national branches in all European countries, including Greece.

CSO: 4920

EDUCATION MINISTER REVIEWS CHANGES

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 21 Jun 80 p 3

[Text]

MINISTER of Education Athanasios Triantafyllou, speaking in Sofia last week at the conference of Ministers of Education of European UNESCO member states, said the restoration of democracy in Greece constituted the most significant event to have taken place in this country since the last conference in 1973.

Mr. Triantafyllou said the seven year dictatorship had created a large number of educational problems, which had resulted in the need for a radical change in this country's educational system.

Changes instituted by the government in the sector of education, the Minister said, included the passing of a law making a three year attendance at high school compulsory, entrance examinations for institutes of higher education being held within the secondary education system, the adoption of 'demotiki' as the official

language within the educational system from primary school to university, the founding of three more institutes of higher education (the University of Crete, the Polytechnic of Crete and the University of Thrace), and attempts to harmonise teaching materials with those of countries of Western Europe.

The Minister said the measures taken or to be taken in the sector of education would contribute to making it more democratic and fulfilling the needs of the economy and society.

CSO: 4920

OPINIONS ON EUROPE'S ROLE IN U.S., IRANIAN CRISIS

Rome. IL SETTIMANALE in Italian 13 May 80 pp 14-17

[Report on interviews with political experts by Stefano Brusadelli: "What Allies! They Don't Agree on Anything;" dates and places of interviews not given]

[Text] Out of fear, Europe lost an opportunity to take a courageous decision and assume a role of international importance. Disappointed in its allies, the United States is thinking of canceling its commitment; but the Europeans are in no position to get along without America. What does this crisis signify? Where is it leading? Here are the predictions of four experts.

America is disappointed. TIME published on its cover a cartoon parody of High Noon, showing Carter girding for the decisive duel while his European and Japanese allies flee in terror to barricade themselves in their houses. The NEW YORK TIMES makes no secret of its irritation. Immediately after the unsuccessful blitz in Iran, it made this comment on the negative reactions issuing from the capitals of Europe: "The Allies should realize that this raid was in part a consequence of their reluctance to share the risks with the United States." In the dramatic speech on 25 April to explain the failure of "Operation Charlie's Angels," the president himself loosed a volley of arrows against the Allies for their indifference. "We hope to have their support at least now," Carter said in a controversial television appearance.

Never since World War II have relations between the United States and its allies been so cool and ambiguous. Although the Luxembourg summit meeting of 27-28 April reaffirmed the EEC's "solidarity" with the United States, many Americans view their vicissitudes with Iran as a trial by fire, which has exposed the Allies' scant trustworthiness. The first disappointment came on 22 April at the summit of the Nine's foreign ministers, convoked to study punitive measures against Iran. Carter hoped that they would endorse the sanctions the United States had called for 5 days previously, among them an embargo on imports and exports and on monetary remittances of any kind to the Iranians. Instead, after 2 days of turbulent discussions, the "soft"

line proposed by France won the day: to begin with, marginal sanctions (bilateral reduction of diplomatic personnel, obligatory visas for Iranians entering the EEC countries, and a suspension on the sale of armaments), and only later harsher measures, such as holding up credits and new contracts, and reducing their petroleum imports should another meeting, on 17 May in Naples, conclude that no progress had been made on the question of the hostages. No reference, therefore, was made to the recommendation Carter had urged, still more heatedly, to freeze all Iranian assets in the EEC nations.

The second disappointment arose from the relations with the USSR. After the invasion of Afghanistan, America petitioned its allies to interrupt their ties with Moscow, which it deemed "signs of weakness," but the Nine appeared ill-disposed to comply. While Chancellor Helmut Schmidt prepared to accept Brezhnev's invitation to Moscow, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington was delegated to explain to Carter that the Europeans saw their involvement with the USSR as "indispensable" to detente. But what embittered Americans more was the Nine's intention--with Schmidt as spokesman--to reverse their policy on Euromissiles by offering Moscow a "dissolvent clause," proposed by the EC: delaying the installation of Pershing and Cruise missiles, thus giving the USSR time to reduce the number of its SS-20 missiles trained on the capitals of Europe.

Today it is Washington's impression that Europe--caught between solidarity with the United States, to which it probably owes its political independence, and a reluctance to be forced into the position of a buffer between the two blocs in the event of another cold war--is adrift at sea without a strategy. Certainly it is not by chance that the Pentagon is currently circulating a secret report, which draws the drastic conclusion: if the Europeans continue to act as "not very trustworthy" allies, it would behoove the United States to leave only a small military force in Europe, thus obliging the EEC to provide its own autonomous nuclear deterrent.

On the motives for the European-American crisis and the question of Europe's role in the immediate future, IL SETTIMANALE has interrogated four specialists: Emilio Di Nolfo, history of international relations professor at the University of Florence; Giuseppe Aré, political scientist; Cesare Merlini, director of the Institute of International Affairs; and Adolfo Battaglia, parliamentary deputy of the Italian Radical Party and chief of the party's foreign affairs section.

Di Nolfo: 'We're Squabbling, but That's Nothing New'

Question: Will the Iranian crisis cause decisive repercussions on Europe's relations with the United States?

Di Nolfo: Crisis between Europe and the United States is a recurrent theme in the history of the post-World War II period. We need only recall the Suez crisis in 1956; the 1961-63 dispute over the question of a multilateral atomic force; the 1964-68 crisis provoked by Gaullist dissidence; the Johnson

years and the problem of Vietnam; the Kissinger years and his policy to strengthen detente by direct dialogue with the Soviet Union; and the 1971 decision to make the dollar inconvertible. The present crisis strikes me as less serious than those preceding it because it doesn't basically affect the substance of the relationship but mainly the way it is expressed.

Question: What are the reciprocal faults?

Di Nolfo: To point out the two sides' respective responsibilities is tantamount to singling out the basic causes of the crisis. From the military viewpoint, the primary problem concerns the adequacy of the American "shield." In both the positive and the negative sense, the anxieties that have marked the relationship between the allies stem from the credibility of the "shield." From the political viewpoint, the crisis arises from America's inevitable propensity to dominate its relations with Europe and regulate them to conform to its own demands, along with a growing propensity in Europe (or of individual European nations) to devise alternate strategies which do not altogether coincide, thus stirring up conflicts and requiring rationalizations.

Question: Is European autonomy conceivable in the near future?

Di Nolfo: If by autonomy you mean an end to existing alliances, it's hard to imagine such a hypothesis, unless radical changes should take place in the international order. But if you mean Europe's capacity to speak with a single voice, to work out actions and to assume the role of an active collaborator, then such a role is not only conceivable but also desirable. Moreover, it would benefit the cause of world peace.

Are: 'In my Opinion, Carter Is Indecisive'

Question: Why have relations between the United States and its European allies progressively deteriorated?

Are: Mainly because in the last 3 years the United States has been inept in handling its global relations. The Carter administration's lack of resolution in the face of the Soviet challenge has been disastrous. At the outset of his term, Carter committed himself not to support reactionary regimes, but he has been unable to translate this moral principle into pragmatic policy. Consequently, on the one hand, the United States has continued to uphold unpopular regimes (Iran, for example) while, on the other, it has missed opportunities to support certain conflicts (I'm thinking of the wars of independence in Ogaden and Eritrea), which could have increased its popularity enormously. This wavering has lessened the European's faith in Washington's global policy and convinced them that they would be better off to do as much as possible by themselves.

Question: Do you mean that a European autonomous initiative in international relations is thinkable in the near future?

Are: No, I don't believe that's possible. Europe is totally unable to confront Soviet imperialism without remaining bound to the United States by two-way ties. Those who solicit a third force, like the PCI, are gambling on a Finlandization of Europe, a Europe under the heel of the USSR.

Question: Then what remains to be done?

Are: At all costs improve Europe's contractual position with the United States so that it can exert greater influence in making decisions.

Merlini: 'Too Many Mistakes on Both Sides'

Question: Will the European-American crisis be a long one?

Merlini: Yes, because the reasons for disagreement are extremely serious. There is a profound divergence between Europe and the United States over priority interests (for example, Gulf petroleum ranks first for Europe but not for the United States), also over what strategy to adopt against Soviet aggression. The Nine want to follow a course of cooperation, Washington a punitive course.

Question: Has the United States made mistakes in dealing with European allies?

Merlini: Right now Europe is rebuking the United States for fusing two trends it considers highly unfavorable: a decreasing capacity for protection and leadership, and excessive unilateral action in making decisions of common interest, motivated by internal politics.

Question: And Europe's mistakes?...

Merlini: The United States scolds Europe for continuing to depend upon American protection, yet turning to the opposite side a bit too much--like someone wanting to play the role of the "best of the family."

Question: Will this lead to Europe's alienation from the United States?

Merlini: No, a rupture is out of the question. But it can mean that the role of the Europeans, standing side by side with the United States, will become increasingly differentiated.

Battaglia: 'Are We Crazy? The United States Is Still Useful to Us'

Question: Why don't Europeans and American agree any longer, as they did before?

Battaglia: For at least three reasons. The first is Europe's rising economic development with respect to the United States, and this has sparked a trade war between the two areas, inevitably with political consequences. In the second place, growing detente has altered America's relations with the USSR:

the opposition between the two states has given way to cooperation, thus modifying the original role of the Atlantic Alliance. Thirdly, the transformations in America's political and institutional affairs and, mainly, the president's lesser role vis-a-vis Congress have aroused European doubts about her ability to honor commitments.

Question: How have the most recent international crises influenced Europe's relations with the United States?

Battaglia: NATO's decision on Euromissiles united the two Western entities, but then the question of Iran and Afghanistan estranged them because the Europeans wanted Washington to give priority to the problem of containing Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. The Americans, on the other hand, reprove the Allies for failing to help them secure release of the hostages.

Question: Could Europe set up a "third force?"

Battaglia: That would be pure folly. It would require not only huge expenditures for rearmament, which our economies would not sustain, but also a European nuclear force. And no one in the world wants nuclear rearmament for Germany, beginning with the Germans themselves.

Question: Taking their differences into account, up to what point can Europe reinforce its solidarity with the United States?

Battaglia: We must push much farther ahead, because solidarity is a matter of deep concern to Europe. In the economic sphere we are weak since we depend largely on the Middle East for our oil supplies, and with or against the Americans, there is no solution on that score. We are weak, too, in the military sense and, in the face of the Soviets' expansionist policy, we must have America's support. And, lastly, solidarity with the United States is essential today if we want to prevent American public opinion from sliding into isolationism. This doesn't mean that there is no need for a European initiative, but that the divisions among the Nine are obstructing it.

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POLITICAL LEADERS INTERVIEWED ON KEY MEZZOGIORNO ISSUES

PSI Secretary General Craxi

Messina LA GAZZETTA DEL SUD in Italian 18 May 80 p 11

[Interview with Italian Socialist Party Secretary Bettino Craxi by Politicus]

[Excerpts] [Question] Moving on to Calabria following the establishment of the Second Cossiga cabinet, which, after 6 years, brought the return of its party to key positions in government, which can have an effect on the future of the region, as well as the entire south--what assurances can you give to the people of Calabria?

[Answer] I can say that the PSI [Italian Socialist Party], from its position within the administration, will concentrate its efforts to activate all of the development processes, either planned or in progress, and to get them started in new places. This week, the administration will go forward with specific guidelines and proposals for Calabria and for the other southern regions. It is our conviction that the basic and historical problem of Italy goes by the name of "South" and this is why we will do what we are going to do. We are also convinced that there are great capacities for work and initiative in the South which are only waiting to be properly awakened in order to express their full potential.

[Question] What significance can one assign to the fact that Minister for the South Nicola Capria, a Calabrese by birth and a Messinese by adoption, was chosen to head the slate for the "community elections" in Naples?

[Answer] Naples is the most important center in Italy's South. Our decision has a precise political significance. It is supposed to evidence our direct commitment and the link between the action of the administration and the real situation in the southern regions.

[Question] The press quite correctly raised the "moral issue" involving a candidate for the community elections in Montebello Jonico in the province of Reggio Calabria, who happens to be a fugitive from justice but who is nevertheless carried on his party's slate; was this kind of candidacy really inevitable?

[Answer] I am not familiar with this case. I only read about it in the press. I immediately alerted the Central Control Commission to look into this situation and to determine any possible responsibility.

[Question] The position of the PSI with regard to Italian participation in the Olympics is not unanimous: The "left" has the same positions as the PCI [Italian Communist Party], in other words, we should go there. In a letter you explained the viewpoint of the PSI secretariat which seems to hint at a "no." Could you be more explicit?

[Answer] This matter indeed justifies a diversity of opinions. International public opinion is divided and so is Italian public opinion; there are diversities of opinion also in my own party. I expressed my opinion. I did so, by the way, in addressing the Chamber of Deputies during the debate on the vote of confidence for the administration. This is a simple and, it seems to me, reasonable opinion. If the Olympics lose their character as a universal sports event and if they lose it in a significant manner, as is happening now, with countries absent from all continents, starting with the United States and going on to Japan, West Germany, and China, well, then, you no longer have any Olympics. The event assumes a quite different character and it is certainly a good idea to realize that. The most reasonable solution would have been and still is a postponement.

[Question] The very recent repeated voting in the senate, including the secret balloting on the petition by the communists, concerning the launching of the agricultural contracts, brought out the compactness of the parliamentary majority. This only happened a few times in the Chamber. What does this depend on?

[Answer] The administration had to face hundreds of secret balloting sessions in the Chamber in recent weeks. But people only talk about very few, three or four, when it did not get a majority. This was to a great extent due to the absenteeism on Monday afternoon and probably somebody exercised the ancient and despicable art of "sniping." This has happened at other times in the past and there is no assurance that it might not happen again in the future. But there is a remedy for all that.

[Question] Terrorism has been dealt serious blows in recent times. But it so happens that, instead of expressing consensus and confidence toward the person who is in charge of this fight in Upper Italy, politicians and sectors of the press are trying to accuse even Gen Dalla Chiesa, speculating on the case of Marco Donat-Cattin. Why? Perhaps we are close to identifying the "grand old man" to use your expression?

[Answer] There has been vast appreciation for the important results achieved in the fight against terrorism which was stepped up after Moro's death and which was then better organized. Appreciation was expressed to the forces of law and order, to the courts, and to Gen Dalla Chiesa regarding the importance of the contribution which he made during the most critical moments and which he continues to make today. What sense does it make to accuse him?

It is the facts that count; the rest is all fantasy and bad intentions. I certainly hope that the investigations now in progress will lift the veil of secrecy from the entire terrorist phenomenon, its roots, the responsibilities involved and its links.

The "grand old man" is an expression which I used in a conventional sense. I was talking about something that is not as yet clear, in other words, where and who the coordinating brain is, the real leadership, the political and ideological leadership which inspired, set up, and guided the armed party. Many military columns have been thrown into disarray but there remains a zone of shadows, a disquieting and mysterious zone, which has not yet been illuminated.

[Question] Can you make a prediction on the outcome of the "regional" elections?

[Answer] As far as the PSI is concerned, I think that the slates with the "red carnation" are going to achieve good results.

[Question] What would you reply to those who, contrary to the turnabout of the three-party [administration] are saying that, whether it wins or loses the elections, the PSI will bring the government down the next day? And, concerning the election results, those of 8 June, with which they will have to be compared primarily--with the "political elections" of last year or with the "regional" elections of 5 years ago?

[Answer] We have barely terminated the political crisis which had been dragging on for many years and it is certainly not our intention to start another one. The administration in power must be able to work and to do its job of taking urgent action which it has been charged with.

The results of 8 June will be compared to the earlier ones, from 1975 until today. We dropped from 12 percent in 1975 to 9.6 percent in 1976 and we then climbed up again a little to 9.8 percent in 1979 and, furthermore, up to 11 percent during the European voting. Now we think that we can recover more ground. The party has always demonstrated a greater hold on the electorate in the administrative elections.

PLI Secretary Zanone

Messina LA GAZZETTA DEL SUD in Italian 21 May 80 p 11

[Interview with Italian Liberal Party Secretary Valerio Zanone by Raffaele Nigro: "Peace Cannot Be Celebrated in the Invader's Capital"]

[Text] Cosenza--Valerio Zanone expects a recovery of the consensus in support of the PLI [Italian Liberal Party] also in the southern regions. "An electoral advance of the liberals," said the national secretary of the PLI who

yesterday spoke in Fera Square, "is the surest way to prevent the implementation of agreements between the Christian Democrats and Communists and constitutes the most eloquent indication of the construction political balances which will guarantee stable, democratic, and efficient administrations." Concerning the role of the PLI at the current political moment, the importance of the problems of the South, of terrorism, and of the conflict between the administration and CONI [Italian Olympic Committee], on the issue of participation in the Olympics, we asked the national secretary of the PLI a series of questions--as we did in the case of Craxi. In an interview given to GAZZETTA DEL SUD (which we are publishing on page 11 [of the original]), Liberal Party Secretary the Hon Valerio Zanone talks about his party's role at the present political moment, about the importance of the coming administrative elections, about the problems of the South, about the struggle of terrorism, and about the conflict between the administration and the CONI regarding Italy's participation in the Moscow Olympics. The Hon Zanone opened the PLI election campaign in Calabria yesterday evening with a meeting at Cosenza.

[Question] Let us talk about the South right away. What are your party's proposals and programs for specifically tackling the problems of development in the southern regions?

[Answer] We respond to the delays and errors in the policy (or lack of policy) for the South which the PLI has always considered and still considers not as an "area" problem but as a national and even European problem, by providing incentives effort and capabilities, as part of an undertaking which involves not only big industry but also agriculture, commerce, tourism, the crafts, and of course small and medium business.

[Question] In recent years, with the plans for the fifth steel mill center, Gioia Tauro came to constitute a mirage on the road of Calabria's industrialization. After Gioia Tauro, what is there left for Calabria?

[Answer] Gioia Tauro represents and constitutes the bitterness of a failure. This is a promissory note which the state signed with lightheartedness and which has now been called out.

[Question] On 8 and 9 June, the people will vote to elect the regional, provincial, and community councils; but the elections will in the end also have repercussions on alliances and on national political conditions. What are you hoping for?

[Answer] The Second Cossiga government clearly has an electoral genesis and constitution. It is therefore inevitable that the electoral response should decide its fate; the growing strength of the electoral opposition will correct the error that was made and will revive the possibility of a legislative understanding among all democratic parties. We are against this administration because we are against the division of the democrats.

[Question] What alliances does the PLI propose in the local entities for the time after the elections?

[Answer] Since this is not a party of bureaucratic centralism, decisions on local alliances, by virtue of the charter, are up to the regional leadership groups and the party's local organs. But there is no suspicion among the liberals which is why the homogeneous and certainly democratic majorities are going to be carried forward in the center and along the periphery.

[Question] Terrorism continues to drench the peninsula in blood. Another brutal crime by the BR [Red Brigades] was reported the other day in Naples. What measures, what steps must be taken to smash the armed party?

[Answer] The most serious risk at this time is that the terrorists, hard-bitten in the northern regions, might try to organize southern columns by utilizing easy contacts with the local underworld, developed in the jails. It is therefore very important to make modern and careful use of jails, regardless of whether they are special or not, in order to prevent any regrouping or contacts. It is also important for the forces of law and order to get off the streetcorners and to set up a decentralized system of police officers on the beat who would also use the cooperation and consensus of the citizens.

[Question] Concerning participation in the Olympics: The cabinet has said no, the DCI has come out in favor of the participation of Italian athletes in the Moscow games. What is the opinion of the PLI?

[Answer] The DCI has found an exclusively athletic justification for registering the Italian athletes for the Olympics. But there is also a political aspect to the problem, considerably more important than the merely athletic aspect. The Olympic Games are not only sports events but also and above all constitute a celebration of peace; and you do not celebrate peace in the capital of repression and totalitarianism which has invaded Afghanistan. The Italian flag will not fly at Moscow. If anything, one might add that the reason given by the Italian government to refuse this is too weak and evasive.

[Question] The last question on the PLI's election prospects. What do you expect from the 8 and 9 June elections?

[Answer] During these elections, the PLI will provide rich and even greater proof of democratic mobilization, with its slates of candidates more numerous than in the past and representative of all generations and all social strata in order to bring honest and capable administrators to the regional council of Calabria and the local entities, including the districts.

PSDI National Secretary Longo

Messina LA GAZZETTA DEL SUD in Italian 24 May 80 p 3

[Interview with Independent Social Democratic Party National Secretary the hon Pietro Longo by Sara Ocera: "The Italian Olympics Committee is not the Foreign Ministry"]

[Text] After criticizing the decision to go to Moscow following the "no" from the administration "in view of the massacre of the Afghan people," the Social Democratic leader is happy that the "sentinel of the West" has been retained. "A profound crisis in the political strategy of the PCI and the PSI." The "grand old man" of terrorism: "Let him who knows talk without metaphor." Catanzaro. The PSDI [Independent Social Democratic Party] last night opened the election campaign in Calabria with a "report" delivered by the party's national secretary Pietro Longo to the leadership cadres and the candidates in the "regional," "provincial," "community," and "district" elections. Leaving Catanzaro in the evening, he arrived at Reggio where he held a meeting. Tonight he will speak in Messina. We asked Pietro Longo some questions on the major topics which seem to characterize the election campaign during this phase: Relationships between parties, political framework, the Moscow Olympics, and terrorism.

[Question] Mr Longo, the national secretary of the PSI, speaking at Catanzaro, described you as the "unwanted sentinel of the West." What have you to say about that?

[Answer] I am happy to hear that the PSI secretary referred to me as the "sentinel of the West." At a moment when everybody is running, this role does not displease me since it is strong evidence of a Western and Atlantic position which the Social Democrats have always defended, especially during the particularly acute moments of the international crisis.

It is known, as a matter of fact, that the PSI always understood what it was all about belatedly. Here it suffices to realize that, in 1949, it was against the Atlantic Pact and that during the Fifties it was against European unity. We can take credit for always having seen the situation correctly in advance, both in the past and in the present.

[Question] The PSDI has chosen a precise line of opposition to the PCI; how do you explain the fact that in Calabria likewise there are administrations where your party is in the majority with the PCI?

[Answer] Our opposition to the participation of the PCI in the government is motivated by reasons of an international character, more than ever before at this point in time and it also springs from substantial differences on the ideological level. These motivations do not have anything to do with the area of local administrations, although the recent meeting of our party's Central Committee expressed the need for doing as much as possible, in future local administrations, regarding the understanding among the parties of socialist and lay democracy, including the DC, on a basis of equality, and to guarantee effective candidacies for reelection.

[Question] Will the PCDI in Calabria on every level (region, province, community) follow the political line which the party has chosen for itself on the national level? More specifically, could it happen that the community and the province of Cosenza might remain in social-communist hands as result of the decisive vote of the PSDI, as it happened during the present legislature?

[Answer] The political indications remain those expressed in response to the earlier question.

[Question] Do you not think instrumental the fact that the communists and the socialists believe that the center-left is outdated and that they continue to insist on formulas, rather than programs?

[Answer] Certainly, there is a profound crisis in the political strategy of the communists and the socialists. The communists are weaving back and forth between the historical compromise and the positions that emerged during Berlinguer's recent press conference, aimed at bringing about a split between the DC and the PSI and at hegemonizing an alternate role in the country. The socialists are allied with the DC on the national level but they everywhere prefer to make their decisions with the communists on the local level. As for programs, they have no valid idea whatsoever on whose basis one could build a serious foundation for the country's government.

[Question] What is your judgment of the fact that the administration has been clearly turned down by the CONI concerning the Moscow Olympics? And do you not think that parliament should take up this issue without for the 15th time coming up with an "Italian-style" decision?

[Answer] We have been the party which from the very beginning adopted a position on the need for a vote in parliament and we firmly maintain that posture because we do not think it conceivable that one could let the

can act as the interpreter of Italian foreign policy while the political forces avoid officially adopting positions on the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, as we have instead been requested by the leading Soviet dissidents themselves and as civilized conscience demands in the face of the massacre of the Afghan people, a massacre which is still going on at the hands of the Russian invaders.

[Question] The PSDI is not a member of the three-party group which by many is considered a bridgehead leading toward collaboration with the communists. Do you not think that your party's absence from the majority would facilitate this design?

[Answer] We are in the opposition to this administration because we think that, in its current form, characterized among other things by the arrogance of the left wing of the DC and the PSI, it can create the prerequisites for a sudden turnabout in the historical compromise, that is to say, the direct accord between the DC and the PCI, with some slightly different features of course. We for our part continue to feel that domestic and international policy, expressed by the lineup of the historical compromise, is not in keeping with the country's real interests.

[Question] On the topic of terrorism, Craxi mentioned the figure of the "grand old man." Do you think that there is such a person and what means would you suggest to get to him and to beat terrorism?

[Answer] Regarding the "grand old man," it would be a good thing for Italian society if the person who knows what this is all about were not to talk in metaphors. The dismantling of the intelligence services, at the time, and, today, the troubles connected with the Russomanno affair are elements of a policy which does not help get the country out of the perverse spiral of terrorism.

[Question] During the First Cossiga government, the PSDI, in the person of the Hon Di Girolamo, was responsible for the Ministry for the South. During his term of office, Di Girolamo, who also visited Calabria, getting a personal look at the region's state of depression, prepared a mini-package calling for the settlement of some industries in Calabria. What real possibilities are there now for the implementation of this mini-package?

[Answer] I am glad that people remember the initiative for Calabria taken by our minister, the Hon Di Girolamo, in the First Cossiga Cabinet which, although it held a rather precarious position in parliament, did develop a coherent action for the South and the housing sector (for example, Law Number 25 which was pushed above all by Nicolazzi) without the uncertainties and slippages which now characterize the "Second Cossiga Government." In this different parliamentary position we will naturally likewise not refrain from fighting to make sure that Calabria will move ahead in the direction suggested by the Di Girolamo.

MSI-DN National Secretary Almirante

Messina LA GAZZETTA DEL SUD in Italian 30 May 80 p 12

[Interview with Italian Social Movement-National Right Wing National Secretary Giorgio Almirante by Aldo Sgroi: "Almirante Says That a Second Republic is Needed To Get Out of the Tunnel"]

[Text] Mostly negative results deriving from regional decentralization. What has been called "a reflux of the right wing" is now also underway in Italy, as in the other countries of Western Europe. Hopes placed in Naples, Reggio Calabria. Interview with Giorgio Almirante, National Secretary of the MSI-DN [Italian Social Movement-National Right Wing], at the end of his election trip to Calabria, following the interviews with Craxi, Zanone, and Longo. Almirante proved to be a little worse for wear due to his "campaigning" but, as he said, he is confident because of the successes achieved from Lombardy to Sicily.

[Text] Mr Almirante, 10 years of regional decentralization enable us now to come up with an initial review. According to the MSI-DN, this review is mostly negative in the South and particularly in Calabria. What are the reasons for that?

[Answer] One will be enough: The constant and tremendous increase, year after year, of unused allocations which at this moment, in the 20 regions, amount to no less 15 billion lire, an enormous sum which the regions did not manage to spend, proving that they are even more inefficient than the central government machine. This means that the regional institution, which should serve to speed things up and decentralize operations, to accelerate the production rhythm, has served for the exact opposite. The regions have thus failed, like the entire rest of the current system.

[Question] You are talking about renewal--the new republic is your primary objective--but you, in turn, are accused of not renewing your cadres on the various levels and, especially you are accused of still using a "vocabulary" which goes a good 3 years back. Do you not think that times have also changed for the right wing?

[Answer] I am astonished at both of these accusations. As for the cadres, we have two parliamentary groups, in the Chamber and in the Senate, which are among the youngest, if not the youngest in absolute terms; also because, for well-known reasons, we had to replace more than half of the groups themselves last year. As for language and vocabulary, it is up to date and modern; it is furthermore true that our meetings are the only ones which people still attend because we speak a language that is accessible to all.

[Question] "New Republic" is the dominant topic of your party's election campaign. What are the possibilities for implementing this and, above all, what would change with respect to what you call the "waste of the First Republic?"

[Answer] What are the possibilities? Answering that this is not a possibility but rather a real state of necessity: Especially in view of the fact that the failure of the First Republic has been admitted by many among its own advocates and that the Italian people, although it may not wish to get out of the civilian setup, cannot allow itself to be caught in the failure of the institutions. When a civilian people finds itself facing such a threat, it always manages to find the road of salvation which definitely is not too strange then if we recall that the great democracies (for example, the French one) in the recent past modified their own institutions based on a popular referendum.

What would change? The entire structure of the state and society. Party rule would disappear from the state on all echelons, and the sovereign people would be given back--within a system of participation--those rights which were denied it in the current republic. The class struggle and caste privileges would disappear from society.

[Question] You yourself admitted that, out of 18 countries in Western Europe, in a good 17, elections have revealed considerable increases in the vote for the right wing. Only Italy in recent years went a different way. Why does the Italian right wing not manage to emerge, in your opinion?

[Answer] The countries I was talking about, fortunately for them, do not have a center, such as we have in Italy, which since the time of De Gasperi (right after 18 April 1948) has done everything possible to shift the country's political axis to the left. In Italy, the Communist Party grew from 5 million votes in 1948 to 12-14 votes in recent years because of the enormous system benefits granted it; at the same time, the right wing has been constantly opposed and pushed into a ghetto. In spite of this there is underway now in Italy what has been called "a reflux of the right wing"; we will see the first result of that on this coming 8 June.

[Question] From Milan to Reggio Calabria, you displayed your latest book entitled "Processo alla Repubblica" [The Republic on Trial], which was a good success in publishing terms also in circles that are not exactly right-wing. What was this success due to?

[Answer] My book's success, which I am naturally happy about, is due to the fact that the people have had it, especially in the South, as far as the republic that was born of the resistance is concerned, the republic that celebrates the resistance, the republic that speculates on resistance, the republic that invents resistance even where it never existed. So the people

gladly read an anticonformist book, a book that runs against the current, a book in which the big shots are put on trial. This is true also because what is involved here is a civil trial and, in the final analysis, a rather amusing trial.

[Question] One can read, also in the press which you defined a "being of the regime," about growing interest, not only in the South, but also in the North, as far as your meetings are concerned. You expect huge results from Campania and Naples in particular. What is this conviction based on?

[Answer] As far as what you read in the "independent press" is concerned, I must credit your newspaper with noteworthy calm which undoubtedly demonstrates your autonomy of judgment. The entire press, on the other hand, has been forced to report the success of the meetings held by us and personally by me everywhere in Italy, from Milan to Turin and Genoa, all the way to Sicily. How come? I do not believe that this is due to curiosity, especially in the South, where I was seen and listened to also very often, nor is this true of the North, where fear certainly prevailed over curiosity.

Looking especially at Naples, I believe that we are witnessing a new phenomenon here, a phenomenon of general lack of esteem for the forces of the regime and general sympathy for us. I do not know--and we will learn only on 9 June--whether sympathy will lead to trust and to what extent that will happen. But my direct contacts with public opinion, especially in Naples, lead me to expect good things.

DC Secretary Piccoli

Messina LA GAZZETTA DEL SUD in Italian 31 May 80 p 18

[Interview with DC National Secretary Flaminio Piccoli by Saro Ocera: "Calabria is Entitled to a Stable Government"]

[Text] The DC is not engaging in any bitter debates with the PSDI and the PLI. "We always refused to cheapen our coherence for the sake of a council member's or mayor's seat or the seat of a provincial president." The PSI is playing a role on the sidelines. This interview was conducted Thursday morning, before the interviewer took up the Donat-Cattin case. This is why it was not mentioned here, Catanzaro. DC National Secretary Flaminio Piccoli held a meeting in the city last night. We used this opportunity to ask him some questions on major topics in the election campaign. This produced an interview in the course of which Flaminio Piccoli, arguing with the communists, denied that the June voting in any way constitutes a referendum for or against the Cossiga Cabinet.

[Question] Mr Piccoli, the results of your party's recent national congress revealed a reversal of the trend within the DC, since it is true that a new majority has been formed, a majority whose expression you in. In Calabria, the DC continues to be run by a majority that is the expression of the Zac area [Zaccagnini group]. Do you think that this could influence the Christian-Democratic electorate in Calabria and therefore the overall election results?

[Answer] Absolutely not. We are a united party--and the response which the PCI, which is trying to divide us, is getting during this election campaign has been and is exemplary--which, in its ranks, reflects the composite reality of Italian society. And the DC goes before the voters as a whole, not in the form of one or the other internal component.

[Question] What is your judgment of the current Cossiga cabinet in relation to the fact that many consider it a bridge leading toward collaboration with the communists?

[Answer] There is no bridge to the Left or to the Right; we have a three-party government with a self-sufficient majority which opens up a new political phase for the direct assumption of responsibility by the PSI. This majority must prove itself through a serious commitment, through a strong will to tackle and solve the country's serious problems. The Cossiga administration is on the job and shows that it is doing a good job.

[Question] Terrorism has struck once again. A journalist has fallen at Milan. In Rome they have had one dead and two seriously wounded among the police. Do you think that the institutions, in the fight against terrorism, are sufficiently backed up by current law, or do you feel that the government should propose the adoption of new measures in parliament?

[Answer] I believe that current legislation is sufficient. The important thing is to commit the forces we have, to develop the work of the security forces in depth, to improve international liaison, to isolate the terrorists in the eyes of public opinion, in substance, to do our full duty in the best possible way. At election time, it is customary to say, on the topic of terrorism, that those who preach abstentionism among the young people inevitably push them toward indifference, toward qualunquism, toward populism, and, in the case of some of them, certainly toward violence. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the courts and the forces of law and order have achieved great successes. But the area of subversion is greater than we thought. So far we therefore have not succeeded in discovering the political brains that guide it and that malignant fungus will continue to grow. This is where we must do our utmost in terms of commitment, search, and alertness on the part of everybody.

[Question] If you had been chairman or a member of the national council of the CONI, how would you have voted on the participation of Italian athletes in the Moscow Olympics? And what is the significance of the decision to prevent the hymns and flags if the television cameras of RAI [Italian Radio Broadcasting and Television Company] will then zoom in on the awards, on the personalities, on the parades, and on the collateral services at the station?

[Answer] I would have voted against, not only because this would be in keeping with the decision adopted by the administration--which I approve--but also because the Olympics, on account of numerous defections, have now lost their significance and only serve as a propaganda tool for the USSR, in other words, a country which is responsible for having invaded another nation, Afghanistan--and I am mentioning here only the latest tragic episode.

[Question] Public opinion was shaken by the failure of the PSDI and the PLI to participate in the cabinet. Could the June election test--as a consequence of the large number of voters involved in almost all regions--constitute the premise for a revision of the political framework?

[Answer] These are administrative elections and they should not in any way be transformed--which is what the PCI would like--into a referendum for or against the Cossiga cabinet. The election figures will be read in terms of their real meaning: If we had adopted a different method, we should have demanded, following last year's "political" elections, a crisis in many left-wing boards which were defeated precisely by the political vote. As for the failure of the PSDI and the PLI to participate in the government, I would remind you that death sentences have already been pronounced on the legislature, that the PCI insisted on saying that nobody could govern without its contribution. Well, we have followed through on the positive availability of the PSI, we quickly resolved the cabinet crisis, assuring the country of a preconstituted parliamentary majority after several years. Does that look like little to you? And the social democrats and liberals who had always wanted the PSI to come in, who have a preferential relationship with the PSI up to the point of supporting a socialist for prime minister, should not have come out with a negative response merely because the particular political situation at the moment did not bring them into the government. But we are not looking for any fight with these forces--which share basic decisions with us. We confined ourselves to reminding the Hon Longo that one cannot accuse the DC of sliding toward the communists when his party--and this was confirmed by former secretary Romita--does not intend to renounce the numerous boards in which it is together with the communists. We always refused to cheapen our coherence for the sake of a seat on the council or in the mayor's office or a provincial presidency.

[Question] In Calabria, and in other regions, it so happens that the PSI is picking its ally between the DC and the PCI on the basis of the

effective possibility of forming a majority. Does it not seem to you that your party should have the right to make these relationships clear to itself and to the voters?

[Answer] A new political phase, which yet remains to be explored, began when the PSI entered the government which also includes the republicans. We hope that the positive development of this collaboration can also lead to peripheral understandings. But we do not support the mechanical shift, to the local level, of the formula of government and we agree that the PSI is entitled to the same attitude. You said that the PSI, in Calabria, reserves itself the right to pick its ally on the basis of the actual possibility of forming a majority. That is the rule of democracy if we do not wish to paralyze the regions and the local entities. The important thing is that, through our commitment, through our coherence, the voters go to cast their ballots in growing numbers, so that this majority will not be able to get along without the DC. Here is the message which I have for the citizens of Calabria who are entitled to have a stable regional administration: You will have just that if you strengthen our party."

Republican Party Secretary Spadolini

Messina LA GAZZETTA DEL SUD in Italian 2 June 80 p 14

[Interview with Republican Party Secretary Giovanni Spadolini by Franco Cangini: "Spadolini: Get Industry and Labor Union Involved"]

[Text] Collaboration by the PCI in the government is impossible today for international reasons above all. Restore government's priority in dealing with party interests. Following the interviews with the leaders of the PSI, Bettino Craxi, of the PLI, Valerio Zanone, of the PSDI, Pietro Longo, of the MSI-DN, Giorgio Almirante, and of the DC, Flaminio Piccoli, here is the interview with PRI [Italian Republican Party] leader Giovanni Spadolini.

Rome--Almost everybody is of two minds but in the election campaign, they prefer to display only one. Not that the Republic Party would not have two such attitudes to exhibit: One of them oriented toward revival and the other one a technocratic one; a little bit of Giuseppe Mazzini and a little of Gianni Agnelli.

The Republican candidates are not in the majority on the Republican slate. Half of the places on the slates were left for independent candidates. At least 20,000 independents are running for regional, provincial, and community council seats on the slates of the party with the ivy symbol. At Milan the slate is headed by publisher Giancarlo Mursia, at Turin it is headed by the manufacturer Aldo Ravaoli, and in Florence it is the writer Alessandro Bonsanti who heads the slate. Secretary Spadolini very much

views the PRI as a party of the democratic left, open toward the productive strata. It was not by accident that he came to parliament in 1972 as the independent candidate put up by the PRI.

Since it is a two-headed party, the PRI looks forward to the coming elections without any great ambitions and also without any overwhelming worries. Its traditional strongholds are standing up under the wear and tear of the times and resist the assault of competition in Romagna, Marche, Tuscany, Sicily, and Lazio. The heritage of the LaMalfian season still has a hold on the directorate, with its fluctuating opinions, in the regions of the industrial triangle.

The PRI achieved its tremendous advance during the regional elections of 1970 when it grew from 1.8 percent to 3 percent. This time the important thing, more simply, is not to fall below the 3.3-percent figure achieved 5 years ago. Giovanni Spadolini expects that the party will succeed in doing that. Following the establishment of the Second Cossiga government, the PRI regained a role as protagonist and also took steps to tone down the image of a party that is receptive toward the PCI, an image which it had assumed, not without electoral risks, at the time when La Malfa arrived at the conclusion that the historical compromise was "inevitable." Many things have changed since then and the idea of the "social contract," promoted by Spadolini also during this interview, boils down to extending a hand to the social left--the labor union--not the communist left.

[Question] In Ancona, and in some other communities, the PRI participates in some left-wing boards together with the PCI. What is this, Senator Spadolini: An indication of a tendency or a leftover from the past?

[Answer] This simply involves some exceptional situations. I would like you to note that the case of Ancona is balanced by the existence, in the region of Marche, by a lay board consisting of the PRI, the PSI, and the PSDI, with the outside support of the DC. Generally speaking, we are guided by the principle of strictness in government as a local watershed. Our judgment on the left-wing boards, in overall terms, is not favorable because of their tendency toward easy spending. Regarding the red boards, the PRI's position is generally a position of correct opposition, as at Milan. I might add that, in case of need, when it comes a choice between a left-wing board and a board of broad democratic solidarity, we prefer the latter.

[Question] Does it seem to you that the administration would gain in terms of political cohesion and operational effectiveness if liberals and social-democrats were also included in it?

[Answer] This is an administration which has a difficult time navigating but it is capable of growing to include new parliamentary consensuses. I consider a social-democratic contribution to be easier in the current state

o affairs. The five-party setup was born as a formula around the socialist candidacy for the office of prime minister in July 1979. After that assumption was out of the way, the five-party setup demanded to be accepted as a practical solution. Last March, the only alternative to early elections was represented by the three-party scheme. In our judgment, the PSDI--perhaps without wanting to--was working toward early elections. As for the liberals, we have never put any obstacles in the way of their joining the cabinet.

[Question] What remains of the national solidarity formula?

[Answer] National solidarity was expressed in a formula of program majority during the season of Moro and La Malfa above all in coincidence with a phase of international detente. This was the moment when the six parties voted at Montecitorio, without any difficulties, to accept a joint foreign policy document and the agreement among the Americans and the Soviets on SALT II seemed just around the corner. It is impossible to separate the emergency formula from the international context.

The eighth legislative session from the very beginning came out with diverse signs. The crisis of balances between the East and West exploded in forms which made it difficult to reconstitute the political framework of 1978. When, at the beginning of this year, the republicans proposed a confrontation among all of the constitutional forces, they first of all listed the problems to be discussed in terms of foreign policy precisely in order to determine the degree of autonomy of the PCI with respect to Soviet power politics and aggressive initiative. The confrontation was not possible in those terms but the substance had not changed. Cooperation by the PCI in the executive branch is today impossible first of all for international reasons.

This is why the republicans--under an umbrella of national solidarity, also covering the PSI--proposed an albeit narrow formula which would identify the forces available for shouldering the weight of government. That is the origin of the three-party scheme which does not conflict with the inspiration of national solidarity but which expresses it in forms and ways that are possible today. The first and broadest of these is the search for a social consensus that would be wider than the one that is expressed in the concrete political alliance.

[Question] Does this mean that it is not indispensable to have the PCI in the government in order to get social consensus for a policy of economic recovery?

[Answer] I think that, during this political phase, it would be the task of any democratically-based government, such as this one or others that may be put together, to pursue the involvement of the union, both the labor union and the entrepreneurial union, in the effort aimed at national economic recovery. In view of the energy crisis and the inflationary

crisis at our gates, there is no political majority that would not have to demand sacrifices also of those social strata which do not follow it, although this line does not entail the participation of the communists in the executive branch.

[Question] One last question on the events of the day: What do you think of the developments in the Donat-Cattin affair?

[Answer] As republicans we are bound to follow the words of Leo Valiani: "The priority of the state, the Republican State, must be restored in dealing with the interests of parties or individuals if we want democracy to live."

In other words, there must be no cloud and no suspicion hovering over a matter such as the matter of terrorism, where the fundamental principles of democracy are at stake, along with its very survival. Respect for the state, which is committed to this battle, cannot be cheapened by any other sentiment, even though it be a purely humane sentiment.

The decision to file the case, made by the the board of inquiry, on a majority basis, will dispel the shadow that had been hovering over the summit of political power. We appeal to all leadership groups to avoid any kind of manipulation here. This election campaign has already been contaminated enough.

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NEW SIAI MARCHETTI S-211 JET TRAINER AIRCRAFT

Rome AVIAZIONE in Italian Feb 80 pp 53-60

[Article by Gianfranco Rotondi: "The New SIAI Marchetti Trainer--S-211: A Trainer Custom-Built for Basic Training in the 1990's--A Machine That is Not the Same as Those Already on the Market and That Is Proposed for Meeting a Need That Will Be Particularly Felt in the Immediate Future"]

[Text] Summary

SIAI Marchetti, designer of the highly successful SF-260, proposes another jet trainer for the world market, a highly specialized aircraft resulting from a private initiative. With the S-211 the Italian company is offering to the air forces of the world, particularly those of developing countries, a jet aircraft whose principal task is that of providing a basic trainer without becoming involved in multi-role activities which would only increase the complexity of the aircraft and its purchase and running costs beyond an acceptable level. It is highly likely that there will be a return to this type of specialization in training with the choice falling upon, above all for the earlier phases, an easy to use, easy to run turbofan. The strong point of this Italian aircraft may well be its selection of the Pratt & Whitney, Canada, JT15D-1, a modern, well-tried engine which up until today has found its principal applications on the civil market.

Stories are told about how a pioneer entrepreneur in English aviation, Mr Noel Pemberton Billing, arrived at the conclusion in August 1914 that it would be a fine thing if his company--which was later to become Supermarine of Southampton--succeeded in building, in the shortest possible time, a scout biplane for His Majesty's admiral; and the meaning that the expression "in the shortest possible time" had in the aeronautical world in those distant years can be inferred from the fact that the airplane--the PB-9, appropriately nicknamed "Seven-Day Bus"--managed to complete its first flight after 7 days of work, the time from the designing to the first takeoff.

several years later, with the speed of airplanes considerably increased, and the time for building them also increased correspondingly. North American (nowadays Alouette) managed to build the prototype of that most notable aircraft the Mustang in a 117-day marathon, while in 1944 Heinkel took only 69 days to design, build and fly the prototype of that jet fighter--no less uniquely (for that era--the He-162A Volksjaeger). That airplanes could be designed and built in decidedly short times in those days is also confirmed by the case of the famous P-51 Mustang Star, which Milo Durham is said to have taken off in on 9 January 1945, 143 days after construction of the prototype began.

Today, with the complexity of modern life (and of flying machines), as one would know of putting a decent military airplane together in such short order, and even though there is obviously quite a difference between getting a prototype off the ground and supplying assembly-line machines to the units, and though the exigencies of a peace that is rather a restless one are quite different from those of a war in full swing, the time that passes from the start of a warplane program to delivery of the first specimens to the units that are to use them is decidedly closer to 2 lustrums than to just 1. In any case, in view of the fact that today's airplanes are so tremendously complex, one should not make the mistake of thinking that they could be hurried up appreciably, another reason being that the inevitable curollary of complexity--quite--makes the economic and financial problem of building a new airplane definitely more difficult than any technical problem relating to it. And unfortunately, it must also be recognized that when the plane on which work was begun 10 years earlier finally arrives in the units, the world situation--in which the machine was supposed to carry out a very specific function--has changed a great deal from the forecasts, the typical time-periods for political upheavals and economic cataclysms being decidedly shorter than the characteristic time-periods of an aeronautical project. If one wanted to go a bit--but not too much--in the direction of paradox, one could reach the conclusion that the warplane, if, unfortunately, serious use has to be made of it, will inherently always end up being used for a task different from the one it was designed for; and history abounds in confirmations of this assertion, with high-altitude fighters doing ground attack, transport planes used as nighttime intruders, stratospheric daytime bombers used as low-altitude nighttime bombers, and other such cases.

Actually, to be honest, there are also several types of military airplane that did end up doing almost exclusively the work planned for them, and even if the P-51's did go off gunning the Viet Cong on night missions, they always did mainly transport (even if, born as distinguished commercial planes, they owed their success largely to being used as transports, albeit military ones). Another illustrious example of planes that generally have not left their design framework are the trainers. But one has to understand something about them. Since the requirements of training have remained practically the same for 10 years and more, and one has to realize that just as no great new finds came out in the field of trainers for propeller-driven biplanes so long as they were in their zenith (and the same was the case in the era of the single-engine propeller-driven plane), before the single-



The makeup of the BIAF 5-211 at Vergiate in the configuration with pylons for external loads.

engine jet airplane formula is supplanted by something more modern, we should not see anything substantially different from what we see today--and that has been seen for a good 10 years--in the field of jet trainers. Anyway, in this sector there is every indication that one of the many cyclical phenomena that stud the history of aeronautics is about to occur. A good 20 years ago, when the first members of this very numerous family of flying machines appeared, there was the debut of airplanes that, strictly speaking, should have been more correctly considered two-seater versions of the operational units' machines, used mainly as converted craft, somewhat as happens today with the two-seater F-15's, the Tornados, the Mirages; airplanes substantially identical to their single-pilot relations, capable of identical performance, and often with analogous weaponry installed--at least for those who remember the T-12's and the Meteor T-7's. But that the training version of the Lockheed Shooting Star and of the ugly Cessna twin-engine jet did not, in more than one respect, represent the ideal solution to the problems of training should have been confirmed in the 1950's by the false promise of "trainer-trainers," designed for specific requirements of the military schools, and all of them simpler, lighter, less fast and less powerful than the contemporary airplanes built for shooting. In the last analysis, with weight, thrust and fuel consumption--less than half those of the Meteor T-7, the unarmed Jet Provost did not seem to suffer too much from being a full 300 km-per-hour slower, in view of the fact that it would at least have had to be demonstrated that a lower speed affected its validity as a trainer in any way. And considering what was done in the various parts of the world in those years, one arrives at similar conclusions in any case. Then the small, light jet trainers grew, and now that we are in the second generation, they are already at the level of the two-seater fighter-trainers.

that preceded the first generation of them. As for weight, thrust and performance characteristics, there is little to choose between a Hawk of today and a T-11 of 17 years ago, between an Alpha Jet such as the Belgians, Germans and French have and an old Meteor T-7, or if we like, between an MiG-17 of 1949 and a Vampire Trainer. And sure enough, we arrive at the multiple compromise, since the new trainers, growing in weight, thrust and performance (also installed equipment, as well as cost), end up becoming rather expensive—about 4.5 billion lire for the aforesaid Hawk, and certainly more for the Alpha Jet—and it is therefore entirely natural that one try to take the bitterness out of the pill for some air forces, and to sharpen their appetites for it, by arriving at the light attack-trainer. There is nothing new about this, to be sure, since history records night-fighter torpedo planes, fighter-bomber interceptors, transport bombers and so on, even if we have not yet seen examples of interceptor-transports or antitank antisubmarine planes.


Naturally, as is indeed verified with all the multiple planes, what one ends up obtaining—in the case of the attack-trainer—is a decidedly heavy plane, powerful and fast for the requirements of pilot-cadet instruction, and something that is a bit too light to be an airplane that shoots, in any case. It remains to ask whether certain speed characteristics are really so useful both in the first and in the second of the two uses, in view of the fact that if one really wanted to show the student certain Mach numbers, the simplest solution would certainly be to alter the Machometer scale appropriately. And as for the speed characteristics of an attack plane, it would be sufficient to mention that in low-altitude missions, the MiG's do not reach 800 km per hour, and that if one wanted to go faster, one would at least need to have avionics of the A-7 type in order to manage to arrive blindfolded at a target which, at Mach 0.9, would not be very easy to pinpoint and collimate by sight, not to mention the possibilities of hitting it. In any case, one cannot help but be perplexed by the fact that in times past, no air force ever dreamed of using a trainer for ground-attack tasks, and that the AT-6, BT-12, Prentiss, Master, Jungmeister, Bestmann, Wo-4 and OV-105 did venerable service in the ranks of the U.S. Army Air Force, the RAF, the old Luftwaffe and the aeronautical administration purely and exclusively as school planes, even though the gap between their performance characteristics and those of the airplanes of the operational units was decidedly narrower than is the case now—to take an example—between the performance of a Hawk and a MiG-17, while the antiaircraft weaponry of the blessed years between 1939 and 1945 was, on the whole, far more inoffensive than that of our day. To be sure, in the era of the Korean war, and then in Indochina and Algeria, the T-6's did an outstanding job as target-markers and light attack planes (some 15 years ago, the T-6's of the Spanish Air Force in the Spanish Sahara flew with lots of rockets under their wings); but at that time there were neither too many MiG's in the air nor individual ground-to-air missiles nor too many 33-mm cannons, and there is no questioning the fact that machines even less fearful than the nonetheless excellent North American trainer would suffice for firing down on someone who cannot reply fit for fit. Indeed, if there were not the usual unpleasant economic problems, it would not be impossible to prepare a pilot to fly the 104's or

the F-15's by starting him flying, from the first takeoff with the instructor, the TF-104's or the F-15A's; all in all, the flight line would be simplified, and apart from the inconveniences of a few more dead (perhaps) and a few more expensive airplanes demolished (certainly!), and a good deal more of expensive fuel burned, it is entirely likely that training activity organized in such a way could even work out. Unfortunately, to the inexorable laws of universal gravitation, the laws of friction, of fluid dynamics, of electromagnetism and thermodynamics, we could add today the law of the ever-rising cost of oil, and no matter how unpleasant it may be, there is no dodging oneself into thinking that the days of gasoline at 150 lire per liter can ever return. And it is therefore necessary to act accordingly. Thus, since the inexorable decline of the multirole plane is resulting from cost considerations today (it is better to burn precious fuel in machines specialized for the particular requirements than to save--within certain limits, obviously--on what the machines cost and waste fuel as an ineluctable consequence of them), the conclusion is inevitably reached, starting from identical considerations, that there will be a return to the pure trainer, optimized for the delicate task of preparing new pilots, and that it will be necessary to do without the warlike trimmings, or at least to reduce their dimensions drastically. In fact, there is no doubt but that the multirole plane now represents the most expensive approach, since an attempt to give a flying machine the capacity to carry out, reasonably well, tasks of interception, attack, interdiction, antiaviation and reconnaissance inevitably means burdening it with an expensive, heavy and bulky array of equipment, and therefore increasing its weight and dimensions in every respect, and consequently fitting it with engines capable of much higher thrust and therefore also making it a much greater fuel-guzzler, with the corollary of directly climbing purchase costs and especially, operating costs. And experience also teaches that with an airplane capable of doing a lot of different jobs, one should not make the mistake of thinking that it is possible to manufacture bigger runs of them, with lower unit costs, in view of the fact that the design and development costs for an inherently more complicated machine go up out of sight, and that all in all, any air force would inevitably and logically end up buying ever fewer of them--since we are talking about genuinely multirole planes--thanks to the possibility of using the same planes all the time for a wide range of different purposes.

From this perspective, it is inevitable that we look back and consider what was seen at Le Bourget last June, and note the fact that the pure trainer is indeed coming back into the spotlight. And the fact that more than one air force does not like to acknowledge this obvious phenomenon should not surprise one too much. The aeronautical user, be he military or civilian, has always been led, understandably and inevitably, to think of tomorrow's airplane, as of today's airplane, to which he is already accustomed, as being equipped with some modifications and improvements that enable him to overcome the limitations that are least acceptable to him, and it is therefore inevitable, with only rare exceptions, that it is very difficult for a specification drawn up by the user to be truly innovative. To take an example, we need only refer to the Vickers Vanguard and a few fighter-bombers that came a little later in order to realize how little futuristic and how un-

lucky in the industrial field certain initiatives could be, and how resounding their failures ended up being. Even if it is obviously dangerous to generalize, there is no shortage of examples confirming the far greater validity of programs originating from proposals by the builders, from the P-80 to the F-86, from the B-17 to the B-47, from the Caravelle to the DC-9 (without forgetting--though obviously of lesser import--national initiatives ranging from the NB-326 to the SIAI SF-260), and which moreover have in several cases sparked genuine revolutions in the aeronautical world. Paradoxically--but perhaps not too much, given the premises--one could reach the conclusion that a successful airplane cannot help but originate from the initiative of a builder firm, almost in spite of, one might say, the military and commercial users of the country of origin. The question obviously gets more complicated if the relationship between the industry that produces the airplane and the customer who is to use it is distorted, and the former ends up imposing his will on the latter, substantially limiting him to the role of purchaser of machines that will be able to serve him more or less, but which in compensation have, for the builder, the great merit of enabling him to get along tranquilly enough and scrupulously avoiding the industry's having to cope with any kind of risk in the carrying-out of any development and construction program. A little less dangerous--but not all that much--would be the other case, in which an excessively prudent user ended up imposing on the builder the development and construction of an unexciting and insufficiently competitive machine; and it scarcely need be pointed out this time that it would be the user who does not want to run risks, and that in the last analysis the desire not to take on a reasonable degree of risk would in any case result in production of inherently outmoded machines that are certainly very hard to sell.

This depressing outlook--and depressing especially for the taxpayer--certainly does not hold today for the new S-211. As mentioned above, it is obviously a pure trainer for which there is certainly no pretext that it can be assigned a complete training program that would take a cadet from the first takeoff to the transition to a machine of the caliber of the F-15 or the F-4, but which will rather be able to be used appropriately in that range of training missions that go from completion of the initial selection--and it is now universally recognized that it is best to assign initial selection, which among other things costs very little, to a propeller plane--to the beginning of those missions in which there is serious shooting, and if we like, to the professional-specialization missions, thus covering roughly one-half of the flying hours need for training a military pilot. The S-211, which should be recognized as having, if nothing else, the merit of not being one of the no-risk atrophying airplanes--and one with no prospects of success--referred to above, is the result of a now long experience in the lower reaches of training, those in which the SF-260, by which it has been substantially inspired, has performed so brilliantly, as a complete outsider. It is no secret today that singleseat and tandem-two-seater versions of the 260 have been designed, but there is nothing surprising about the fact that both of these have remained on the drawing board. A tandem-two-seater 260 would simply have made it necessary to solve a series of structural and centering problems, but without offering anything that the




The three views of the S-211. The cockpit on the actual airplane will be lengthened by 30 mm.

260 with side-by-side seats could not already offer, in view of the fact that the front section of the fuselage would in any case have turned out to be determined by the bulk of the engine, and therefore it is to be acknowledged that with equal installed power, a tandem ~~airplane~~ would have had perform-


ance characteristics practically identical to those of the side-by-side 260. Nor would things have gone any differently for a single-seater, which would have been able to serve at most as an ultralight attack plane, and would have had to give up any inclination to being a trainer. True, there would also have been the possibility of a turboprop 260 (and it only needs to be pointed out that with the 1019, SIAI certainly did not lack adequate experience in using the small Allison 250), but in this case also, one would not anyway have achieved results very different from those obtainable with an honest alternative engine, even if, logically, a tandem or single-seat solution would have been able to benefit considerably from the reduced bulk of the engine. In any case, the fact remained that a turboprop would have cost a fair amount more--both for purchase and for operation--than a piston engine, which would have been usefully employable only for a fraction, and not a very large one, of the training programs, and that in view of the fact that only some military pilots require preparation on turboprop aircraft (and normally on multiengine specimens), the possibilities for moving a jet training plane on the world markets would have in any case been far better than the possibilities of managing to promote a turboprop trainer. It would certainly have been possible to adapt the 260 to jet propulsion, but certainly very little of the elegant two-seater-three-seater designed by Frati would have remained. Above all, there was a lack, as there still is now, of a modern turbojet with thrust not too high and already sufficiently perfected, while the greater weight of a fuel load certainly far bigger than the 260's 240 liters of gasoline would inevitably have raised critical questions about both the wing structure and the undercarriage. Therefore there was no choice but to admit that no matter how much enthusiasm the success of the 260 had aroused, it could not have lasted forever and that it was therefore necessary to go for a completely new machine.

Indeed, to judge from the blossoming of initiatives in the jet-training sector, it would not have been difficult to imagine an airplane more or less of the caliber of the Hawk, the CASA C-101, the Alpha Jet, the Iskra, the Galop, the Albatross, going down perhaps to aircraft a little smaller and lighter, such as the Fouga 90; but it would certainly not have been an intelligent policy to do something similar to what is already found on the market--even if one could in that way have the illusion of not having decided to build a mistake of a machine--instead of being able to offer something decidedly competitive as regards price and performance characteristics. Unfortunately, in these last-named two fields there was absolutely nothing to be done, since in any case, the engine and a good part of the accessories would be imported for any airplane produced in Italy, thus reducing the proportion of labor to earn from, especially in view of the fact that national productivity is definitely in a downswing and costs are therefore up. At this point, the SIAI had practically no other possibilities of choice: the new trainer, if produced, would have had to be radically different from the existing ones, and especially, cost little, in order to be accessible to even the minor air forces for which the cost of buying a Hawk or an Alpha Jet can be decidedly heavy. And furthermore, why not think also of all the air forces--they do exist--for which a machine of the caliber of the 326E is already the most advanced operational jet plane? It is clear that

training mission



to to mission (four rocket launchers)



to to mission (four rocket launchers)



ferry mission (2 x 350 N external tanks)



take off distance



climb performance



level flight performance



range




max specific range



landing distance



one could not have counted on the support that an air force normally gives to aircraft capable of military use that are produced in its own country, by the attestation of faith and demonstration of seriousness that derives from even a modest order; but the SIAI had noted that the sacramental procedure can even be overturned, as had happened with the 260, and furthermore, they could not entertain any illusion that the Italian Air Force, with a trainer line based on the same 260 and on the MB-339, could have found room for an-



other jet plane in its schools. In any case, there remained the observation that if the 339 was the lightest of the heavy trainers, there would more easily have been a place for a light trainer in the air forces using heavy trainers.

The S-211 is a tandem-two-seater single-engine jet, with medium-high wing of light sweep, designed for the requirements of that range of military training that can be roughly situated, as stated, downstream from initial selection, with a propeller-driven plane used, and upstream from that part of it devoted to more typically "warlike" preparation, and in any case, before transition to the two-seater changeover versions of the line-unit airplanes. Therefore it can be stated roughly that the S-211 can be assigned, within the framework of the training programs of an air force on Western standards, about half of the flying hours in the training syllabus. With an empty weight of only 1,420 kg--less than half that of the Alpha Jet and the Hawk--the S-211 will have among its advantages, for succeeding in the world markets, that of low cost, and even though it is certainly too simplistic to think that the less an airplane weighs, the less it costs, still it is true that even for airplanes--or at least for the airplanes of a certain class--one can reasonably define a cost per kilogram. In any case, a strong point of the S-211 is its engine--whose cost per kg is far higher than that of the airframe--thanks to the adoption of the excellent and very proven Pratt & Whitney JT15D1, the compact Canadian turbofan to which the success of that intelligent airplane the Cessna Citation is largely due. In reality, there still persists today a tendency to view civilian engines as something far more "peaceful" than the military ones; but to prescind from the observation that the old Viper shows how the same engine--albeit in different versions--can carry itself with honor in both military employment and civilian use, it would be well not to forget that in the present state of the technology, civilian use is certainly far heavier than military use, rather than vice-versa, and that with more than 1,500 specimens already delivered, and more than 2 million hours of flying time to its credit, the Canadian turbofan can

boast a service status—with 3,000 hours of interval between overhauls and less than one breakdown involving the stopping of a jet engine for every 50,000 hours of operation—which more than one military turbojet engine might well envy. As usual, the aerodynamic design determines definitively the physiognomy of the aircraft, especially important features of which are the considerable thickness of the wing contours, and the large surface area of the horizontal empennage. The modest taper ratio and the low sweep of the wing ($15^{\circ}30'$ at 25 percent of the chords), along with the supercritical contours adopted, with thickness of 15 percent at the root and 13 percent at the extremity, indicate with particular clarity the special importance assigned to the aerodynamic characteristics at the maximum incidences, as is also denoted by the marked twist of $-3^{\circ}30'$. The slight negative dihedral (2°) is obviously dictated by the concern to correct the lateral-directional stability characteristics typical of a high swept wing, while the aspect ratio (5.08) is sufficiently high, confirming the concern to obtain good aerodynamic characteristics under conditions of flight that is not too fast, as well as the quest for adequate aerodynamic efficiency, that can have the effect of lower fuel consumption, if nothing else. The Fowler-drift flaps, with maximum angles of 40° (and with supercritical contours it is rather improbable that greater deflections could usefully be achieved), are of relatively modest surface area, but the high position of the wing doubtlessly enhances their efficiency, in view of the fact that the airplane's maximum lift/drag ratio is close to the value of 2.3, which is far from contemptible. The ailerons, equipped with servotabs and controlled tabs, have maximum angular excursions of $+20^{\circ}$. The two semistabilizers, with angles of 25° in zooming and 15° in diving, and each on three hinges, do not have controlled tabs, the stabilizer being of the electrically regulable wing-setting type for the requirements of trim, while the vertical empennage, with considerable sweep on the leading edge (45°) and strongly tapered, has its rudder—on three hinges—with maximum angles of $+20^{\circ}$. Both the horizontal empennage and the vertical one are on contours with maximum thickness of 9 percent. If one superimposes the contour of the S-211's nose on that of the 339, that of the Hawk and that of the Alpha Jet, it is practically impossible, as one might guess, to distinguish one from the other, since a common characteristic of all the trainers that have appeared in the last 20 years or so is the typical stepped arrangement of the pilot seats, as prescribed by the MIL-STD-850B standard. Moreover, it is planned for the nose of the aircraft, as exhibited in the mockup presented at the latest Paris show, to be widened by a few centimeters, so as to provide better habitability and easier installation of the controls and control panels for the various on-board equipment. The jet engine's air intakes, which are very prominent and have a lip with generous radius of curvature, impose a robust front section on the S-211's fuselage; but it is obvious enough that even without arriving at a configuration that obviously takes the form of considerable resistance to forward motion, the SIAI trainer could not in any case have entertained great ambitions about speed, in view of the solution adopted for the propulsion problem. It is indeed a characteristic of all turboprops that they experience considerable drops in the thrust furnished at flying speeds that are just a little high, and they are also penalized, as stated, by the resistance of air intakes that have to have considerable section, in view of

the strong flow of air that they must gulp in. And conversely, it should be noted that an intake leading edge with ample radius of curvature assures the intakes of higher qualities at the maximum incidences and in markedly deflected attitudes, which among other things are those in which it is necessary to have all the installed thrust available. The marked constriction of the fuselage sections immediately aft of the air intakes may perhaps not be very pleasing to some facile purist advocates of a facile aestheticizing aerodynamics, but conversely, it appears to be dictated by rigorous considerations, since it is certainly more advisable to reduce the section of the fuselage just where the pressure field that acts under the wing underside has the effect of ruling out the risk of stalls, also making it possible to contour correctly the entire rear section of the fuselage itself, therefore avoiding having to place the horizontal empennage in a flow zone that otherwise would be violently disturbed. A ventral airbrake, at practically the height of the leading edge of the wing root, provides, with its 0.42 m², the possibility of powerful deceleration in a nose dive, thus fulfilling specific training functions also, since it would be very difficult for the 211 to reach excessively high speeds even in very sharp dives.

The structure of the S-211 is of traditional type, following the classical pattern of the semishell in light alloy stiffened by stringers and diaphragms, and is subdivided into little more than 20 principal elements. The wing is in a single section, with force structure composed of a two-spar box on five ribs per outer wing, in which the major part of the fuel load is housed and the notable thickness of whose contours ensures it excellent qualities of strength and stiffness, as well as providing considerable capacity. The dorsal shell is stiffened by five small stringers set along the span, and the ventral shell--subjected mainly to traction stresses--by four, while four couplings at approximately the intersection between the spars and the ribs at the root of the outer wings connect the wing to the fuselage. Ailerons and flaps, and the terminals, are connected to the aforesaid structure, which also carries the strengthening elements for the four underwing pylons. Finally, it should be noted that the medium-high position of the wing, which also makes for considerable height of the wing tips from the ground, automatically reduces the possibility of damage to them in the taxiing phase, and ensures that loads even of considerable bulk can be attached to the four underwing pylons referred to. The structure of the fuselage, subdivided into two principal sections, is obviously more complex. The after section, which carries the wing attachments and those of the jet engine and the empennages, and with which the rear legs of the bogie (which draw up under the air intakes) are articulated, is on a total of 12 diaphragms, the last three of which belong to the beam that supports the jet engine's exhaust duct and to which the tail planes are connected, while the forward section, in which the cockpit is housed, is on 9 diaphragms. The nose, into which the forward leg of the bogie draws up and in which is installed the greater part of the avionics, and the cowlings--easily removable--of the exhaust duct complete the fuselage structure, together with the air-intake sections and the panels that connect the various parts of the aircraft. The empennages have an entirely traditional structure, based on the usual two-spar box for the fixed surfaces (the vertical one on five ribs) and on the


equally normal single-spar with torsion-resistant covering for the movable ones, the vertical having a compensating lip at its end. The bogie, with pitch and track of, respectively, 4.02 m and 2.29 m, and whose tires are 5.00-5 in the front and 6.50-8 in the rear, has legs that draw up into the fuselage with forward rotation, so that they can be lowered, if the hydraulic installation breaks down, by the action of gravity and the wind. While the forward leg is of the conventional telescoping type with torque link and steering control, the rear legs have a more complex tripod structure, each with external shock absorbers that act when the legs spread apart under load and with retraction jack that extends for the lowering of the leg, while an articulated push-rod gives, during retraction, 90° rotation of the wheel axle, so that it is house flat in the underside of the fairings of the air intake. A small skid protects the underside of the rear fuselage section if contact with the ground should be made in abnormally pulled-up attitudes.

As has been said, what substantially makes an airplane of the caliber of the S-211 possible is the engine, the robust and compact JT15D1 turbofan of Pratt & Whitney of Canada. With a diameter of 691 mm and a length of 1,500 mm, and a fitted-out weight of only 230 kg, the Canadian two-shaft turbofan can furnish maximum thrust of 998 kg at takeoff, with very respectable specific consumption, equal to only 0.54 kg per thrust-kg per hour. In accordance with the manufacturer's tradition, it is of the usual mixed type, with a 28-blade forward axial rotor capable of producing a maximum flow of 34 kg of air per second. This flow is conveyed through a 66-blade stator stage, also axial, to the exhaust cone at the rate of about 26 kg per second, and it arrives at about 8 kg per second, through two 33-blade stators, at the centrifugal rotor, made of titanium, on 16 radial blades. Reaching, through the diffuser, also of 16 blades, a pressure approximately 10 times higher than ambient pressure, the primary air is put into the inverted-flow annular combustion chamber, and from there--at a temperature of 960°--into the 71-blade high-pressure single-stage turbine, which drives the centrifugal compressor's rotor through the external shaft; thence it goes to the two-stage low-pressure turbine, on two rotors, the first having 61 and the second having 55 blades, which drive the axial first stage of the compressor, and from which the gas flow exits at about 560° C. The two flows--that of the hot gases and that of the dilution air--are therefore mixed at the extremity of the exhaust cone, and are then ejected from the duct with which the cone ends.


The adoption of the Canadian turbofan, whose compact architecture makes it possible, among other things, to keep down both the weight and the length-wise bulk of the engine, obviously sets, with its limited ejection speeds, precise limits to the speeds that the S-211 can reach, and there is no doubt that a hypothetical pure jet engine, with the least resistance resulting from the small size and lower capacity of its air intakes, and with considerably lower specific consumption of thrust with increase in flying speed, would have made it possible to obtain considerably higher speed characteristics, if only by virtue of a weight/thrust ratio which statically and at altitude 0 would be around 2.2. However, it should be kept in mind that a modern pure jet engine in the 1,000 kg-thrust class simply does not exist, and that an

additional 100 or 150 km/hour of maximum speed would have changed practically nothing in the framework of the training capacity of the aircraft (whose aerodynamics would also have been seriously affected), but would rather have had the effect of considerably greater fuel consumption, since with all turboprops, the increase in specific consumption encountered with increase in altitude and flying speed is invariably accompanied by corresponding decreases in thrust. But by keeping the takeoff speed of the S-211 down, by means of wing load that stays below 180 kg/m^2 , it has been possible to keep the thrust dropoffs that every turboprop shows as soon as flying speed rises appreciable from penalizing the aircraft's takeoff characteristics, which are indeed splendid.

With weight, dimensions and speed kept down, the S-211 can naturally be content with decidedly simple systems installations, with all the cost advantages and ease of use and maintenance. The fuel supply system, for example, comes off only two tanks--the wing tank, which holds 600 liters, and extends from one aileron root to the other, and the 150-liter fuselage tank, positioned immediately at the shoulders of the rear pilot seat and fed from the preceding tank--from which the fuel is sent into the feed-tank by ejection-type transfer pumps. An electric pump installed in the feed tank moves fuel during startup and under emergency conditions (and can be used for drainage), while an auxiliary pump is installed in the fuselage tank, in a position easily accessible once a removable ventral panel is taken off. Fuel is gravity-fed, through a nozzle on the back of the wing, and the fuel installation--whose capacity can be increased by attachment of 350-liter tanks to the internal underwing pylons--obviously ensures a regular fuel supply to the engine even during any kind of acrobatic maneuver. The hydraulic system is particularly simple (the airplane's bulk and speed rule out the necessity of servoassisted controls), since it is only for the three jacks that control the retraction and lowering of the bogie and that of the ventral airbrake. With a normal operating pressure of 105 kg/cm^2 , the installation is powered by the pump of a small plant installed in the right-hand side of the rear fuselage section--this plant too is easily accessible--and composed of the fluid reservoir, the pressure accumulator, the electric pump already mentioned, that furnishes energy to the system, and various accessories. It should be mentioned that in order to keep costs down, components already available in the accessory market have been used in the hydraulic system to a great extent. The 28-V DC electrical plant is powered alternatively by a starter-generator coupled to the turboprop, by a NiCd battery (adequately protected against danger of explosion) installed in a compartment on the left-hand side of the fuselage, behind the space into which the left-hand rear leg of the bogie retracts, and by outside sources, through the tap that is also located on the left-hand side of the fuselage. Directly powered by the DC system are the stabilizer actuator, the aircraft's lights, the above-mentioned pumps of the hydraulic system and of the fuel-supply system, as well as the flap actuators, while two static inverters furnish AC energy to power the instrumentation and the avionics. The avionics installation provides for various equipment groups, depending on the customer's specific requests; the standard group includes, for communications, two UHF/VHF transmitters, with antennas set in the leading edge of the fin, and a side-band



S211 - LANDING GEAR



**S211
FUSELAGE ASSEMBLY**

overpressure HF installation (obviously required by the necessities of ground-forces support training missions), while the radionavigation equipment consists of ADF, TACAN, VOR-ILS, IFF, flight director and radioaltimeter. The various pieces of equipment are installed mainly in the nose and in the back of the fuselage, just behind the rear cockpit, and provision is also made for installation of Doppler radar, a system--planned from the beginning--for heads-up presentation of the flight data, an attack radar in the nose, electronic-countermeasures equipment, and a system for radar sig-

S 211 - FORWARD VISIBILITY



Forward visibility from the pilot positions of the S-211


milling of bearings. In what had easily been viewed from the beginning as the ineluctable evolution of the original design, in which, with a certain ingenueness, the button of all-out simplicity had probably been pressed a little too hard, the S-211 provides today both an installation for pressurization (with AP of 0.28 kg/cm^2 in the cabin) and for air-conditioning, supplied with air tapped from the engine, and the ejections seats for the two members of the crew, housed under an ample transparent canopy hinged on the right-hand side of the cockpit and equipped with a system for induction of oxygen that is fed from 126-kg/cm^2 tanks and ensures a steady supply for 4 hours. However, it is probable that the arrangement offered today may be modified later, in view of the important necessity of protecting the two pilots from the danger of impact from flying objects, and thus it would not be surprising if the instructor's post eventually had its own strong wind-screen. In accordance with the practice already followed on more than one of today's trainers. On the instrument panels, which are identical for the two pilot positions, from what the mockup showed, the instrumentation is conventional, with compass and artificial horizon in the center, and on the left, ammeter, incidence indicator, Machanometer, cabin altimeter, clock, emergency horizon and panels for weaponry control. On the right, though, are positioned an altimeter, variometer, radioaltimeter, fuel flowmeter and capacimeter, lubricant telethermometer and manometer, and manometer for the hydraulic system.

Where the manufacturer probably sins from an overdose of ingenueness (even if it is more likely that what is involved is the very understandable concern the "delicate" feelings of our rulers) is in the attempt to keep us from noting what the possibilities are for armament of the S-211; and it is only of ingenueness that we may speak, since it is unlikely enough that an airplane designed for training military pilots could not be capable of carrying a certain load whose metamorphosis from training to "real" is entirely too easy to imagine. Even though the aircraft's modest weight, which at

2,700 kg at takeoff in the training configuration does not leave even the slightest margin for the most modest load of weaponry (once the plane is filled up with fuel). Is the surest guarantee against the possibility that an ill-intentioned user might try to employ the S-211 as a light attack plane, it is nevertheless obvious that especially at the maximum weight of 2,800 kg, it will certainly be capable of warlike uses; after all, even a tranquil, very peaceful machine such as the Rallye manages, in the Guerrier fighting version, to carry four rocket-launchers, or two rocket-launchers and two gondolas for automatic weapons, bombs or anything better that one might desire, and all at the dizzying maximum speed of a full 275 km per hour, thanks to the 135 HP of a 6-cylinder Lycoming, notwithstanding its inoffensive air of being a Sunday-afternoon aircraft, and with 510 kg total for the pilot, gasoline and weaponry load. And while, strictly speaking, even 500 kg hung on the wings of an airplane that flies at a little more than 300 km per hour can doubtlessly constitute a warlike load, there remains the fact that the 600 kg that can be attached to the S-211's underwing pylons--when the airplane is at maximum weight--cannot make a very dangerous weapon of it, even if we recall that it was indeed a few small bombs, of a few kg, dropped from two old PQ-2's commanded by North Korean Lieutenant La Woon Yung that on the night of 16-17 June 1951 caused, with the destruction of one F-86 and the damaging of eight others, more losses to the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing than the excellent MiG-15's had inflicted in 6 months of aerial combat. To the internal underwing pylons of the S-211 can be attached up to 300 kg (350-liter tanks, as already mentioned; gondolas for reconnaissance, each housing four cameras and infrared-sensitive devices), bombs, napalm containers; rocket-launchers--Matra 155 with 18 68-mm rockets, or INERA RWE-200's with 12 81-mm rockets; gondolas for a 20-mm cannon, while to the external ones can be attached loads up to 150 kg, such as air-to-ground or air-to-air missiles, gondolas for 7.7-mm (single or twin) or 12.7-mm (single) machine guns, practice bombs up to 150 kg, containers of illumination bombs, and rocket-launchers of various types (AL-18-50 with 18 50-mm rockets; Matra F-7, with six 68-mm rockets; AL-80 with six 80-mm rockets), and attachment of other loads too, depending on the necessities of the training missions, can also be easily provided for.

Accurate analysis--based on, among other things, extensive high-speed tunnel tests and vertical tests, at Easing and at Lille, in the installation of the INERA (National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research)--has shown that the S-211 possesses laudable aerodynamic characteristics, among which is excellent behavior in spin. However, in the present view the more exclusively technical characteristics of an airplane end up losing relevance if they are measured--once the capacity to meet the basic operational requirements is reasonably well-assured (and in the case of the S-211, all the performance characteristics are substantially the result of its capacity to "hold" 2.5 for long periods in maneuvers at 4,500 m altitude)--against the fundamental requirements of economy of purchase and operation. According to the IAL, the ideal trainer--at least for use in the range of programs that we have stated for training of military pilots--should cost less than \$1 million, and every hour of flying time should not exceed \$150 in direct costs, with levels that are therefore decidedly lower than those possible with the air-

planes used in the schools today, that cost—no give an idea of the price range—between \$2 million and \$6 million, and that cost from \$200 to \$400 per hour of flying time, and the second of these last two figures seems far more plausible than the first: even the modest and aging T-37B costs around \$225 per hour of flight. On the other hand, it is obvious that with such ambitious targets in the matter of costs, one necessarily has to be prepared to sacrifice something in other areas, and in this regard the SIAI declares



Longitudinal section of the new SIAI Marchetti trainer

that the trainer most appealing to many customers should aim both at the lowest possible costs and at the capacity to guarantee to the student pilots a preparation such as is effectively required for eventual transition to more advanced operational machines, sacrificing, without too much regret, many multiple accessories, which, among other things, it would be a good idea to try to view in a far more critical light than is usually done. That is, multiple use capacity, which is gradually proving a luxury for those who can afford not to keep too close an eye on their budget, should not be assigned a weight greater than 10, with cost and training effectiveness assigned 90, divided equally between them. In the design of the S-211, special attention has therefore naturally been devoted to the problems of maintenance, providing, through careful analysis of the structures and the systems, and choice of the system elements, for 1.9 manhours of programmed maintenance per hour of flying time, and 0.33 manhour of unforeseen maintenance per flying-time hour. If to the costs represented by these categories we add the cost of fuel and that of the spare parts, the total direct cost per S-211 flying-time hour comes, per 1979 estimates, to about \$130 per hour, leaving all existing trainers far behind. The SIAI jet plane's position does not vary substantially, and is even strengthened, if the evaluation comprises also the amortization costs, since the aim is to present the S-211 as by far the most economical, as regards purchase cost, of the jet trainers and those foreseeable in a reasonably distant future, with an operating lifetime presently planned to be 10,000 hours of flying time.

Naturally, the building of an airplane that is decidedly modern even though of modest weight, and that certainly does not incorporate revolutionary solutions, is nonetheless an undertaking of exceptional challenge, especially in a country where the aeronautical industries, as we have said, have always had the common characteristic of working substantially for the account of the military client alone; but the 16 countries whose air forces use an airplane created in Italy--almost despite the customary client, one might say--were obviously enough for the SIAI to decide to tackle the 211 program on its own resources. With a forecast of investment recovery in 4 years of production, the estimates, in 1979 lire, are for 15 billion in nonrecurring expenditures up to the building of the prototypes (two intended for the flight tests, plus one airframe for the static and fatigue tests), which would rise to 20 billion by the beginning of deliveries. After a little more than 3-1/2 years from now, with delivery of about the 210th aircraft, the 211 program would begin to pay a profit, and if we assume for the new trainer no more than a success comparable to that of its propeller-driven precursor, there is no doubt but that the SIAI two-seater jet should also prove one of the most profitable projects our builders have ever ventured upon.

SIAI S-211

Wing span	8 m
Overall length	9.28 m
Height	3.73 m
Wing area	12.60 m ²
Aspect ratio	5.08
Sweep at 25% of the chords	15°30'
Chord at the root	2.151 m
Chord at the tip	1 m
Aerodynamic mean chord	1.646 m
Empty weight	1,420 kg
Weight at takeoff (training)	2,200 kg
Weight at takeoff (armed)	2,800 kg
Internal fuel load	660 kg
Maximum fuel load	1,188 kg
Maximum external load	600 kg
Wing loading (training)	174.6 kg/m ²
Wing loading (armed)	222.2 kg/m ²

Engine: a Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D1; maximum static thrust at altitude 0: 998 kg

Performance characteristics at 2,200 kg weight at takeoff

Maximum speed	667.7 km/hour at altitude 7,620 m
Maximum cruising speed	639.8 km/hour at altitude 7,620 m
Terminal speed in nose-dive	741.3 km/hour (or Mach 0.8)
Initial rate of climb	19.81 m per second

Service ceiling	12,192 m
Stalling speed (with flaps)	126 km/hour
Prudent limit of endurance (with 30' reserve)	4 hour 15'
Maximum range	1,640 km
Minimum radius of turn at altitude 0	<300 m
Extended-maneuver load factor $n = 2.55$ at altitude 4,572 m	
Takeoff distance over screen of 15.24:	440 m
Landing distance over screen of 15.24:	537 m

11267

CSO: 3104

SVALBARD AIRPORT CHIEF NOTES USSR MOVES TO EASE DISPUTE

Oslo NORGES HANDELS- OG SJØFARTSTIDENDE in Norwegian 2 Jun 80 p 4

[Report by Tor Husby, special correspondent]

[Text] Longyear City.--"Norwegian air traffic authorities asked a year and a half ago that the Russian helicopters on Svalbard establish direct communication with the airport tower in Longyear City to announce their arrival at the airport. That request has been repeated twice since, and we now have hope that the direct communication can be established in the course of the summer season," Torbjørn K. Østerud, director of the airport in Longyear City, tells NORGES HANDELS- OG SJØFARTSTIDENDE.

"We are aware that Aeroflot has started courses to teach its helicopter pilots the English phraseology that is used in the tower, and we are also helping the Aeroflot representatives in Longyear City ourselves with the same task."

Østerud points out that in the regular meetings with Aeroflot's representatives the question of communication with the helicopters often comes up. As the situation has been, it is the Aeroflot office in Longyear City that has the direct communication with the helicopters and then relays the information to the airport tower. But there have often been delays before the announcements reached the tower.

"The airport office has taken this up on several occasions, and we have gotten improvements. We have now formalized it so that the reporting service is much better than it used to be. We ask to be informed of arrival 20 minutes before landing. But we can also add that we are not satisfied until we have direct communication between the helicopters and the tower."

The Aeroflot helicopters have regular landings at the airport every month during the winter season, when the Aeroflot machine from Moscow arrives.

The helicopters carry mail, freight, and passengers between Barentsburg and the Soviet mainland. In the summer season Aeroflot has landings twice a month. To service this one Aeroflot craft the Russian have stationed four representatives at the airport. One of them also has his wife with him. This is the result of the famous wife case in 1976 when the wives of the Aeroflot representatives suddenly came to Longyear City the day before Christmas Eve and thus almost doubled the Soviet colony there. The matter was not settled for several months, until a compromise was reached according to which if any of the Russian employees wanted to have their wives with them the number of employees would be reduced correspondingly.

Østerud says that there is very little contact with the Russians. He does not know, for example, how they spend their leisure time. When it comes to the much talked-of Russian photographing of passengers getting off SAS planes, he says that a great many people take pictures when the SAS planes arrive.

Cameras are to be seen everywhere. He also calls attention to the fact that the Russians will soon have to move to the small plane hangar. They had already been informed of that before the erection of the new building.

8815

CSO- 8148

NORDLI DISCUSSES BASE POLICY, LABOR OUTLOOK, ELECTIONS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 20 Jun 80 p 6

[Text] If there should be an unexpected majority for the negative side in the referendum, it is likely that we will have one of the largest labor conflicts in recent years. The government will probably not fall back on a compulsory wage board to ensure labor peace. Prime Minister Odvar Nordli made this entirely clear at his press conference yesterday, which marked the conclusion of the spring session of the Storting.

A Negative Vote Means Conflict

"A compulsory wage board is not inevitable. It is most likely that we will have a conflict," said the prime minister firmly. To the question of whether there will be room for additional wage increases and other compensation if a majority of the organized workers vote negative, Nordli answered that the wage settlement has gone well past the general economic framework. "Substantial wage increases will lessen the possibilities of holding price and cost increases under control," he said.

Odvar Nordli was also confronted with the question of whether a negative majority vote must be regarded as showing a lack of confidence in the leadership of the trade union and political labor movements. "That is for others to judge. However, I feel certain that organized labor considers the wage proposition in isolation, and that the question of confidence or no confidence in the leadership is not a part of the referendum," said Nordli.

The prime minister said that one of the reasons why so many voted negative to the settlement is that they see parts of the negotiated results as interference in the fundamental rights of the trade union movement.

"If there is a majority, it is a clear expression of solidarity with the low-wage earners of organized labor," said Nordli.

Price increases also were a central issue during the prime minister's press conference. He confirmed that the government's goal is to hold the increases below the average for the OECD area. He said that so far the government has no plans for extraordinary steps to keep prices under control.

Base Policies Remain the Same

Norwegian base policies remain the same and will not be changed.

Prime Minister Nordli responded thus at his press conference to questions connected with United States plans for advance storage of equipment for a Marine brigade of 8,000 men in North Norway.

Nordli said that the question of advance storage must be judged in relation to our security policies. It must be seen in relation to the question of whether it contributes to fulfilling the goals of our defense and security policies, he said.

The prime minister also said that there had been no negotiations between the United States and the Norwegian Governments on this matter, but that the two countries together had carried out studies on advance storage.

Remarkable

"I think it is remarkable that the bourgeois parties are not able to get together on an agreed position on the government's long-range program. It is remarkable that the leader of one of the parties, long before the long-range program is ready, goes out and says that it will be difficult to reach an agreed bourgeois position. Before an election the voters have the right to know which policies a broad bourgeois government plans to carry out."

That is what Prime Minister Odvar Nordli said a couple of days after the chairman of the Center Party, Johan J. Jakobsen said that he did not believe that the cooperating parties would issue any joint comment on the long-range program, as they did before the election of 1977.

"The parties do not want to present any joint alternative before the election. But they are prepared to bring the government together if there should be a bourgeois majority. Will the parties, if they win, sweep their differences together in a heap, and form a government on this basis? I really believe that the parties should let the voters know what alternatives they have to choose from," said Nordli.

At the press conference he was asked to sum up the spring session of the Storting.

"During the past year no joint alternative to the existing minority government has been proposed. In a number of cases we have seen that the bourgeois parties together now than it was one year ago."

The prime minister was also asked if the Labor Party's congress should again designate the party's candidate for prime minister.

"It has not been and should never be the job of the congress to designate the prime minister. It would be unfortunate if we reached the point where

It was the usual case for the congress to choose the prime minister. In my own situation, I will give the party organs the necessary information in ample time before the congress.

The question was asked whether the Labor Party is willing to seek cooperation with other parties to ensure a majority in the government.

Nordli refused to discuss such government alternatives before the election. He was asked what would happen if in 1981 there was either a foundation for a bourgeois three-party government or a Labor Party government. He answered, "We must of course judge the situation which then exists, and it is clear that the Labor Party, as the country's largest party, must be willing to take its part of the responsibility for establishing a vigorous government."

9287

CSO: 3108

CENTER PARTY CHAIRMAN DISCUSSES COALITION CHANCES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 18 Jun 80 p 7

[Article by Per-Arne Bjerke: "Disagrees With Conservatives, But Would Govern With Them"]

[Text] The Center Party desires to form a government with the Conservative Party. At the same time the Center Party leadership recognizes that the party is on a collision course with the conservatives on a number of issues. When the chairman of the Center Party, Johan J. Jakobsen, was asked at a press conference yesterday if he expected a new joint bourgeois position on the government's long-range program before the election in 1981, he replied, "To be honest, I believe it would be difficult to establish such a position. But we must not think it unfortunate that the bourgeois parties go to the election with some different viewpoints. It should not be our goal to force ourselves to devise a unity which is not realistic."

As is known, the Conservative Party, Center Party, and Christian People's Party issued a joint declaration on the government's program before the election three years ago.

Johan J. Jakobsen said that the conservatives' position on abortion contributed to great uncertainty about bourgeois cooperation. But the chairman did not agree that the distance between the three bourgeois parties had also increased over several other issues.

"The disagreement which has appeared during the past year was also there previously. It concerns issues such as oil, energy, agriculture, and taxes. But this year in the Storting we have had better coordination of viewpoints among the bourgeois parties. Therefore comments relating to the conservatives have been somewhat more friendly. We saw examples of this during the budget debates last fall."

The Liberals May Join

The chairman said that close cooperation among the middle parties will continue. But expanded middle party cooperation would not prevent entering governmental negotiations with the conservatives if the election should bring a bourgeois majority.

The Center Party would also like to have the Liberal Party participate in that cooperation.

"At the outset we will not exclude any party," said Jakobsen.

"Will the Center Party favor reversing the resolutions on oil drilling in the north and development of Alta if you come into the government?"

"We are sufficiently practical politicians to realize that it is unrealistic to try to reverse Storting resolutions on these matters, even though we voted against them."

Cooperation On Lists

For the election in 1981 the Center Party again has a position on cooperation on lists. In a statement the party's central committee protests that the Labor Party is not willing to change the existing ballot arrangement. This has again caused cooperation on lists to become a current issue, and in several counties there have already been contacts between the Center Party and the authorities for joint lists.

In another statement the central committee of the Center Party says that the Labor Party and the Conservative Party are violating important principles in the agricultural agreements.

"Confidence that the escalation plan will be carried out is now in danger of fading away," said the statement from the central committee of the Center Party.

9287

CS0: 3108

COUNTRY'S LARGEST POWER PLANT BEGINS OPERATION

Oslo HANDELS- OG SJOFARTSTIDENDE in Norwegian 18 Jun 80 p 6

[Text] The country's largest power plant is in operation-- after Prime Minister Odvar Nordli yesterday morning gave an order by telephone to the staff at Vestland power central in Sauda, 110 km from Sima, to send power out over the net. What has now happened at Sima power plant in Eidfjord is that the two smallest turbines are in operation. When all four are in full operation in March of next year, production will reach 2.4 billion kilowatt-hours per year. That is equivalent to one and one-half times the amount of power needed by the entire Bergen municipality.

The two turbines that are now in operation each produce 250 megawatts. The next two will produce 310 megawatts. The entire power plant has until now cost over 1.9 billion kroner, and it is probable that the total will exceed 2.2 billion when the Eidfjord plant is completed.

The Foundation of Our Living Standard

Prime Minister Nordli used the occasion to say a few words about the value of water power.

"Many are perhaps unaware of the enormous importance of water power in the development of the welfare society. Certain access to sufficient and reasonable power has been of decisive importance for the industrialization of Norway. It has meant that water power is a foundation of our high living standard."

Nordli said that it would be some time before people fully realize the importance of having ready access to a renewable energy source such as water power. But the global energy crisis with which we must live during the coming years will teach us a useful lesson.

Reduced Development

Production at Sima is only 47 percent of what it could have been if the plans from 1968 had been carried out. The reason for the reduction was, among other things, that the Veig River was declared protected, following strong pressure from environmental groups.

Planning began in 1962 when the National Power Authority studied power resources in the northwest portion of Hardanger. The project was divided in two parts between Veig and Bjorelo, and was given the names Eidfjord North and Eidfjord South. The application to begin construction was made in 1968.

Because the possibilities for water storage at Eidfjord North were limited, a large reservoir was recommended for Halne-Hein in the fluvial basin of the Numedals River. But in 1973 the Storting rejected this recommendation. Eidfjord North was reduced, a plan was approved in 1976 for damming the Sysevatn somewhat higher than originally planned, and the name of the project was changed to "Sima Power Plant."

The Station Hall

The enormous station hall is located at least 600 meters beneath and 700 meters into the mountain--200 meters long and more than 40 meters high. The two turbines have been running for test purposes for quite a while, and in that time they have brought in more than 2.5 million kroner to the National Power Authority.

Each of the units has the world's largest Pelton turbines, and to ensure that large rocks do not fall down in the mountain rooms over 20,000 steel bolts have been driven into the overhead of the power plant and the tunnels in the vicinity.

Over 1300 people worked on the plant during the summers of 1978 and 1979. Today the staff is down to over 700.

Eidfjord Municipality Benefits

The Norwegian News Agency reports that the host community of Eidfjord has good times coming. The area around Vaerings Rapids expects 1200 inhabitants and a budget of over 13 million kroner. In future years the National Power Authority will pay about 20 million kroner to the community for taxes on incomes and capital. In addition the community will receive license fees of over 2.5 million kroner per year.

And if that were not enough, the municipality will take over the administration building, stores and workshops at a bargain price when NVE [Norwegian Watercourse and Electricity Board] and the National Power Authority no longer have use for them.

The National Power Authority has also improved the public highways in the area, and established a direct highway connection for Ulvik via national route 7.

9287

CS0: 3108

INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION LEADER ATTACKS OIL POLICY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 10 Jun 80 p 7

[Report by Roy Helge Simonsen on Egil Bakke's press conference]

[Text] The government's financial policy is too expansive. We are using too much oil money already. Balance the welfare budget in the course of 4 to 5 years. Public employment must not be increased. Norway is not winning back lost markets.

Those are some of the salvos fired at the government's economic policy by the Norwegian Industry Association in its semiannual economic report, which was presented by department director Egil Bakke at a press conference yesterday.

Bakke says that apart from the oil activity, the growth in the Norwegian economy will be very slight this year. Next year--1981--it is doubtful whether we shall have any growth at all. Norwegian industry is producing less today than 6 years ago. In other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries production has increased between 10 and 15 percent during the same period. It is thus a very gloomy picture that the industry association paints of the Norwegian economy halfway through 1980. The association says that international repercussions are having effects on Norway.

In the report it is stated that the growth in buying power on "our" markets has been nearly 50 percent since 1973, but we still export no more to these markets than we did in 1973. We are weakening our position both at home and abroad, while imports are increasing.

Department director Egil Bakke tells ARBEIDERBLADET that it is primarily the financial policy that has led to the difficulties in the economy.

"There was splendid agreement that we should not use the oil money and create pressure in the economy. But we have already done that. We are

using oil income to straighten out maladjustments that the oil money has already inflicted on us."

"And what measures do you recommend for the government to take?"

"A number of drastic measures are mentioned in the report that we think are necessary. In the course of 3 to 4 years we must balance the welfare budget, public employment must not be increased for the time being, the state's tax and transfer systems must be simplified and made efficient, and the economic policy in general must be aimed at transferring decisions from the central bureaucracy to the decentralized decisions of the market," says Egil Bakke.

"And that is enough to straighten out the distortions you think you can show?"

"Even if the financial policy and the economic policy are set up according to the recommendations, the problems will not be overcome all at once. We have gone too far to believe that one blow of the sword can cut through the Gordian knot," says Egil Bakke.

In the report it is emphasized that if Norway does not manage to regain the ability to grow in its ordinary economy, our ambitions concerning a better society must be watered down considerably. We must reduce our demands for better standards in all fields, the industrial association insists in its report.

The association is counting on a price rise of between 10 and 11 percent from 1979 to 1980. The rate of price rises in Norway can easily go up to 12 or 13 percent in the second half of 1980 and be 2 to 3 percent higher than those of our trading partners. That can mean an increased price rise in 1981 as compared to 1980.

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CSO/ 5108

PARLIAMENT APPROVES OIL TAX INCREASE

Oslo Aftenposten in Norwegian 6 Jun 80 p 5

[Text] Norway is tightening up the tax regulations for the oil companies in the North Sea. In 6 years this will bring the treasury an additional 53 billion kroner besides the 228 billion already booked. The Norwegian system is becoming perhaps even stricter than the English, and most of the companies' extra profit resulting from international price increases is being taxed away. But there will still be something left for the companies, Ulf Sand, minister of finance, said in the Odelsting when the new taxes were approved there yesterday by an overwhelming majority.

Only the Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party were interested in a system based on separate taxation for each individual field. A proposal from the Socialist Left to study such a system of taxation was then approved for sending to the government without a final vote. The systems advocated by the two parties had in common that they would bring in several billion kroner more to the treasury than the taxes voted by the majority.

In a comment on the alternatives proposed by the two small parties, Ulf Sand, minister of finance, said that those proposals did not place enough weight on the misgivings that a further tax increase would arouse in the present situation.

The spokesman for the bill, Gro Harlem Brundtland (Labor), of Oslo, sketched the main points of the Odelsting's changes in the law:

"The average percentage of tax is increased from about 69 percent to 81 or 82 percent. The biggest part of the total increase comes from the increase in the surtax from 25 to 35 percent--and from the effect of the reduction in the tax credit from 12 months to 6 months."

With regard to the tax increase, the majority were especially concerned about some special aspects: Kjel Magne Bondevik (Christian People's

Party), of Møre and Romsdal, brought up one of these, namely the anxiety about whether the Statfjord C platform will be built. Nothing has been decided, he said. Mrs Harlem Brundtland stated that Statoil will favor building Statfjord C. Minister Sand said that Mobil has made a stipulation about considering the construction again.

Another interesting point for the majority is the possibility of channeling funds from the North Sea to continental Norway. Rolf Presthus (Conservative), of Akershus, emphasized that the Conservative Party looks upon that with great sympathy; the job is to find a form which will have the least possible adverse effects. Sverre Helland (Center Party), of Hordaland, said that an important objective is for the oil income to provide secure and lasting jobs, and for this income to strengthen the districts. For that reason such a proposal should be evaluated carefully in connection with taxation of the companies.

Lastly there is the question of what position is to be taken on the tax aspects of the expenses for future removal of installations on the continental shelf. For the time being we must await the results of studies now under way, said Mrs Harlem Brundtland, who also did not rule out the possibility that the taxes will have to be evaluated once more--if, for example, there should be another big increase in the price of petroleum.

8513

CSU: 3108

BUSINESS ORGAN SHOWS ROLE OF OIL SECTOR IN ECONOMY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Jun 80 p 28

[Text] The annual survey of the country's 100 largest industrial concerns, which is compiled by the newspaper NORGES INDUSTRI, shows great changes in rank as compared to last year. Norsk Hydro is by far the biggest in turnover, with sales last year of over 9 billion kroner. The Aker group, in second place, reached a good 3.6 billion kroner. Most striking was Statoil's great advance. The company advanced from ninth to fourth place on the list, and its turnover increased by about 63 percent as compared to the year before. How long will it be before this concern is the biggest in Norway, the paper asks.

Borregaard dropped from second to fifth place, and Kvaerner Industries from seventh to ninth place. Only Norsk Hydro at the top and Norske Esso in seventh place had the same position as the year before in the ranking of the ten biggest industrial concerns.

Where in 1978 there were 17 companies with more than a million kroner in turnover, last year that "club" got five new members. They were Denofa-Lillberg, NIBB, Siemens, Norsk Jernverk, and Moss Rosenberg Verft, according to the survey.

The calculations that ØKONOMISK LITTERATUR did for NORGES INDUSTRI show that both company capital and surplus as percentages of turnover increased for the 100 biggest concerns in 1979 as compared to the year before. Company capital rose by 1.31 percent to 17.51 percent, while the surplus as a percentage of turnover rose from 1.09 to 2.54 percent. The main reason for the rise in the surplus, not unexpectedly, was the so-called processing industry, and the ASV group, for example, increased its earnings from 0.5 percent to 7.82 percent.

For the traditional home-market concerns, on the other hand, there was no question of any special change, and NORGES INDUSTRI believes, therefore, that it may still be permitted to say that low earnings still are a very great problem for Norwegian industry. Even with the upswing in the traditional export industries, the surplus is alarmingly low in comparison to the rest of Europe. Also, the profitability here in Norway is very weak in relation to the 10 percent that is regarded as acceptable in industry, the paper says.

LABOR MP KJELL MAGNE FREDHEIM HAS SPECIAL INTEREST IN NORTH

Stockholm NORDISK KONTAKT in Norwegian Jul 80 pp 506, 507

[Text] Not many MP's have been interested in the border regions and their problems and possibilities. Kjell Magne Fredheim is one of the few who have seriously considered these problems and who have defended the interests of the border populations both locally and on a national level.

This is perhaps not surprising. Fredheim himself was born in a community with close ties to Sweden (Os in Osterdal), and for much of his adult life he had been professionally involved with the border districts of the Arkore region (the Arvika-Kongsvinger district).

But no one could think that only the border districts have been the apple of his eye. He has become most famous as his party's spokesman in matters having to do with the Norwegian National Broadcasting Company. For some years he has been chairman of broadcasting affairs in the Storting, and he has fought a continuing fight in favor of free broadcasting, as independent as it can possibly be within the framework of the government control of radio and television which we have today.

The least hint of "administration" or censorship of the Norwegian National Broadcasting Company makes Kjell Magne Fredheim raise his hackles. He disdainfully refuses every attempt to regulate broadcast writers by means of directives and decisions. All directives of this kind have an inadvertent inhibiting effect on the individual writer's freedom of expression, he says, and therefore must be vetoed. The road leading from guidelines and directives to a standardization of policy orientation is not a long one.

For Fredheim, every form of opinion censorship is an abomination. Only in a free environment can opposing opinions encounter each other and the thoughts and ideas which help mankind progress be able to flourish.

His uncompromising policy when it comes to the independence of the mass media from public authorities is without a doubt a product of his long years of activity in the press. After he finished his schooling and worked several years in a cooperative, he changed over to journalistic work.

He was employed by the Norwegian Telegram Bureau as well as by the WORKER'S RIGHTS in RORØ and GLAAMDALEN in Kongsvinger. He later worked for the latter newspaper as a political correspondent, and there is every reason to believe that he will go back to journalistic work when he finds that the time is ripe to end his political career. It probably won't be long before we see him as an editor of one of the Labor Party newspapers.

Kjell Magne Fredheim was caught up in the cause of the labor movement at a young age, like so many others. He started his political career in local politics as a member of community government, local executive committees, and county councils. He was also the chairman of the Hedmark Labor Party for some years. He seriously entered the national political arena in 1965, first as an alternative representative, and since 1969 as a full representative for the Hedmark Labor Party.

Many positions of honor have been entrusted to him through the years. For instance, for many years he was the chairman of the support committee for Norwegian daily newspapers, a position demanding both determination and a thorough knowledge of newspaper geography. For several years he was a delegate to the North Atlantic Assembly.

It follows that a man with such strong interests in the border regions would also be actively interested in all forms of Scandinavian cooperation. He keeps well abreast of the work accomplished by the Nordic Council, and has served as a substitute member of the council. Hopefully he will also become a full member before he returns for good to his press activities.

Kjell Magne Fredheim is also a man in the prime of life, born in 1928. He will certainly be able to make himself effective in discussions concerning Norwegian public life for many years to come.

9584

CSO: 8139/1342

POLL SHOWS MORE PERCEIVE AFGHAN INVASION AS PEACE THREAT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Jun 80 p 4

[Article by Omar Magnergard: "Soviet Threat to Peace"]

[Text] Not unexpectedly, the invasion of Afghanistan has influenced the Swedish people's view of the Soviet Union. Last fall only less than one in four Swedes (23 percent) thought Soviet policy a constant threat to peace. Now, more than one in three think so.

This was the result of an extra SIFO [expansion unknown] poll, taken by the Preparedness Committee for Psychological Defense. Research Secretary Knut Tornquist says to SVENSKA DAGBLADET: "The political and military world situation has been changed to such a degree that we thought an extra Gallup poll justified at the present time. It included 500 statistically selected persons of ages 18 to 70."

Accordingly, the stock of the Soviet Union has dropped among Swedes, while sentiment for American foreign policy has become warmer--a trend that has been under way since 1973.

For example, 24 percent think the United States tries to preserve peace in the world. Only 3 percent believe in the Soviet Union's peacekeeping efforts, as against 21 percent for those of China.

Women are more likely than men to see Soviet policy as a threat to peace--41 and 32 percent, respectively.

To be sure, the superpowers are not seen as direct threats to Sweden. On the other hand, 71 percent say they are disturbed by world tension, as against 51 percent in the fall of 1979. Fifty-three percent (39 percent last fall) think the risk of a great conflict, into which Europe can be drawn, is great. Knut Tornquist: "What is now surprising is that the anxiety over the world situation, which has increased markedly, has not at the same time affected the attitude toward armed resistance and will to defend the country."

Only one in four of those asked thinks Sweden will be able to stay neutral in a third world war. And only one in two has confidence in the ability of the defense forces to maintain peace. Military defense, however, is regarded as a considerably greater deterrent (56 percent) to an attack than a guerilla defense (17 percent), or civilian resistance (9 percent). Eighty-four percent are in favor of all young Swedes being subject to the draft, while 72 percent are of the opinion that there should be resistance to an armed attack--even with the outcome uncertain for Sweden.

11,256

CSO: 3109

COLLAPSE OF SAAB-FAIRCHILD ENGINE DEAL SEEN AS BLOW TO VOLVO

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Jun 80 p 23

[Article by Sophie Petzell: "No Engines for Saab Aircraft"]

[Text] Volvo Aircraft Motor will not participate in furnishing engines for Saab/Fairchild's new civilian aircraft. The Swedish-American consortium has now announced a new variant of the plane to carry fewer passengers. But Volvo Aircraft Motor has not had much of a chance.

General Electric received the big order from Saab/Fairchild, and the same firm will probably produce the engine for the new variant.

Swedish Saab-Scania and the American Fairchild in February made public their plans for building a 30-passenger civilian aircraft. The aircraft, still unnamed, is now being designed. The first options are expected in the fall, and the first planes will be delivered in 1984.

A year later a 14-18 passenger variant will come into the market. At first, this plane will be sold to large enterprises needed to fly personnel and customers long distances.

The business plane will possibly have a shorter body than that of the 30-passenger plane.

The business plane will in any case need larger engines than those required in the 30-passenger plane. It is to be able to fly across the United States, a considerably longer stretch than the passenger plane, which is primarily intended for shorter stretches between airports.

For the passenger plane the world market during the coming ten-year period is expected to amount to 2,000 units. Saab/Fairchild hopes to be able to sell at least one-third of them. For the same period the market for the business plane will be about 700, and the consortium hopes to be able to sell one-half. Fairchild already has a large share of this market with its Metro plane

The consortium's two aircraft are expected to cost 2.5 and 3 million dollars each.

Tough Competition

They will be equipped with two turboprop engines of 1,500 horsepower each. The three American engine makers, General Electric, Pratt & Whitney, and Garrett, have fought hard for the orders for engines for the Saab/Fairchild plane. The terms in the end become very favorable for the buyer.

General Electric won, because that firm's engines are more fuel-efficient, lighter, and less expensive than those of its competitors. Unlike the two losing engines, the GE engine is also found in a version for helicopters, requiring only adjustment.

"However, we can also change the interior arrangement of the large plane with the body shape retained. This will be cheaper," says Tore Gullstrand, chief of Saab/Scania's aircraft division.

A Severe Setback

To Volvo Aircraft Motor the outcome was a very serious setback. Early this year Volvo Aircraft Motor announced cooperation with Garrett concerning the engines. The two companies were to further develop Garrett engines for small business jets and a 30 passenger civilian plane. The financial arrangement amount to 500 million kroner.

When the agreement was announced Gunnar Johansson, vice-president of Volvo Aircraft Motor, said that a condition for the profitability of the agreement was that Saab/Fairchild chose the Garrett engine.

Volvo had good reason to assume that Saab/Fairchild would choose the Garrett engine, because Garrett up to that time had furnished all engines for Fairchild's civilian aircraft. According to reports, however, the Swedish engine manufacturer did not contact Saab to test that possibility.

Gunnar L. Johansson refuses to comment. Nor will he respond to the question of why his firm entered an agreement with Garrett before the engine had been selected.

Volvo Aircraft Motor has for a long time enjoyed good cooperation with both General Electric and Pratt & Whitney. The Viggen engine, made by Volvo, is based on further development of Pratt & Whitney's civilian engine, found among other places in the DC 19. Together with General Electric, Volvo is working on development of an engine for, among others, Boeing's new 757. Thus, cooperation with one of the two companies in the engine for Saab/Fairchild should not have been impossible.

The Riksdag has granted Saab a loan of 350 million kronor for development of the civilian plane, and Volvo Aircraft Motor 150 million kronor for the Garrett engine. Industry minister Nils G. Asling says to SVENSKA DAGBLADET that the loans are strictly business affairs and that the companies are free to make business decisions in their dispositions.

11,256

CSO: 3109

FALLDIN AT CENTER PARTY MEET REVEALS WORKERS FUND PLAN

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Jun 80 p 4

[Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander: "Wage Earners Must Share in Production Capital"]

[Text] The great task is that of increasing the working capital of the enterprises. But it is difficult to create understanding of profit increases if all profit ends up in the pockets of the present owners. The wage earners must receive part of them, and thereby gain influence in the enterprises. So said Premier Thorbjorn Falldin when on Friday he spoke in Solleftea before the Center Party youth and women's organizations.

Much of the question period following the speech dealt with the relations of the Center Party with the Moderates. Falldin thought the situation was not as dark as the youth organization wished to make it. In his opinion the government's program was being adhered to. The moment the Moderates do not wish to live up to the government's interpretation of it, we break the coalition.

Falldin was more concerned about relations with the Social Democrats. Several times, both during the question period and at the press conference, he returned to speak of the severe attacks directed by Olof Palme and Kjell-Olof Feldt against Ingemar Mundebo and Thorbjorn Falldin during the Riksdag financial debate on Wednesday.

"Politics have undergone an extraordinarily dull development. To judge by the cascades of words and the signals the Social Democrats directed against us on Wednesday it would be a waste of time to deal with them on economic problems."

"Error on Indexed Taxation"

He attacked them also for giving misinformation on the question of index regulation of tax rates:

"They say that index regulation favors those best situated. But the truth is, and the Social Democrats know this very well, that those who earn less than 60,000 kronor annually will have tax increases of 4,700 million kronor if index regulation is rejected, and those who earn less than 80,000 kronor will have increases of 6,300 million kronor."

According to present calculations rejection of the index regulation would increase income taxes by 7,200 million kronor.

The youth organization wishes the Center Party leadership to take the initiative to break the political block limit prior to the 1982 election.

"But that will not do," said Falldin, "It would require willingness on the part of the opposition. Listen to them! Watch their actions!"

Criticism

Falldin admitted that on occasion he meets with criticism of the cooperation with the Moderates in his contacts with party people.

"But the Center Party people live in the secure assurance that it will not do to carry on a conservative policy in our government."

"The fact that their party secretaries time and again present their own proposals is certainly also proof that their ideas are not listened to in the government."

The weakest groups are to escape the effects of the economizing package. Who, then are included in these groups?

"The retired without ATP [expansion unknown]; families with many children; handicapped youth," were the three examples given by Falldin. But not those on partial pensions.

"Those who today choose partial retirement are on a high compensation level," said Falldin.

Poor Regional Policy

He was also criticized for the Center Party's regional policy not being adequately acted upon in the government.

"It is not easy, with the economy stagnating and public activity, found mostly in Stockholm, growing," said the Premier. He promised, however, that the question of enterprise establishment control would not be taken up again.

"We shall begin to investigate which criteria can be used to arrive at control of enterprise establishment. But coordination of economic and regional policy matters is needed. People of initiative must know that it goes to use it."

In itself there was nothing wrong with extra compensation for moving expenses for construction workers from upper Norrland and Varmland, but it had been presented very badly, Falldin admitted.

"We have commandeered too much of the capacity in Stockholm for state projects--the Riksdag building, buildings for the ministries, the new mail terminal. It would be better to bring in construction workers for short terms, not to move them to Stockholm."

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PAPER DISAPPOINTED WITH FALLDIN AT CENTER PARTY MEETING

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Jun. 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Falldin in Solleftea"]

[Text] Anyone who waited for signals for a new Center Party policy in Premier Thorbjorn Falldin's speech at the Center Party national meeting in Solleftea waited in vain. Falldin made a typical "Center Party speech." He offered a smorgasbord of various (U) specialties, but hardly drew up guidelines for a more dramatic revision of Center Party policy.

There was a dose of education, a dose of agriculture, a dose of alcohol problems, a dose of defense and security policy, and of course a dose of nuclear energy.

But in the overall picture, nuclear energy played a subordinate role. Falldin dismissed the subject quickly, really only asserting that the referendum in a certain sense was a victory for the Center Party. For all parties now have winding up of nuclear power as their goal.

To a party leader who for decades has used all his strength and prestige to stop the march into a nuclear society this success should seem modest, but Falldin obviously thinks his conscience clear. He has done what he could, and the people has relieved him of further obligations.

What will the Center Party do, then, when the uproar over nuclear energy is only a memory?

To judge by Falldin's speech at the meeting, it will not be a matter of any new revolutionary strokes. Rather a return to the policy the Center Party carried on prior to the nuclear energy epoch, a policy the party in reality carried on during that epoch, though noted by a few because nuclear overshadowed everything else.

The Center Party will in the future talk a lot about decentralization. The line of demarcation in Swedish politics goes between centralization and decentralization, Falldin asserted in Solleftea. This is seen in area after area.

Falldin is now, among other things, back to thoughts the Center Party developed at the time the party launched its great national plan, a plan according to which the people was to be scattered across the country in accordance with a centrally developed system. At the time, the Center Party was prepared to employ strict means of control of regional policy, unique centralist methods, at least for a plan originating in a decentralist party.

In Sallsteden Falldin advocated new means of control, [Enterprise] establishment control, for example, in certain regions where the old regional policy is not adequate.

Falldin's initiative is not surprising. In the Center Party, where there is no great interest in marking boundaries between the planned economy and the market economy, such ideas are being toyed with. That strict centralist methods would be hard to reconcile with a consistently applied decentralism is of little concern to the Center Party.

In the more definitive parts of his speech Falldin firmly opposed the economic policies of the Social Democrats. Their so-called hundred-day program would if it had been carried out cost 8 or 9 billion kronor. During the past winter the Social Democrats voted in the Riksdag for a policy that would have increased the budget deficit by 2 billion.

Nevertheless they accuse the government of mismanagement, Falldin asserted. They do not hesitate to add fuel to the fire of labor unrest, nor to use the trade unions for political crossing of swords.

"It is strange that a party that claims to be opposed to block politics in reality does all it can to fan the flames of disagreement among parties and groups of people," Falldin asserted.

There is a significant distinction, and it should be pointed out repeatedly by Falldin and other representatives of the government, as long as the Social Democrats continued their demonstration [sic] policy. It must be clear to the citizen that the Social Democrats in their ardent and understandable desire to get back into power are about to lose all responsibility for the social economy. Soon there will be nothing left but pure opportunism.

As concerns the government's coming plan for saving money Falldin was determined.

"During the 1970's we granted ourselves large fund advances. We lived beyond our means. This must now be paid for. We must adjust our appetite to our income. Private and public consumption must be limited. Otherwise we shall be unable to make the necessary investments in the economy. And without them we shall undermine both employment and welfare. That is when real wages will be endangered and pensions threatened. Then our welfare system will creak in every joint."

simple, concrete, and not without a string. Falldin was also right in underlining that the government's savings plan is to meet the demands made by a socially conscious distribution policy. The Social Democrats are not to have the chance to show that the three-party government has worsened the social cleavages in Sweden.

When Falldin acts as the spokesman for the government's economic policy he does so with considerable force. It would certainly be well for the government if Falldin appeared in that role more often. And this will perhaps happen when the savings plan takes on its final form.

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CENTER PARTY YOUTH GROUP: END COALITION WITH MODERATES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Jun 80 p 4

[Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander: "M a Brake"]

[Text] Solleftea (SvD). The Center Party must not cooperate in a government with such extremist parties as the Moderates. The Center Party must take the initiative to cooperation over the political block border for the 1982 election.

These two demands were presented by the Center Party Youth Organization (CUF) when the CUF meeting in Solleftea continued on Friday.

A long list of speakers severely attacked the cooperation with the Moderates. "Traveling companions with tickets directly to the abyss," were spoken of, and of the Moderates as a brake on policies in the interest of the majority of the people. CUF chairman Anders Ljunggren did not have much to object to in the demands, though they went considerably farther than the leadership had planned. But he responded to a superstition concerning the possibility of cooperation with the Social Democrats:

"The block policy has become sharper in the Riksdag. The Social Democrats withdrawn more and more from Center Party policy, but we shall nevertheless make efforts to arrive at cooperation.

"Every time I have spoken of a three-party cooperation among the Center Party, the Liberal Party, and the Social Democrats, people close to the party leaderships have come to me and told me I am right."

Moderates to Blame

Ljunggren thought the Moderates had only themselves to blame if the three-party government were to split:

"They shoot away the foundation of the government by time and again taking the lead themselves. They let Party Secretary Lars Tobisson, who is not a member of the government, take the lead, with the approval of the party

leadership, of course." The members of the Board of the Center Party were accused of paying no attention to the youth organization. Only one of the "old" party board members, Torsten Bengtsson, was present to listen to the numerous attacks upon the cooperation with the Moderates. He also thought it was time to settle accounts with the Moderates:

"Our attitude toward them is not hard enough, and we could have opposed more of their proposals in the Riksdag.

"However, we cannot get away from the block policy just now. Cooperation over the block limits is not to go on so that the government makes a fuss over the Social Democrats, and as has now happened, it appoints four or five Social Democrats as provincial governors."

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1980 DEFENSE BUDGET STRESSES ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 25 Jun 80 p 21

[Article by zy: "The 1980 Defense Program: Antiaircraft Stressed--The Rapier Guided Missile System and the Skyguard Fire Control System"]

[Text] Bern, 23 June--The principal feature of the 1980 defense budget, which the Federal Council is sending to the federal councillors together with a budget message concerning military construction and land acquisition, is the strengthening of antiaircraft defenses. Out of a total fund commitment of 1,5555 million Swiss francs, which will be stretched out over several years until final delivery of the equipment to the armed forces, 1,192 million francs are earmarked for 60 launch facilities of the British Rapier antiaircraft guided missile system and 198 million francs for a third increment of 30 Skyguard fire control devices which have been developed and are being manufactured in Switzerland. Added to this are 94 million francs for illumination shells for the infantry's 81 mm trench mortars, 39 million francs for communications equipment and 32 million francs for ambulances of the Austrian Pinzgauer type.

The construction budget message, at 186.5 million francs, is relatively smaller. Main items are 42 million francs for terrain reinforcements and buildings for arms manufacturing plants and for weapons and firing ranges.

Air Defense for Mechanized Units

Upgrading of antiaircraft defenses is an indispensable prerequisite for full operational and tactical mobility of mechanized divisions and therefore for the realization of our defense concept because of the increasing threat from the air, particularly to those units, by air-to-ground guided missiles having great long-range accuracy and from combat and antitank helicopters. The 20 mm cannon, the armament of the attack tanks of the mechanized infantry, provides only limited protection to the armored units, and the Tiger fighter aircraft are inadequate in providing extended-time protection against aerial attack. The air force can go into action only during restricted time periods and in few locations. That is why the mechanized divisions require their own extended air defense. This is an item of the highest priority.

To provide the mechanized divisions with ideal conditions and with their full mobility potential through dependable air defense, the optimum solution would be a combination of cannon and guided missile systems for their antiaircraft defense. But inasmuch as the pending domestic development of an antiaircraft cannon-equipped tank is not ready for procurement action, the acquisition of the Rapier guided missile system is currently a high-priority item. This is even more true because the small and medium caliber antiaircraft guns of the army units (20 mm and 35 mm cannon, respectively), both of which are permanently emplaced, are insufficient substitutes, especially in view of their limited effective ranges (1,500 and 3,500 meters, respectively).

'Fire Mobility'

The availability of air security through an antiaircraft guided missile system at mechanized division level will provide the opportunity of effectively engaging enemy aircraft on their way to the target and during the initial attack phase. According to statements made by the Chief of the General Staff, Corps Commandant Hans Senn, during a press conference arranged by Federation President Chevallaz at the Bundeshaus, the Rapier all-weather system provides the solution of the "fire mobility" concept, as opposed to the "weapons carrier" system, as it applies to the cannon or guided missile antiaircraft tank. Its operational use consists of far-reaching multidirectional fire from appropriately selected launch sites which can be optimally determined for the system. Its disadvantage is that from time to time individual launch units must be repositioned and newly emplaced.

Rapier's tactical unit is the battery with eight fire control units. Due to its great effective range and its capability for rapid repositioning by moving some of its fire control units, a Rapier battery can ensure air protection of an augmented tank regiment within the assembly area and during the approach movement until the enemy is engaged. Corps Commandant Senn dismisses the criticism according to which the Rapier, being a towed system, is unable to keep pace with the unit to be protected, as opposed to a weapon system mounted on tracks. He emphasizes the advantages for camouflage deriving from the possibility of dispersing the launch units within the deployment area and the use of cross-country paths, made possible by smaller weight and dimensions, for mobility away from the tank force's main axis of movement.

Proven, Simple, All-Weather Capability

Corps Commandant Kurt Bolliger, commander of the air and air defense forces, emphasized to the press that the Rapier system had proven its reliability and its capabilities during a 2-year period of operational use and that it therefore fulfills a major Swiss criterion for acquisition. Inasmuch as it also fulfills the requirement for simplicity, it has the potential for maintaining combat capability beyond the year 2000. Finally,

its all-weather capability is essential in our type of climate. Many other systems which were tested and did not prove to have this capability were therefore eliminated from the evaluation process extending over several years.

Concerning the misgivings about the Rapier system's lack of protection against bomb fragments, Corps Commandant Bolliger stated that an armored vehicle can hardly be hidden in the field, and its tracks not at all. The small Rapier units, which do not have "rapidly twirling antennas," are barely visible from only a few hundred yards when properly camouflaged.

The Rapier system's fire control unit consists of a search and quadruple guided missile launch radar, a friend-enemy recognition device, a command, control and digital computer, all contained in a two-wheel trailer. In addition there is a target-tracking radar, optical aiming device, target display and support equipment and two power supply units. Every fire control unit has three Pinzgauer vehicles and a radio communications unit. The entire Rapier procurement includes 194 1.5-ton Pinzgauer vehicles and 45 1-ton radio vehicles and additional communications equipment for the platoon, battery and unit levels. Each of the three mechanized divisions are to be equipped with one Rapier guided missile unit containing two guided missile batteries each.

Explorations of the possibilities for Swiss industry participation in Rapier production have shown that the best chance for this lies in manufacturing the missiles. Further explorations are in progress concerning the manufacture of spare parts on a subcontracting basis. Present estimates place the domestic share of the overall cost at 23 percent.

The Third Skyguard Increment

An additional increment of Skyguard fire control devices is slated for delivery to the remaining intermediate antiaircraft defense units of Anti-aircraft Brigade 33 to replace those fire control devices which, unlike the still modern 35 mm antiaircraft guns, are no longer adequate to satisfy increased requirements. The new equipment proposed for procurement is the same as that previously procured, which has proven satisfactory. Significantly increased combat effectiveness is due to its integrated search radar, quick-reaction operating capability and effective electronic protective measures. Skyguard provides the means for early spotting of low-flying aircraft, tracking them, and attacking them with the attached 35 mm antiaircraft gun in an effective manner. A provisional contract has been signed with the manufacturer, Contraves of Zurich. A total of 75 percent of the estimated 198 million francs total cost will provide employment within our country.

Illumination Shells, Communications Equipment, Ambulances

The procurement of illumination shells for the 81 mm trench mortar in the amount of 94 million francs is designed to enhance the essential night

combat capability. It will complement orders placed in previous defense budgets. The objective is to illuminate the intermediate distances of the battlefield. This second increment of the materiel developed in Sweden can be produced in Switzerland under a licensing arrangement.

The new communications equipment, budgeted to cost 39 million francs, is designed to counter the increasingly effective means of impairing electronic communications. It is a continuation of protective countermeasures, consisting primarily of ensuring communications security. The telecrypto devices and channel encoders proposed for procurement have been developed in Switzerland.

The order for the Pinzgauer ambulances (32 million francs for 310 fully equipped vehicles including accessories and spare parts) constitutes a follow-on to previous procurements. Assembly of this Austrian product will be performed by the Saurer works in Switzerland and the plastic chassis including interior finish, as well as the tires, will be manufactured in Switzerland.

Further Financial Effects

As a rule, new equipment entails additional expenditures. In this case, 16 million francs will be needed for buildings incident to troop training with the Rapier; 2 million francs for special storage facilities for the illumination shells; and 4 million francs for parking facilities for the ambulances. The Rapier system will require an additional 3.2 million francs in follow-on expenditures. Finally, the Rapier training program will require an additional 10 manpower slots for training staff; 2 manpower slots will be required for the maintenance of the additional Pinzgauer vehicles.

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